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Abstract 
This thesis is an econometric investigation of what determines an individual's 
probability of union membership. 
Following Olson (1965) it is argued that unions are fundamentally 
collective organisations that seek to advance collective goals. Therefore, it is 
stressed that union membership needs to be understood as a collective action 
problem in which individuals have an incentive to free ride the collective benefits 
of unionism. 
The empirical analysis commences with the estimation of a simple reduced 
form model of union membership. Similar models of Australian union 
membership have been estimated by Crockett and Hall (1987), Miller and 
Rummery (1989), Deery and DeCieri (1991), and Christie (1992). Chapter 3 
surveys the findings of the previous studies and presents new evidence from the 
Class Structure of Australia and Issues in Multicultural Australia surveys. In 
particular, the first Australian estimates of the impact of workplace size on the 
individual's probability of union membership are reported. 
However, in the following chapters we show that the standard model 
masks important relationships that are revealed by more disaggregated models. 
Indeed, a major contribution of this thesis is the development of more detailed, 
"multiple-hurdle" models of union membership. 
In Chapter 4 we modify the simple model by specifying a two-stage model 
of unionised employment and union membership. Here union membership is 
modelled as a decision which is conditional on the individual being employed in a 
unionised workplace. One of the principal findings of this chapter is that once 
the availability of union membership is controlled, there is no significant 
difference in the propensities of private and public sector workers to join unions. 
Another issue explored in Chapter 4 is the appropriate interpretation of the 
relationship between wages and union membership. Some researchers argue that 
there is a wage premium associated with union membership, and that this wage 
premium should be treated as a determinant of the individual's probability of 
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membership. However, we argue that, under normal circumstances, an individual 
cannot expect a wage gain simply by joining the relevant union. Indeed, our 
estimates indicate that there is no wage advantage associated with union 
membership in unionised establishments. However, we do fmd a significant wage 
premium associated with employment in a unionised establishment. 
There is some controversy in the literature about the impact compulsory 
union membership arrangements have on the overall level of union membership in 
Australia. In Chapter 5 we specify a two-stage model of compulsory and 
voluntary union membership. Using the estimates from a model of voluntary 
union membership, we fmd that closed shop arrangements have a substantial 
impact on the overall level of union membership. In particular, we estimate as 
many as 65 percent of compulsory union members would not join a union if 
membership was not a condition of their employment. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 we investigate the reasons why a smaller proportion 
of women join unions than men. We fmd that the male-female membership 
differential is largely the product of two factors: (i) that women are less likely 
than men to be employed in unionised establishments; and (ii) that women have a 
substantially lower rate of closed shop employment than men. We fmd little 
evidence to support the proposition that women have a weaker desire for union 
membership than men. 
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Introduction 
For over a century trade unions have had a profound impact on Australia's 
political and economic development. Trade Unions formed the oldest of 
Australia's political parties, the Australian Labor Party. Through the Labor 
Party, they have provided the nation with some of its most influential leaders. 
Unions have also helped shape the unique institutions of Australia's regulated 
labour market. Today, more than 2.5 million Australian workers belong to a 
trade union (ABS, 1993), and the Labor Party has been in power federally for 
more than a decade. Yet it is widely believed that union influence has peaked 
and that unions face a future of inevitable decline. 
Certainly national data point to a decline in union membership in the 
late 1980s (see Figure 1.1). Moreover, both Coalition and Labor governments 
have set about reforming the structure of industrial relations by placing a 
greater emphasis on enterprise bargaining. Unions are now faced with the 
dual challenges of adapting to an increasingly complex, and possibly more 
hostile industrial environment, and of remaining relevant to needs of modem 
workers. In this climate, a study of trade union membership has not only 
academic appeal, but is also very topical. 
While there are a host of important issues that might be tackled, not 
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least of which are the reasons for the decline in union membersh ip ' , this thesis 
has a very specific focus. The central aim is to use econometr ic methods to 
investigate what factors determine whether an individual becomes a union 
member . For instance, is a worker ' s probability of membership related to his 
or her sex? Is it related to occupation? Is it related to political aff i l iat ion? 
FIGURE 1.1 
Australian Union Density (1976-1992) 
Union Density (%) 
52 
38 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Year 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Trade Union Members Australia, various issues. 
'The models developed in the thesis could be applied to Investigate the sources of the 
decline In trade union membership using Individual data (see, for example, Farber 
(1990)). However, to the best of our knowledge, suitable Australian data sources for 
such an exercise are not readily available (the unit record data collected by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics Is a possible exception but Is only available at considerable expense). 
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In order to answer these questions a source of individual data including 
union status is required. Although such data sets are comparatively rare in 
Australia, in this thesis data from two Australian surveys are used. Neither of 
these data sources have previously been used to model the determinants of 
union membership. Furthermore, both surveys contain information not 
available from other Australian data sources. 
The first survey is the Class Structure of Australia (CSA) survey which 
was conducted in 1986. The CSA survey includes data on whether an 
individual is employed in a unionised or non-unionised location. This is a 
crucial piece of information because workers in unionised locations clearly are 
expected to be far more likely to become union members than those in non-
unionised establishments. 
The second data source is the Office of Multicultural Affairs' 1988 
survey Issues in Multicultural Australia (IMA). The IMA survey is a unique 
source of information on compulsory union membership. 
The Theory of Union Membership 
Why do workers join unions? Chapter 2 surveys the theories proposed by 
economists and other social scientists. 
Much of the literature on the determinants of union membership relates 
to the United States. In the United States, institutional arrangements allow 
union membership to be modelled in a relatively straight-forward fashion. It is 
typically assumed that the labour market consists of two sectors - a unionised 
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sector and a non-unionised sector - and that the structures of compensation in 
the two sectors differ. Utility maximising workers choose their preferred 
sector of employment based on the utilities expected in each sector (Farber, 
1986). Since a majority of workers are employed in non Right-To-Work states 
(where membership is compulsory for workers in unionised establishments), 
the decision to seek employment in the union sector is tantamount to choosing 
to join a union. The major innovation in recent years has been the recognition 
that it is costly for American unions to organise new jobs and that, as a result, 
there is likely to be an excess demand for unionised employment, and therefore 
a queue for union membership. Consequently, it is assumed that a worker 
only becomes a union member if: (i) he or she desires a union job; and (ii) if 
he or she is chosen from the queue by a unionised employer. 
Explaining why workers join unions when union membership is not 
compulsory is more problematic. Since unions are engaged in supplying 
services which are collectively enjoyed by members and non-members, there is 
an incentive for workers to free-ride and not join their union. Because 
approximately 50 percent of Australian unionists are voluntary members, a 
large part of Chapter 3 is devoted to outlining theories of open shop unionism. 
Much of the literature surveyed is the product of recent research by British 
economists who have sought to explain trade union membership in the wake of 
the Thatcher government's abolition of the closed shop. 
Following Olson (1965) it is recognised that, within a rational choice 
framework, unions must supply private incentive goods in order to attract 
members. Thus, unions provide excludable private services such as insurance 
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benefits, cheap holidays, retail discounts and the like. While such fringe 
benefits no doubt help attract and retain some members, they fail to provide a 
complete explanation for the existence of trade unions. After all, private firms 
could offer the same benefits without incurring the cost overheads associated 
with the other services provided by trade unions. 
The social custom model offers a more complete explanation of open 
shop trade unionism. This model relies on the observation that human 
societies establish certain norms of behaviour (or social customs). Individuals 
who disobey a social custom suffer a loss of reputation in their community. 
Potentially, we might think of union membership as a workplace social 
custom. 
If union membership is established as a social custom in the workplace, 
then individuals who value their reputations with their workmates have an 
incentive to join the union. In effect, the excludable private good provided by 
the union is a good reputation with one's fellow workers. However, the most 
unsatisfactory aspect of the social custom model is that the process leading to 
the formation of the workplace social custom is only vaguely developed. 
An important goal of the trade union is to protect its members against 
unfair dismissal or other arbitrary managerial decisions. The insurance model 
of voluntary union membership is based on the idea that the job protection 
services of trade unions are private goods. In this way, the desire for job 
protection can provide sufficient incentive for an individual to join a union. 
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Empirical Survey 
It is somewhat surprising, in a country as heavily unionised as Australia, that 
the first econometric study of individual union status was not published until 
1987 (Crockett and Hall, 1987). However, thanks largely to the efforts of 
researchers connected with the Western Australian Labor Market Research 
Centre there is now a small but growing literature investigating the 
determinants of union membership in Australia.^ This literature is surveyed in 
Chapter 3. 
All of the previous Australian studies estimate dichotomous choice 
models using probit, logit or linear probability (OLS) techniques.^ The 
models are usually interpreted within a rational choice framework; that is, it is 
assumed that a worker joins a union if he or she expects that membership will 
yield greater utility than non-membership. This approach is sufficiently 
common for us to label it as the "standard approach" to modelling individual 
union status (see Figure 1.2). 
Since the IMA and CSA data have not previously been used to model 
union membership, Chapter 3 offers an ideal opportunity to survey the results 
from the earlier studies in the light of new estimates available from these data 
sources. Moreover, the chapter is a convenient vehicle for presenting the 
^Four of the five major Australian studies of individual union status have been by 
researchers associated with Western Australian institutions. 
3i ^More complicated "structural" models of union membership and wage determination 
are developed in two of the studies (Miller and Rummery 1989; Christie 1992). 
Nevertheless, these papers also report estimates for a reduced form model of union 
membership. 
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estimates from the standard model of union membership. These estimates can 
then be used as a basis for comparing the estimates from the alternative 
specifications developed in the later chapters. 
FIGURE 1.2 
The Standard Model of Union Membership 
Join a Union 
Yes / 
Expected Utility Gain from / 
Membership? \ 
No \ 
\ Do not Join a 
Union 
Even though the Australian determinants of union membership literature 
is relatively small, there are now sufficient studies, using a variety of data 
sources, for common patterns to be identified. For example, several job-
related characteristics such as occupation, tenure in current job and sector of 
employment are routinely found to have a statistically significant impact on an 
individual's estimated probability of union membership. Conversely, many 
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personal characteristics such as sex, marital status, country of birth and 
migrant status are found either to be consistently insignificant, or to produce a 
mixture of significant and insignificant results depending on the data source 
used. However, personal attitudes towards trade unionism and political 
affiliation are found to have a significant impact on the worker's predicted 
probability of union membership. 
Unionised Employment and Union Membership 
Several researchers are critical of the standard approach to modelling union 
membership (for example: Green, 1990; Spilsbury et. al. 1987; Visser, 1992). 
These researchers point out that workers usually only join unions if they are 
employed in unionised establishments; that is, in establishments where there is 
an active union presence. While Australian employees in non-unionised 
establishments are still able to join unions, we would expect that, at the very 
least, there is a very substantial structural break in the union membership 
model for workers employed in unionised and non-unionised locations. It 
makes sense, then, to model union membership as a decision made conditional 
on a worker having first secured employment in a unionised location. 
In Chapter 4 union membership is modelled as a decision taken by 
unionised employees. A two stage model is developed in order to account for 
potential sample selection bias arising from the non-random assignment of 
workers to unionised employment. In essence, the model views union 
membership as being determined by a sequential process (see Figure 1.3). 
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First, workers are assumed to choose between unionised and non-unionised 
employment. Then those individuals who secure unionised employment are 
confronted with the decision to either join the union or not join the union. 
Modelling union membership in this way produces some interesting 
results. For example, one of the most robust findings from the standard model 
of union membership is that public sector employees have a significantly 
higher estimated probability of membership than similar workers in the private 
sector. However, when we model union membership as a decision taken 
conditional on unionised employment, we find no significant difference in the 
unionisation probabilities of private and public sector workers. 
FIGURE 1.3 
Two Stage Model of Unionised Employment and 
Union Membership 
Employed in a 
a Unionised 
Establisliment? 
Expected Utility 
Gain from 
Membership? 
Non-Member 
Join a 
Union 
Do not 
Join a 
Union 
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Unionised Employment, Union Membership and the Union Wage Premium 
Several Australian studies reveal a statistically significant wage premium 
associated with union membership (Miller and Mulvey, 1993). Consequently, 
it is argued by some researchers that an individual can expect a wage gain by 
becoming a union member (Miller and Rummery, 1989; Christie, 1992). The 
individual's expected wage gain from union membership is therefore treated as 
an important determinant of his or her probability of membership. 
However, we assert that the act of joining a union does not, in normal 
circumstances, yield higher wages for the individual. Therefore, we argue that 
the conventional union membership premium should not be treated as a 
determinant of union membership. The crux of our argument is that both 
unions and firms have incentives to see that individuals with similar attributes, 
performing similar tasks, are paid equal rates. In particular, we expect that 
union members and non members in unionised establishments will be 
remunerated on an equal basis. Our theoretical reasoning is reinforced by an 
examination of the possible sources of an observed union membership premium 
in the Australian institutional context.'' 
"^For example, the wages of most Australian workers are regulated by legally binding 
awards. One explanation for the observed union membership wage premium is that there 
are differences in the distribution of union members and non-members across industrial 
awards, such that the average award rate of union members is higher than that of non-
members. However, because award rates must be paid to all workers, then it does not 
follow that an individual, simply by joining a union, would expect to improve his or her 
wage. After all, the individual is already covered by a particular award and joining a 
union does not change that fact. 
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However, whether our argument is correct is ultimately an empirical 
question. To this end, in Chapter 4 we present empirical evidence which 
suggests that: (i) employees in unionised establishments receive a wage 
premium compared to those in non-unionised establishments, and (ii) there is 
no individual wage advantage associated with union membership in unionised 
establishments. 
Compulsory and Voluntary Union Membership 
Any complete study of the determinants of union membership must, at some 
stage, confront the issue of compulsory trade union membership. 
Approximately 50 percent of all union members in Australia are employed in 
closed shops where union membership is a compulsory condition of continued 
employment. In effect, for these union members employment in a closed shop 
and union membership are a "tied sale". 
Chapter 5 commences with a survey of the different forms of 
compulsory unionism. We then proceed to model the membership decision of 
workers in open shops. In order to account for potential sample selection bias, 
a two stage model of union membership is developed (see Figure 1.4). In the 
first stage workers are assumed to sort into closed and open shop employment. 
Then, in the second stage, we model the union membership decision of 
workers in open shops. 
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FIGURE 1.4 
Two Stage Model of Closed Shop Employment 
and Union Membership 
Employed in a 
Closed Shop? 
Expected Utility 
Gain from 
Membership? 
Join a 
Union 
Join a 
Union 
Do not 
Join a 
Union 
The small amount of research that has been conducted into the impact 
of compulsory membership in Australia has produced mixed results. On the 
one hand, Crockett and Hall (1987) suggest that most compulsory members 
would still join a union even if membership were voluntary. This finding is 
also implicitly supported by Miller and Rummery (1989: p.209). On the other 
hand, according to Rawson (1978), approximately two-thirds of closed shop 
employees are unwilling union members. 
Estimating how many compulsory members would still join a union if 
there were no closed shops is a hazardous exercise. However, one 
counterfactual is that closed shop employees would join unions in the same 
12 
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way as open shop employees now do. That is, we might use the estimates 
from a model of open shop union membership to predict how many 
compulsory members would still join unions in the absence of closed shops. 
In line with the statistics presented by Rawson, we estimate that as few as 36 
percent of closed shop employees would voluntarily join a union if membership 
were not a condition of their employment. 
The Male-Female Membership Differential 
One of the most prominent features of Australian unionism is the substantial 
difference between the male and female rates of union membership. While the 
gap has narrowed over the last 30 years, males have an average rate of union 
membership almost 25 percent higher than female workers (Curtin, 1993). 
The aim of Chapter 6 is to determine the source(s) of this membership gap. 
Broadly speaking, the explanations for the male-female membership 
differential can be grouped in two categories. In the first category are the 
explanations which rely on men and women having different desires for union 
representation. For example, it is sometimes suggested that women are less 
likely to become union members because unions do not place sufficient 
emphasis on addressing the special needs of female workers. Similarly, it has 
been suggested that unions are adversarial, male dominated institutions which 
women are reluctant to embrace. 
The second set of explanations argue that sex per se is not important 
and that the differential is simply the product of the differing employment 
13 
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patterns of men and women. For example, it is often said that women are less 
likely to become union members because of their weaker attachment to the 
labour force than men. That is, because women, on average, have less labour 
market experience and expect to be in their jobs for shorter periods than men, 
it is thought that women have a lower stake in investing in trade union 
membership. 
While data inadequacies prevent a definitive conclusion, we find scant 
evidence to support the proposition that there is a significant difference in the 
desire for union membership by men and women. In other words, the lower 
membership rate of women is largely the product of female employment being 
concentrated in those jobs where all workers - both men and women - are less 
likely to be union members. 
The Theory of Union Membership 
2.1 Introduction 
Why do Australian workers join unions? This chapter suggests some answers 
by surveying the explanations proposed by economists and, to a lesser extent, 
by sociologists and political scientists. Inevitably, much of the literature 
surveyed contemplates union membership in institutional settings which are 
quite different to Australia's. For the most part these institutional differences 
are unimportant, but sometimes they are critical. Therefore, although we 
provide a broad survey of the literature, we also aim to show how the 
literature might be applied to explain union membership in Australia. 
A complete understanding of union membership requires a knowledge 
of the "technology" of trade unionism. Accordingly, this chapter consists of 
two parts. In the first part we review the economic approach to analysing 
trade unionism. The second part examines the individual's decision to join a 
union. 
2.2 The Economic Analysis of Trade Unions 
In their History of Trade Unionism Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1902: p. l) 
defined a trade union as "a continuous association of wage earners for the 
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purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives". 
Their definition was necessarily broad because when they commenced their 
study of trade unions they had expected to find "an economic thread for a 
treatise", but in the course of their research they found a "spider's web" 
instead (p.xxvi). Students of trade unionism have been grappling with the 
difficulties of untangling the spider's web ever since.' 
For economists the task has proven to be particularly challenging. 
Writing in 1975, George Johnson noted that "the problem of modelling trade 
union behaviour has proven to be virtually intractable" (1975: p.24). Since 
then, a good deal of research on the economics of trade unions has been 
undertaken and important progress has been made, but many issues remain 
unresolved.^ Chief among these are the related questions of what is the 
objective function of the trade union?; and how is that objective function 
determined? 
'A contemporary view of the web of trade union structures and activities in 
Australia is provided by Deery (1989: p.74): 
"Generalisations about the behaviour and activities of Australian 
unions can be a somewhat difficult and hazardous exercise in a 
country which boasts over 300 organisations representing more than 3 
million members. Australian unions have a variety of objectives, 
interests and activities. They differ in size, structure, and 
organisational strength and nature and coverage of membership. They 
often hold conflicting political ideologies, pursue varying industrial 
tactics and serve different interests and roles. To attribute a single set 
of goals and objectives to them is to assume a unity of purpose which 
is simply not present." 
^Surveys of this research include Creedy and McDonald (1992), Pencavel (1991), 
Ulph and Ulph (1990), Farber (1986), and Oswald (1985). 
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Trade Union Objectives 
The modelling of trade union objectives is beset with a host of principal-agent 
and social choice problems (Pencavel, 1991). For example, in his famous 
critique of attempts to model the trade union as maximising a well-defmed 
objective function, Arthur Ross (1946) pointed out that the preferences of the 
union's leaders and officials (the union's "management") should be considered 
separately from those of its members. Thus, trade union behaviour might 
fruitfully be modelled in a principal-agent framework in which the union's 
management is viewed as an agent delivering services to the membership 
(Rosa, 1984; Martin, 1984; Faith and Reid, 1987). 
Ross also observed that most trade unions have democratic structures, 
and that internal political processes constrain the actions of union leaders who 
wish to maintain the support of their members. In this context, a public choice 
approach to modelling trade union behaviour may provide useful insights 
(Burton, 1984; Booth, 1984). 
Economists commonly make two implicit assumptions when specifying 
the objective function of the union.^ First, potential social choice 
complications are avoided by assuming that union members are identical, or 
that members' utilities can be aggregated in a simple utilitarian framework. 
Second, the union's management is assumed to be a perfect agent such that the 
union's objective function solely reflects the preferences of the members 
^Oswald (1985) and Pencavel (1991) provide detailed surveys of the various trade 
union objective functions proposed in the literature. 
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(Farber, 1986). 
The assumption that union members are homogeneous has been relaxed 
by several authors including Farber (1978) and Booth (1984). Other 
researchers, following Berkowitz (1954), view the objective function of the 
union as solely reflecting the preferences of its management. In this context, 
possible maximands for the union include the size of the membership, the total 
revenue from union fees, or trade union profits (union revenues less costs) 
(Farber, 1986). 
Unions as Rent Seeking Coalitions 
While the question of what constitutes the relevant objective function of the 
trade union is disputed,'* there is greater consensus among economists that 
unions are best viewed as organisations which seek to create or capture rents in 
an industry (Farber, 1986). While the literature largely focuses on the use of 
monopoly power by unions to extract rents from firms, increased attention has 
been paid in recent years to the ways in which unions may create rents by 
improving workplaces and enhancing productivity. 
^In his recent book, Pencavel (1991: p.54) states that economists' knowledge of 
trade union objectives is meagre and warns that "economists have good reason to 
adopt a very modest posture when discussing the structural operation of unionized 
labor markets in that at least one crucial component of our modelling of such markets 
is not at all well understood". 
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Monopoly Power and Union-Firm Bargaining 
Over the last decade or so there has been a great increase in research by 
economists into the nature of union-firm bargaining (Pencavel, 1991). The 
models are based on the idea that firms extract rents in product markets, and 
that unions aim to capture part of these rents for their members. The ability of 
unions to expropriate the rents, however, depends on their bargaining power 
(their "monopoly power") relative to that of firms. 
Much of the literature has focussed on the determination of wage and 
employment levels when a single firm bargains with a single union (Farber, 
1986).^ The bargaining process is modelled by defining the payoffs to the 
union and firm. 
The firm is assumed to maximise profits, n(w,n), where w is the wage, 
and n is the number of workers employed by the firm. Usually, product 
market conditions are taken to be exogenous (that is, the price at which the 
firm sells its output is assumed to be independent of the outcome of the 
bargaining process).*^ 
As we have seen, the specification of the union's objective function is 
^While wages and employment are variables of central importance, in practice 
unions and firms bargain over a myriad of employment issues (Pencavel, 1991). The 
basic bargaining framework outlined here can be extended to include such things as 
hours of work (Earle and Pencavel, 1990), innovation (Dowrick and Spencer, 1991), 
investment (Hoel, 1990), and effort (Bulkley, 1992). Similarly, the models can be 
extended to allow for industry-wide or multiple union bargaining (Ulph and Ulph, 
1990) and centralised bargaining (Calmfors and Driffil, 1988). 
•^Dowrick (1989) relaxes this assumption, and investigates the interaction between 
the bargaining process, profits and product prices in an oligopolistic product market 
setting. 
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more controversial, so it is represented here in a generic form as U(w,n) . 
Typically, an asymmetric cooperative Nash model is used to determine the 
solution to the bargaining process. Thus, the level of wages and employment 
which emerge are those which maximise the product of the weighted net 
payoffs to the union and the firm. That is. 
max N = Uiw,ny n(w,n)^ (2.1) 
where 7 is a parameter that represents the bargaining power of the union 
relative to that of the firm. This parameter reflects the parties' relative rates 
of time preference (which captures their eagerness to settle a dispute), and 
their relative degrees of risk aversion (which captures the degree to which the 
parties would be prepared to accept a certain payoff in one period relative to 
an uncertain future payoff) (Ulph and Ulph, 1990).^ In addition, the model 
can be augmented by specifying the payoffs to the firm and the union in the 
event that they are unable to reach agreement (Svejnar, 1986). 
^In addition, Svejnar (1986) suggests that 7 is a function of variables such as the 
institutional structure of bargaining, the rate of inflation and the unemployment rate. 
McDonald and Suen (1991) argue that the quality of the union leadership and the 
union members' perception of the "justness" of their claims are also relevant 
determinants of trade union power. 
^The specification of the "threat-points" depends on the namre of the bargaining 
process (Binmore et. al. 1986). If a strike is involved, they depend on the funds 
available to union members and the stream of income available to the firm for the 
duration of the strike. If negotiations are to break down completely, they depend on 
the income available to union members in alternative employment (or in 
unemployment if there are insufficient jobs), while for firms they depend on the 
income derived from using non-union labour. 
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The magnitude of the payoff to the union depends on two things: the 
monopoly power of the union (which determines what proportion of the 
available rents it succeeds in extracting), and the size of the rents that are 
available to be bargained over in the first place. In turn, the size of the 
available rents depends on product market conditions. Under perfect 
competition, for instance, there are no rents to be shared in union-firm 
bargaining'" while in an oligopolistic market setting, Dowrick (1989) 
confirms that the higher the available rents, the greater the scope for unions to 
raise wages above competitive levels. 
Political Power 
Unions are influential actors in the political marketplace. This is especially 
true in Australia where there has always been a close association between trade 
unions and the oldest of the major political parties - the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP). Many unions are formally affiliated with the ALP and pay 
subscription fees based on the size of their membership. This arrangement has 
^ e r e are two general models of union-firm bargaining which may be analysed 
using the above framework; namely, the right-to-manage and efficient bargain models. 
In the right-to-manage model, the union and the firm bargain solely over the wage. 
Once the wage is agreed, the firm unilaterally determines the level of employment 
(which, for the profit-maximising firm, will be on its labour demand curve). In 
general, it can be shown that the solution derived from the right-to-manage model is 
not Pareto optimal and that there are potential efficiency gains to be made if the union 
and the firm bargain over both the wage and the level of employment as they do in the 
efficient bargain model (McDonald and Solow, 1981). 
'"However, the union may still be able to extract benefits for its members if 
bargaining takes place on an industry rather dian company level. 
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seen unions exert strong control over the internal affairs of the party (Rawson, 
1978; Deery, 1989). 
The political activism of trade unions is interpreted by many economists 
as being an extension of their rent-seeking activities. Such researchers cite 
union campaigns for tariffs (increasing the rents available to be extracted from 
domestic firms) and minimum wage legislation as supporting this view (Faith 
and Reid, 1987). Similarly, union campaigns in favour of the right to strike 
and against legislation outlawing secondary boycotts may be interpreted as 
attempts by unions to secure a legislative environment which enhances their 
bargaining power. 
The ability of unions to successfully achieve their political objectives 
depends on their political power. This, in turn, depends on several factors 
including the number and distribution of pro-union voters (Faith and Reid, 
1987). 
Collective Voice 
The collective voice model of unionism is most clearly articulated by Freeman 
and Medoff in What Do Unions Do? (1984). Their model builds on Albert 
Hirschman's (1970) insight that individuals communicate their preferences in 
two ways: by entry and exit decisions, or by using some direct form of 
communication or "voice". 
In the labour market, entry and exit are analogous to workers quitting 
unsatisfactory jobs and taking-up new jobs that better match their preferences. 
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In a world of perfectly mobile labour - where workers can quit their jobs and 
immediately find alternative employment - the entry and exit mechanism is an 
efficient way of conveying worker preferences to firms. But, in reality it can 
be costly for workers to exercise the exit option. This is particularly true for 
older, more experienced workers with greater investments in firm-specific 
human capital. 
Discontented workers facing high exit costs may consider voicing their 
grievances instead of quitting. However, according to Freeman and Medoff, 
individuals acting alone face (possibly severe) disincentives to revealing their 
preferences in this way. For instance, an individual who raises grievances 
directly with management may be fearful of becoming known as a "trouble 
maker", of being victimised, or possibly even of being dismissed. However, 
unions provide an alternative mechanism for transmitting worker grievances to 
firms: union members can raise concerns through their union safe in the 
knowledge that they will not be victimised. 
In a competitive labour market without trade unions, Freeman and 
Medoff argue that firms tailor their employment conditions to suit the 
preferences of marginal workers (that is, those workers who are most likely to 
quit if dissatisfied). These marginal workers tend to be younger and have 
lower investments in firm specific human capital. 
While not explicitly stating the precise form of the union's objective 
function. Freeman and Medoff stress the political dimension of trade unionism. 
Consequently, they view the union as placing more weight on the preferences 
of inframarginal members. In effect, then, the union provides a mechanism for 
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aggregating workers' preferences and acts as a "collective voice" for its 
members." 
The collective voice function of trade unions has benefits for both firms 
and workers. Because the union provides workers with a viable means of 
airing grievances, discontented workers exercise the exit option less frequently 
and are thus saved the costs of searching for more suitable employment. 
Similarly, firms gain when workers are more prepared to use a voice process 
to reveal their preferences. In particular, unionised firms gain from greater 
employment stability because turn-over costs are reduced and, with a lower 
probability that employees will quit, they have greater incentive to invest in 
their workers. Conversely, in the absence of unions, firms are penalised by 
the shirking (or perhaps even active sabotage) of discontented workers who 
face high exit costs and who feel unable to voice their grievances fully. 
The Australian Context 
Much of the literature reviewed here has union activity at the enterprise level 
as its main focus. Consequently, trade union gains in the form of higher 
compensation and better working conditions are viewed as being obtained and 
"By acting as a single bargaining agent for its members, the union may also 
enhance enterprise efficiency other than through the collective voice channel. For 
instance, trade unions enable firms to realise potential economies of scale in the 
negotiation of employment contracts: instead of incurring the costs of bargaining with 
many individual workers, the firm negotiates a single contract with the union (Faith 
and Reid, 1987; Hundley, 1989). Furthermore, union officials and management can 
build up a relationship which may engender a more cooperative and informed 
bargaining environment. 
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distributed at the firm level. For example, most bargaining models are 
concerned with the bargaining process between a single union and a single firm 
in a decentralised bargaining environment free from legislative constraints. 
Similarly, the collective voice model of unionism implicitly assumes that 
unions are active at the firm level. 
The Australian labour market, however, is characterised by a high 
degree of centralised control over wages and many other facets of 
employment, although this is diminishing.'^ This restricts the applicability of 
such models within an Australian context, particularly over the time period for 
which the data used in the thesis relate (1986 - 1988).'^ ''' Nevertheless, 
such models do shed some light on how union power might be exercised to 
secure benefits for union members, particularly in regard to those facets of 
employment not directly regulated through awards. 
'^Australia Is now steadily moving to a less centralised industrial relations system 
(Hancock and Rawson, 1993). Nevertheless, enterprise bargaining has yet to be 
implemented in most of the labour market. Furthermore, that bargaining which has 
taken place has been heavily scrutinised by Industrial tribunals. 
'^Over this period unions were able to secure adjustments in wages and conditions 
in accordance with the centrally determined Principles of Wage Fixation. However, 
these adjustments were only granted on the proviso diat unions entered a "no extra 
claims" commitment - that Is, If they agreed not to seek further adjustments over and 
above those prescribed by the Principles. 
'"^Because so many employment conditions are determined through awards, the 
collective voice role of Australian unions Is weakened. Some commentators have also 
noted that the occupational basis of many unions as may weaken the collective voice 
mechanism. Because union membership tends to be more spread out, union activity at 
the workplace level is reduced and the productivity enhancing effects of collective 
voice is constrained. 
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2.3 The Union Membership Decision 
Union Membership and the Logic of Collective Action 
It used to be widely thought that common interests were sufficient to sustain 
collective action (Moe, 1980). The conventional wisdom was that the prospect 
of gains to be made through collective action would be sufficient to ensure that 
individuals participated in collective endeavours. In this way, union 
membership could be explained in straight-forward terms: individuals become 
union members if they belong to a group of workers for whom collective 
action yields net benefits. 
However, Mancur Olson (1965) in The Logic of Collective Action 
challenged the conventional wisdom by arguing that the core services provided 
by collective associations such as trade unions are public goods which are 
consumed by members and non-members alike. Since non-members are not 
excluded from the fruits of the collective action, there is an incentive for 
individuals to free-ride while others fund the costs of the collective action. Of 
course, if all potential members choose to free-ride, the collective endeavour 
will fail. Therefore, Olson argued, the promise of collective gains is not 
sufficient by itself to ensure that individuals participate in collective endeavours 
such as trade unionism. 
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The Collective Benefits of Unionism 
Perhaps the most basic goal of the trade union is to secure better conditions of 
employment for workers - unions seek higher wages, better fringe benefits, 
and improved working conditions.'^ While unions may wish to promote the 
interests of their members ahead of non-members, in practice many of the 
conditions they negotiate flow to non-members. In effect, these benefits of 
unionism are public or collective goods. 
Why do many of the benefits of union activity flow equally to non-
members? The answer provided by Olson is that the exclusion of non-
members is often not feasible. Consider, for example, the physical conditions 
of employment in a given establishment. These conditions are public goods 
for the workers in the plant (Flanagan, 1983; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). If 
a union succeeds in securing improvements in conditions, non-members can 
only be excluded by dividing the plant in two. Obviously, exclusion of this 
sort is rarely, if ever, feasible. 
Legal constraints are a further impediment to the exclusion of non-
members from union gains. For example, in the United States, where 
bargaining occurs at the firm or plant level, unions are required by law to 
represent fairly all workers in the bargaining unit (Pencavel, 1971). Similarly, 
'^The fringe benefits targeted by unions include such things as long service and 
annual leave, superannuation, meal allowances and other work allowances (clothing, 
travel, car etc.). 
The working conditions are the physical conditions of work. The safety of the 
workplace, meal and rest breaks, staff facilities such as lunch rooms, and the amenity 
of the environment in which work takes place. 
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Australia's award system guarantees that non-unionists enjoy many of the 
benefits of union activity (awards are legally binding documents covering all 
workers within their scope irrespective of union membership status)'^. Thus, 
even the employment of non-unionists in establishments with no union 
members can be - and indeed often is - regulated by union-negotiated awards. 
Furthermore, non-unionists cannot be excluded from the benefits of 
union pressure to induce governments to make policy changes or enact 
legislation favourable to their members. For instance, legislated occupational 
health and safety standards apply to all workers, not just union members. 
Similarly, union-negotiated increases in family allowances, health benefits and 
other aspects of the "social wage" also accrue to non-members. 
Finally, even if exclusion were feasible, unions and firms have 
incentives to ensure that conditions of employment and levels of remuneration 
are determined equally for members and non-members. For example, unions 
have an incentive to see that non-members are remunerated on a equal footing 
with members, otherwise non-unionists might undercut the union rate (Booth 
and Chatteiji, 1993; Hancock and Rawson, 1993) and secure employment 
ahead of unionists. In order to avoid harming the employment prospects of 
their members, unions therefore have an incentive to seek common standards 
for workers. 
Conversely, it can be argued that firms have an efficiency incentive to 
ensure that union-negotiated wages and benefits are also paid to non-members. 
"^Plowman (1992) and Strauss (1988) provide useful surveys of the institutional 
structure of industrial relations In Australia. 
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This line of reasoning is most likely to be valid in teamwork settings where 
cooperation is important. In such settings, worker unity is maintained by firms 
paying workers performing similar tasks equal rates (Lazear, 1989). 
The Free Rider Incentive: A Simple Model 
Consider a union which only supplies collective goods with a total value C, 
and which charges a fixed membership fee, F. We assume that workers derive 
different levels of utility, Sj, from consuming the collective goods: 
S. = a.C, a .^0 (2.2) 
Similarly, we allow the loss in utility, Qi, from paying fees to vary for 
different workers: 
Q. = p ^ , p,<0 (2.3) 
For generality, we might allow C to be negative or positive; that is, we might 
admit the possibility that for some workers the collective services of unionism 
are a net "bad". However, for simplicity we will assume that the service 
provided by the union is always a net "good" (ie. O O ) . 
We might suppose that if a worker joins the union there is an increase 
in the value of the collective goods provided, A,C. For example, an increase 
29 
Chapter 2 
in membership may enhance the bargaining power of the union, and hence 
increase the union's ability to extract rents from firms (Naylor and Cripps, 
1991). Or an increase in membership may raise the political power of the 
union and its ability to obtain concessions from governments. Finally, we 
might expect that the effectiveness of the union as a medium for enhancing 
workplace productivity improves as its membership increases. 
A rational choice framework is typically used to model the individual's 
decision to join a union (for examples see: Booth, 1986; Lee, 1978; and 
Christie, 1992). In formal terms, it is assumed that a worker, i, has a utility 
function Vj. Each worker is able to evaluate the payoffs from joining the 
union, V a n d from not joining the union, V;'^ . Workers who expect a net 
utility gain from membership (ie. Vi"-Vi'^>0) join the union. 
Assuming that the worker's utility function is additively separable, the 
expected payoffs to joining and not joining can be written as 
Vl' - a / C + A p + p.F 
V' = aC (2.4) 
Thus, the expected gain from union membership is 
Vl' - V,"" = a /A.C) + p^F (2.5) 
Clearly, the size of the marginal increase in the value of the collective 
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goods provided, AjC, is a crucial factor in the individual's decision to join the 
union. While there may be exceptions'^ we would usually expect that an 
extra member has, at best, a marginal impact on the union's monopoly power 
or its capacity to improve productivity through its collective voice function 
(thus, AjC^O). Consequently, the worker chooses to free ride as she expects 
a net utility loss from membership: 
rU .rN r. r. . r . (2.6) K - K = 
In summary, when the union only supplies collective goods, each 
worker has an incentive to free-ride and let other workers fund the services 
provided by the union. 
Union Membership as a Prisoner's Dilemma 
Consider a group of workers for whom union action yields a net utility gain 
for each member of the group when all members of the group join the union 
(that is, ttjC'^"^"'" > for all i). Now if all of the workers choose to 
free ride, union services will not be provided, and each worker will be worse 
'"'Here is an exception: Consider a worker employed in a non-unionised plant 
where the employer is not fully complying with award conditions. If the worker joins 
the union, she may call on the union to see that award conditions are enforced. Even 
if no other workers join the union it may still be in her interest to become a union 
member. (However, even this example need not solve the free rider problem if our 
worker is aware that state and federal arbitration inspectorates will respond to 
workers' complaints and act to ensure that there is compliance with the award). 
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off than if they had all chosen to join. In this context, union membership can 
be viewed as a multiple person Prisoner's Dilemma: collectively, it is best if 
all members of the group become union members, but the dominant individual 
strategy is to free-ride.'^ 
The sort of Prisoner's Dilemma envisaged here (and by Olson in The 
Logic of Collective Action) is akin to a static, one shot game. In this setting 
the problem of collective action is at its most serious because, from the 
individual's perspective, the strategy to free-ride dominates all other strategies 
(Rasmusen, 1989). However, trade unions are engaged in ongoing collective 
action - workers are faced with a recurring union membership decision - and, 
consequently, the problem of ongoing collective action can be viewed as an 
open-ended, indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Hardin, 1982; Elster, 
1989). 
In the indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma free-riding (or 
defection) is not the dominant strategy (Rasmusen, 1989). The idea is that in a 
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma there is scope for strategic interaction between 
individuals. So long as individuals do not discount future benefits too highly, 
they have a stake in the collective action continuing in the future. Therefore, 
cooperation can be maintained by the threat that if one individual does not 
cooperate, others may also choose not to cooperate. In this way if someone 
chooses not to cooperate, they run the risk of jeopardising the collective 
18 , Actually, the optimal result may arise when only a subset of the group are union 
members: with decreasing marginal returns to participation in the union, it may be 
that beyond a certain threshold the marginal cost of union membership is greater than 
the marginal benefit. 
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endeavour and, in the process, penalising themselves as well as others. 
In a group of conditional cooperators (for example, a group of workers 
in which each worker is a union member only as long as all others are also 
union members), the cost-benefit calculus underlying the individual's 
membership decision is transformed. If it is shared knowledge that all 
members are conditional cooperators, a worker knows that by choosing to free-
ride, the union will quickly unravel as others retaliate and also choose to free-
ride. In this context, union membership can be explained by a rational choice 
model provided that: (i) the value of the collective good provided in the future 
is sufficient to cover the costs of union membership; and (ii) the individual's 
rate of time discounting of future union benefits is not too high. 
The ability to monitor the actions of others is a crucial ingredient in 
maintaining conditional cooperation. This, Michael Taylor (1982: p.53) 
argues, is more likely to be true in smaller rather than larger organisations: 
Unfortunately, [voluntary cooperation] is less likely to occur in large 
groups than in small ones, since a conditional cooperator must be able 
to monitor the behaviour of others in the group so as to reassure 
himself that they are doing their parts and not taking advantage of 
him. Clearly, as the size of the group increases, this mutual 
monitoring becomes increasingly difficult and the "tacit contract" of 
conditional cooperation becomes increasingly fragile. 
If small groups are better able to sustain conditional cooperation, then 
one way to overcome the problem of collective action may be to organise large 
groups as federations of smaller groups (Olson, 1965; Bendor and Mookeijee, 
'^Cited after Bendor and Mookerjee (1987: p. 131). 
33 
Chapter 2 
1987). Thus, a union wishing to ameliorate the problem of collective action 
might organise branches at the firm or workplace l e v e l . I f workers are 
aware that workplace level action is crucial in order to secure the main 
collective benefits of unionism, they have a stake in seeing that their branch of 
the union is supported. As long as the branch is not too large, workers will be 
able to monitor their workmates' participation in the union, and the union may 
be sustained through conditional cooperation. 
On the other hand, unions which conduct much of their activity at an 
industry or some other aggregate level, face potentially severe collective action 
problems. As the importance of workplace activity is reduced, so too is the 
stake workers have in seeing that the union is supported at their workplace.^' 
Furthermore, while workers in one plant may be able to monitor the actions of 
their workmates, they will be less able to monitor workers in other plants and 
firms. Under such conditions, the potential for the union to be sustained by 
conditional cooperation is greatly undermined. 
While the game-theoretic analysis of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 
provides a useful framework for describing the problem of collective action, 
researchers have largely avoided explaining the individual's decision to join a 
union in these terms. One possible reason may be that a cooperative 
role of head office would be limited to providing technical assistance to the 
branches, and to pursuing objectives which cannot be achieved through workplace 
bargaining. 
^'Similar reasoning analysis underpins Kenyon and Lewis' (1992) explanation for 
part of the decline in Australian union membership over the Accord years. The 
increased centralisation of wage fixation, diey argue, diminished the role of shop floor 
union structures and, consequently, increased the scope for free-riding. 
34 
Theory of Union Membership 
equilibrium requires individuals to behave in a psychologically implausible 
manner (Elster, 1989). For example, a cooperative equilibrium requires that m 
individuals cooperate in a certain period if and only if exactly m-1 other 
individuals cooperated in the previous period (Taylor, 1987). While such 
behaviour may be plausible in small groups, it is unlikely that individuals base 
their union membership decision on such precise reasoning. 
If conditional cooperation is an unsatisfactory explanation for union 
membership, why do workers join unions? Broadly speaking, there are two 
explanations (Olson, 1965). First, union membership can be made 
compulsory. Indeed, around 50 percent of all Australian union members are 
employed in closed shops where union membership is a compulsory 
requirement for continued employment (Zappala, 1992; Rawson, 1990). 
The second explanation is that unions provide private incentive goods in 
order to attract and retain members. These goods include fringe benefits (such 
as discounted insurance policies, medical benefits, cheap holidays and the 
like), protection for union members against unfair dismissal, and workers' 
compensation assistance. The last two goods underpin the insurance model of 
union membership. While a further private good - reputation - underpins the 
social custom model of union membership. 
2.4 Compulsory Union Membership 
Compulsory unionism in Australia is grounded in a diverse and complicated 
web of institutional arrangements. While a host of different closed shop 
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arrangements can be identified, they may broadly be categorised as either pre-
entry or post-entry closed shops (Wright, 1981; Weeks, 1987; Zappala, 1992). 
As implied by its name, the pre-entry closed shop is a workplace where 
union membership must be acquired before a prospective employee can seek 
employment on the site. Perhaps the most conspicuous evidence of the pre-
entry closed shop in Australia is provided by the "no-ticket - no start" signs 
which are displayed prominently outside many large building sites. 
While the pre-entry closed shop is perhaps the best known form of 
compulsory unionism, it is by far the least common. A 1981 study by Wright 
(which remains the most recent source of data on the different forms of 
compulsory unionism), showed that only 3.3 percent of all compulsory union 
members were employed in pre-entry closed shops. The remaining 96.7 
percent of compulsory union members were employed in post-entry closed 
shops of one sort or another (Wright 1981: p. 134). 
When membership is compulsory, union membership and job choice are 
joint decisions: a worker choosing to work in a closed shop also chooses to 
become a union member. Yet there is a subtle difference in the sequencing of 
these decisions depending on whether the worker is employed in a pre-entry or 
post-entry closed shop. 
In the pre-entry closed shop the worker makes the union membership 
decision prior to applying for work. In effect, union membership is a permit 
which enables one to seek employment in the pre-entry closed shop. 
In post-entry closed shops, workers are not required to become union 
members until after they have been offered employment. Thus, we expect that 
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workers will join the union if the costs of union membership are less than the 
costs incurred by refusing the job and looking for alternative employment. 
Only the broadest features of compulsory unionism have been sketched 
here. In Chapter 5 the institutional underpinnings of compulsory union 
membership are discussed in greater detail, and the union membership decision 
made by workers open shops is modelled separately. We then seek to answer 
two major questions: (i) does compulsory unionism increase the proportion of 
workers who become union members?; and (ii) how are traditional models of 
union membership affected by the failure to account for the presence of 
compulsory unionism? 
We turn now to models of union membership in open shops where 
union membership is voluntary. 
2.5 Voluntary Union Membership 
The Social Custom Model 
The game-theoretic analysis of the repeated prisoner's dilemma shows that 
collective action based on conditional cooperation is fragile - one defector is 
sufficient to unravel the entire cooperative endeavour. However, models 
which incorporate social, as distinct from strategic, interactions between 
individuals may offer a more robust solution to the free-rider problem in large 
groups (Elster, 1989). 
Sociologists have long recognised that communities establish certain 
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customs or norms of behaviour, and that the individual who disobeys a social 
custom suffers a loss of reputation within the community. People who value 
their reputation in the community, can therefore be made to adhere to a social 
custom even when it is against their individual pecuniary interests to do so 
(Akerlof, 1980)^1 If a community adopts cooperation as a social custom, 
reputational considerations alone may be sufficient to maintain collective 
action. 
Booth (1985) suggests that union membership may be established as a 
social custom for a group of workers. For members of the group, trade union 
membership confers a private benefit - a good reputation with one's 
workmates. Workers may therefore be motivated to join the union solely by 
the reputational benefits of membership. 
It should be noted that a social custom need not be supported by all 
members of a community; that is, the non-pecuniary benefits of a good 
reputation may not be large enough to prevent some individuals from free-
riding. Nevertheless, we expect that the greater the adherence to the social 
custom, the greater the reputation one derives from obeying a social custom^^ 
(Akerlof, 1980). 
In establishments where union membership is a social custom, the cost-
benefit calculus underpinning the worker's membership decision is altered by 
^^Akeriof (1980: p.749) defines a social custom as "an act whose utility to the 
agent performing it depends on the belief or actions of other members of the 
community" 
^^Intuitively, the loss of reputation for an individual who fails to support a social 
custom with, say, 99 percent support will be greater than for an individual who breaks 
a social custom with, say, 75 percent support. 
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the inclusion of reputational considerations. For example, if ^ represents the 
union density rate in the establishment - that is, the level of adherence to the 
social custom - the utility derived from having a good reputation may be 
written as: 
R,>Q, /?2<0, /?(0)=0 (2.7) 
In the absence of any other private incentives, a worker joins the union 
if the utility gained from a good reputation is greater than that lost from paying 
union fees (ie. if R^in) > 
One of the key results of the game-theoretic analysis of the repeated 
prisoner's dilemma is that multiple equilibria are possible. While a social 
custom of cooperation may provide a more robust foundation for explaining 
ongoing cooperation in large groups, the potential for multiple equilibria still 
exists. 
Booth (1985) demonstrates this point clearly in her model of union 
membership. Assuming all workers in the group are identical. Booth shows 
that by including reputation an equilibrium level of union density which is less 
than 100 percent but greater than 0 percent is possible. However, this 
'^'It is not necessary that the social custom be established in the workplace to 
provide a reputational incentive for union membership. Several writers approaching 
union membership from a sociological perspective have emphasised the importance of 
family and social background in shaping a worker's attitude towards trade unionism 
(see, for example, van de Vall, 1970). Therefore, an individual from such a 
background may still have a reputational incentive to join a union even though the 
social custom may not have been established in his or her workplace. 
39 
Chapter 2 
intermediate equilibrium is unstable - a slight disturbance will see union 
density climbing to 100 percent or unravelling to 0 percent. Both of these 
alternative equilibria are stable. The intuition underiying Booth's model is 
straight-forward: identical workers who value their reputations either all join or 
none join. 
In a series of recent papers (Naylor, 1990; Naylor and Cripps, 1991; 
Naylor and Rauum, 1993), Robin Naylor and his collaborators have developed 
the social custom model further. Allowing workers to value their reputations 
differently, they show that a stable, intermediate equilibrium is possible. 
However, there are other equilibria. 
First, as with Booth's model, zero union membership is one 
equilibrium. This is the situation where the social custom is not established 
and the incentive to free-ride dominates. Moreover, it is a stable equilibrium -
a small exogenous increase in union density does not provide sufficient 
reputational incentives to sustain a positive level of union membership. 
The second equilibrium is at an intermediate level of union density. 
This is the density rate that is just sufficient for the social custom to be 
established, and to provide workers who place a high value on their reputations 
with an incentive to join the union. However, this equilibrium is unstable. A 
small exogenous decrease in union membership is enough to weaken the 
reputational incentive sufficiently for marginal members to resign. As union 
density decreases, the reputational value of membership is further eroded and 
still more members resign. This process continues until union density 
ultimately falls to zero. 
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Alternatively, a small exogenous increase in union density from the 
unstable equilibrium strengthens the reputational value of union membership 
and some marginal non-members join the union. As union density increases, 
the reputational value of union membership strengthens, and still more workers 
join. This process continues until a third equilibrium is reached. 
The third equilibrium is a stable equilibrium. Depending on the 
distribution of preferences, it may be established at 100 percent as in Booth's 
model. However, if some workers place relatively low weight on their 
reputations, they may continue to free-ride even at high levels of union 
density. Consequently, the third equilibrium may be at some point below 100 
percent. 
The model can be modified by allowing workers to have differing 
beliefs about the social custom (Akerlof, 1980; Naylor, 1990). For example, 
we might categorise workers in two groups. The first group consists of those 
who believe in union membership (for example, those who have an ideological 
affinity with the aims of trade unionism). The second group consists of those 
who do not believe in trade unionism. Clearly, a greater proportion of the 
first group are expected to become union members. However, the reputational 
incentives may be strong enough to induce even some of the non-believers to 
become union members. 
The social custom model of union membership has two important policy 
implications for trade unions (Naylor and Cripps, 1991). First, the model 
implies that a "critical mass" of union density must be established before union 
membership can be sustained. In order to be certain of successfully organising 
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a non-unionised establishment, a union must devote sufficient resources so that 
it recruits sufficient members to ensure a stable non-zero equilibrium. A 
recruitment campaign that fails to generate this critical mass will ultimately 
prove futile. 
The second policy implication relates to trends in aggregate union 
density. Naylor and Cripps suggest that because union density can fall quickly 
below its critical mass, and is subsequently difficult to re-establish, movements 
in aggregate union membership may be downwardly flexible, but "upwardly 
sticky". If this is correct, then Australian unions face a very serious challenge 
indeed in reversing the recent decline in union membership. 
While the social custom models reviewed here shed new light on the 
nature of union membership, they leave several important questions 
unanswered. Most importantly, they fail to explain precisely how the social 
custom of union membership is established in the first place, or under what 
circumstances its emergence is more likely.^^ 
Intuitively, we might think, however, that when the gains from 
unionism are greater, workers have a stronger incentive to see that unionism 
succeeds, and that somehow this translates into a greater likelihood of the 
social custom of union membership being established. If this intuition is 
^^Schelling (1978) discusses the importance of critical mass in several other social 
contexts. One of his examples is the "dying seminar" syndrome which occurs when 
participation in an academic seminar falls below some critical threshold and partici-
pants no longer feel that their attendance at the seminar is worthwhile. 
^^There is a developing literature which attempts to explain the emergence of 
social customs or conventions in game-theoretic terms (see, for example, Sudgen, 
1989). However, it appears that no attempts have been made to apply this literature 
to the specific issue of trade unionism. 
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correct, we have an explanation for how the promise of greater returns to 
union action for certain groups of workers can produce higher levels of union 
density among these groups. The traditional explanation is that workers are 
more likely to become union members if they belong to a group for which 
union action produces greater gains. But how this occurs in the face of an 
incentive to free-ride is usually not discussed. However, if the prospect of 
greater gains provides additional impetus for a social custom of union 
membership to emerge, then there is an explicit link between individual union 
status and the size of the potential collective gains from unionism. 
Job Protection and Union Membership 
One of the fundamental aims of the trade union is to protect workers against 
unfair or arbitrary actions by employers. Unions help workers resolve 
grievances by supplying the services of trade union officials who are skilled in 
dispute resolution, and who are backed by the authority of the union. 
Of course, unions are able to exclude non-members from the job 
protection and grievance resolution services they provide. Indeed, by 
supplying job protection services as private goods, unions have a way of 
overcoming the free rider problem. 
There are two pieces of evidence which suggest that job protection is an 
important element in the union membership decision for many workers. First, 
unions emphasise their ability to protect individual members as a key "selling 
point" of membership. Second, union members, surveyed across several 
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countries, consistently report that job protection was a key consideration in 
their decision to join a union (for a survey of this literature see Moe, 1980). 
Of the various matters in which unions may safeguard the interests of 
their members, protection from dismissal is often considered to be among the 
most significant. While the desire for job protection is widely cited as an 
important element in the demand for union membership, the only attempt to 
formalise this proposition has been that of Blanchflower et. al. (1989). The 
following section sketches a similar insurance model of union membership. 
An Insurance Model of Union Membership 
As before, assume that a worker (who expects to remain employed in her 
current job), is able to evaluate the payoffs from joining the union, Vj", and 
from not joining the union, Vj'^. Now, assume that the worker faces a 
probability, 5, of being dismissed. 
If dismissed, she has some probability, T, of finding an alternative job 
with the payoff, Otherwise, she receives unemployment benefits with the 
payoff, V Thus, if she is dismissed, her expected payoff, Vj^, is 
V^ = xVf + (l-T)Kf (2.8) 
We assume that the probability of dismissal is lower for a union 
21n The payoffs are ranked as follows: V;^  > V;^  > Vi^ 
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member than a non-member (ie. Therefore, her expected payoff 
when she does not join the union, is now 
= V^ - b^'iVl'-V;') 
(2.9) 
However, if she joins the union her expected payoff is 
Vf = - b^v!" (2.10) 
For simplicity, we shall assume that the union is able to completely 
insure its members against dismissal (ie. 6"=0) . The worker's expected utility 
gain from union membership is now 
v; - vr - v!^ - v!' ^ b-ivrvh (2.11) 
Thus, the worker will join the union if she expects that the loss in utility from 
paying union fees, jS.F, will be less than the expected utility gain arising from 
the certainty of not being dismissed. 
The simple model outlined here formalises the basic mtuition 
underlying the membership decision when unions insure their members against 
dismissal. For instance, the model implies that an increase in the probability 
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of dismissal for non-members relative to members increases the rate of union 
membership, and also shows that the rate of union membership is related to the 
expected costs of dismissal. 
One implication of the insurance model is that unionisation rates for 
similar workers will be higher in regions with higher levels of unemployment 
(Blanchflower et. al. 1989). In these regions, dismissed workers have a lower 
probability of finding alternative employment.^^ As the expected costs of 
dismissal for these workers are higher, they have a greater incentive join a 
union in order to insure against job loss. In a similar fashion, the model also 
implies that aggregate union density increases in recessions as the level of 
unemployment rises (Naylor and Cripps, 1991).^^ 
The simple model presented here could be extended in a number of 
ways. First, we might allow the probability of dismissal for union members to 
depend on the strength of the union (Blanchflower et. al. 1989).^°'^' A 
second extension would be to relax the implicit assumption that all workers are 
equally risk averse - naturally we would expect that more risk averse workers 
^^That is, T is assumed to be a function of the regional rate of unemployment. 
^ I^n recent years, many Australian states have improved access to state industrial 
tribunals for non-union members seeking action against unfair dismissal. By 
weakening the insurance function of trade unions, these reforms may explain part of 
the recent decline in union membership. 
stronger union is expected to be able to better protect its members. Since 
union strength depends partly on die level of union density, the insurance model, like 
the social custom model, implies a positive relationship between union density and 
probability that an individual joins the union. 
^'Since union members may not be able to fully observe the union's efforts to 
protect their job, the model could also be extended to incorporate moral hazard 
considerations. 
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would be more likely to insure against dismissal. 
A more complicated extension would be to consider different forms of 
dismissal. For instance, we might assume that unions are able to provide 
complete protection against unfair dismissal (via the relevant industrial tribunal 
if necessary) but only provide partial protection for workers facing legal 
dismissal for misconduct or shirking.^^ 
Workers' Compensation 
Unions have traditionally campaigned hard for safer working conditions and 
better, more effective workers' rehabilitation and compensation schemes. 
Most of the benefits of this activity are collectively enjoyed by union members 
and non-members alike." However, unions offer excludable, private benefits 
in this area as well. In particular, unions act for injured members to see that 
they receive their full entitlements at law. In some cases, this may even entail 
the provision of considerable legal assistance to members pursuing 
compensation thorough the courts. 
Union membership, therefore, has another insurance dimension: 
workers may purchase membership in order to be more certain of receiving 
proper compensation if they are injured at work. This implies that union 
^ I^f workers can be insured against dismissal from shirking or misconduct, there 
is adverse selection dimension to union membership as poor quality workers have a 
greater incentive to join the union than high quality workers. 
" U n i o n s have successfully lobbied for health and safety standards to be regulated 
through legislation which then applies to all workers - members and non-members. 
Similarly, all jurisdictions have workers' compensation and rehabilitation legislation. 
47 
Chapter 2 
membership is expected to be more prevalent in occupations in which there is 
a greater risk of injury. 
Information 
So far, we have assumed that workers are perfectly informed about the costs 
and benefits of union membership. But what if they lack sufficient information 
to accurately assess the net benefits of membership? Crouch (1980) argues 
that a lack of information about the benefits of union membership is pervasive 
and that workers rely on shorthand formulae or general perceptions about 
unionism when deciding to join a union. 
One rule of thumb is the degree of support for unionism in the 
community or, more importantly, the workplace. For instance, a worker 
unsure of the precise benefits of unionism may view a high rate of union 
membership in her workplace as evidence that other workers find union 
membership worthwhile.^" 
In his study of public interest groups, Rothenberg (1990) also stresses 
the importance of information in the individual's membership decision. He 
argues (p.244) that people join interest groups for relatively vague reasons, 
then learn about the organisation before making a considered judgement about 
the value of membership: 
^"•similarly, economists have long recognised the importance of demonstration 
effects in consumption behaviour (for a survey, see Frank (1985)). 
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"First-time contributors are only likely to have very rough evaluations 
about how much they value the group's magazine or the political 
information furnished to members, the types of interactions offered, 
the association's specific positions on a variety of issues, or the 
additional monetary or non-pecuniary costs of membership besides 
annual dues." 
A crucial element in the initial decision to join is contact with the interest 
group. This line of reasoning is equally valid in the context of trade union 
membership. 
Unions advertise their services mainly through literature distributed at 
workplaces, through the workplace visits of union organisers, and via the word 
of mouth recommendations of union members. Workers who do not come into 
contact with union officials are less likely to be informed of the benefits of 
membership and, consequently, are less likely to become union members. 
Moreover, it is clear that workers in the extreme, but not uncommon, situation 
of being unaware that there is a union that they are eligible to join will not 
become union members. 
The Fringe Benefits of Union Membership 
Given the potentially severe collective action problems facing unions, it is not 
surprising that unions supply a diverse range of fringe benefits for members. 
However, the fringe benefits provided by Australian unions have not been the 
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subject of much academic research.^^ An exception is the chapter by Deery 
(1989). A recent survey conducted by the ACTU also provides further 
information about the fringe benefits unions supply (ACTU, 1991). 
In the past, many unions acted as friendly societies providing a range of 
insurance benefits for their members (Beatrice and Sidney Webb, 1902). With 
the advent of universal social security benefits, this function of trade unions 
has gradually become less important. Nevertheless, the ACTU survey shows 
that the legacy of the early days of unionism persists. For example, some of 
the most common fringe benefits provided by unions are accident insurance, 
medical benefits, and death benefits. In addition, most unions provide legal 
assistance schemes as well as discounted general insurance policies. Other 
common fringe benefits provided by unions include financial and taxation 
advice, and cheap holidays (often at facilities owned by unions). 
2.6 Union Organisation and Eligibility for Union Membership 
Broadly speaking, Australian unions can be categorised in three groups. First, 
and most numerous, are the occupational or trades based unions. These unions 
represent workers in specific, narrowly defined occupations. Employment in 
the occupation (and hence the membership of the union) may be concentrated 
in a particular industry (as is the case for the Australian Nurses Federation) or 
'^There is also an apparent dearth of literature on this aspect of trade unionism in 
other countries. A notable exception is Alison Booth's (1989) survey of the fr inge 
benefits supplied by British unions. 
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dispersed across several industries (as for Australian Services Union). 
The second group of unions are industry unions. These unions, such as 
the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association (SDA) and the 
Transport Workers Union, recruit workers across a range of occupations in a 
single industry. In the case of the SDA, for example, the membership is 
drawn from warehouse workers, shop assistants and clerks in the retail sales 
industry. 
Finally, there are general unions which organise workers across a range 
of occupations and industries. Prominent examples of such unions are the 
Australian Workers Union and the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union.^^ 
The activities of trade unions in Australia are regulated by the federal 
Industrial Relations Act (1988), and similar legislation in each of the states. In 
all jurisdictions unions must be registered with the appropriate industrial 
tribunal (the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in the federal 
jurisdiction). In the federal jurisdiction, registration requires that unions 
submit proposed rules including a clause defining the categories of workers 
eligible for membership in the union. A union which already has coverage of 
workers that another union wishes to recruit may object to the scope of the 
proposed membership clause. Normally the Commission will not approve a 
^^The recent movement towards amalgamated "mega-unions" will inevitably lead 
to a blurring of the distinction between the various forms of union organisation with 
occupational unionism, in particular, becoming less common. 
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37 union's application to enrol workers already covered by another union.-
Many unions are therefore granted an effective monopoly over the 
provision of union services to particular groups of workers. Consequently, 
workers dissatisfied with the performance of their union cannot form rival 
unions; instead they can only air their grievances within the internal forums of 
their union.^^ 
Because there is a diverse range of unions in Australia, each holding a 
monopoly over the recruitment of specific categories of workers, there are 
often several unions present in a single workplace.^' Some of these unions 
may be more active in representing the interests of their members than others. 
Thus, it is conceivable that similar workers in the same workplace receive 
quite different levels of service from their respective unions. Moreover, it is 
entirely possible that some workers are ineligible to join any of the unions 
actively present in their workplace. Although possibly employed in highly 
organised establishments, these unrepresented workers may not have a strong 
'^Most states have similar registration requirements. However, since the 
Employee Relations Act 1992 was enacted in March 1993, there has been no 
requirement that a union seeking recognition in Victoria must not seek to represent 
workers who might "conveniently belong" to another recognised association. 
^^There are some, albeit quite rare, instances where individual workers do face a 
choice between membership of rival unions. Somewhat more numerous (but still 
relatively uncommon) are the situations where a group of workers in a particular 
workplace has some choice in determining the union to represent them. However, 
having made a decision on representation, the group is effectively "locked-in" and 
would find it difficult to move to a rival union. 
^^Callus et. al. (1991: p.49) report that on average there are 1.9 unions present in 
unionised workplaces with 5 or more employees. The number of unions present is, 
however, strongly related to the size of the establishment. For example, there is an 
average of 6.3 unions present in unionised workplaces with more than 500 employees. 
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desire to join unions which, after all, are not actively delivering a service to 
their workplace. 
In Australia there is no central database showing precisely how many 
workers are eligible for membership in one of the nation's 200 odd unions. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics does, however, collect statistics on award 
coverage. The data used in the empirical analysis in the later chapters are 
from surveys conducted in 1986 and 1988. During this period, the ABS 
reports that the extent of award coverage was 85 percent (ABS, 1990).'^° 
Presumably, most (if not all) of these workers are eligible to join a union. 
That is not to say, however, that all of the remaining 15 percent are not 
eligible for membership. For instance, some of these uncovered workers are 
managers who, although not covered by an award, may still be eligible for 
union membership. 
In summary, there is currently no way of knowing precisely what 
proportion of wage and salary earners are eligible for union membership. 
However, award coverage statistics suggest that, during the period from 1986 
to 1988, the figure was in the region of 85 to 90 percent of all employees. 
2.7 Union Membership and Unionised Employment 
Underpinning our discussion of union membership has been the assumption 
that, within a given establishment or firm, union negotiated improvements in 
" '^he latest survey shows that some 80 percent of wage and salary earners are 
covered by an award (ABS, 1992). 
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wages and conditions usually flow to all workers, both members and non-
members. That is, viewed at the plant level, union negotiated improvements in 
wages and conditions are public goods. However, notwithstanding the 
constraints imposed by the award system, we have not assumed that 
remuneration and conditions of employment are determined equally for similar 
workers in different establishments or firms. In particular, we have not 
assumed that remuneration levels and conditions of employment are equal for 
similar workers in unionised and non-unionised firms. 
While it is generally believed that the award system ensures greater 
uniformity in conditions across firms, there is still scope for unions to extract 
additional benefits for workers in unionised firms or plants. First, unions may 
secure higher wages and better conditions than the minimum standards set by 
awards. These over-award payments may be the result of unions exercising 
monopoly power at the firm level or, alternatively, they may arise from the 
productivity enhancing (collective voice) activities of the union. 
Similarly, unions may secure gains for workers in unionised firms in 
areas outside the ambit of awards. Again, these gains may be monopoly gains 
or gains arising from higher rates of productivity. 
Finally, while awards are legally binding, some firms may not fully 
comply with their provisions.'^' Non-compliance with award standards may 
be a conscious decision taken by the firm, or it may simply be the result of 
"'The introduction of occupational superannuation in awards is evidence of this. 
Non-compliance with the superannuation provisions was so widespread, especially 
among small business, that the Australian government was eventually forced to enact 
separate superannuation legislation. 
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ignorance about the award or recent variations to the award. However, unions 
monitor and ensure compliance with award conditions and this alone may be 
sufficient for wages and conditions to vary between unionised and non-
unionised establishments. 
If wages and other conditions differ between unionised and non-
unionised locations, might not workers take these differences into consideration 
when deciding where to work? In the United States, where wages and other 
conditions can differ markedly between unionised and non-unionised 
establishments, union membership has traditionally been modelled as a job-
choice decision (Farber, 1986). For instance, it is a well established fact that 
unionised workers in the United States enjoy a sizeable wage premium 
compared to similar workers in non-unionised employment (Lewis, 1986). 
Thus, it is commonly assumed that the difference between the wage a worker 
expects to earn in unionised employment and the wage she expects to earn in 
non-unionised employment will be an important element in her decision to take 
a unionised job (Farber, 1986). Because of the prevalence of compulsory 
unionism in unionised establishments, union membership and the decision to 
seek a unionised job are treated as joint decisions.'^^ 
By modelling union membership as a job choice decision, the free-rider 
problem is circumvented. While union gains in the form of higher wages and 
better conditions may be public goods from the perspective of workers already 
"^This assumes that all workers who want a unionised job are able to get one. 
Abowd and Farber (1982) suggest that because of the difficulties American unions 
face in unionising jobs, some workers who want union jobs will be unable to secure 
them. Therefore, there is a queue for union jobs and a worker only becomes a union 
member if she is selected from the queue. 
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employed in unionised establishments, they are excludable in the sense that 
workers must become union members in order be employed in the unionised 
establishment. 
There are two main reasons why this sort of model is less appropriate 
for the analysis of union membership in Australia than it might be in the 
United States. First, around 50 percent of Australian union members are 
employed in open shops. For these workers their continued employment is not 
dependent on union membership. Second, workers in non-unionised 
employment are not prevented from becoming union members and having a 
union represent them, even if no other workers in the plant become union 
members. In contrast, American workers in non-union plants must enter a 
complex election process before a union has the right simply to commence 
negotiations of their behalf. 
In the Australian environment it is more appropriate to treat the union 
membership decision for workers employed in open shops as being separate 
from the decision to join a union. In this way, the collective gains of unionism 
do not factor in the worker's union membership decision. 
2.8 Conclusion 
If we were to identify the central theme of this chapter, it would be that unions 
are fundamentally collective organisations which seek to advance collective 
goals. Any theory of union membership must recognise this fact by explaining 
why individuals join unions when they have an incentive to free-ride the 
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services supplied by unions. However, the previous econometric studies of 
Australian union membership pay scant attention to this fundamental point. 
Indeed, a review of these studies reveals no mention of the free-rider 
problem."^ No doubt this is due, in large part, to the considerable influence 
of American studies of the determinants of union membership. The central 
focus of most of these studies, however, is on the problem of modelling the 
choice between unionised and non-unionised employment, with union 
membership treated as a characteristic which goes with a unionised job. 
Although the previous econometric studies of Australian union 
membership do not seek to explain union membership as a collective action 
problem, there is a considerable body of literature on this issue. Our survey 
of the literature reveals four major explanations for why workers join unions. 
They are: 
1. Compulsion. The simplest way to overcome the free-rider incentive is 
to make membership compulsory. Thus, workers in closed shops are 
•^ I^n contrast, unionists have long been aware o f the Incentive for workers to free-
ride the benef i t s o f union membership. Their sentiments are clearly ref lected in the 
wor ds o f the "Non-unionis t ' s psalm": 
The dues paying member is my shepherd, 
1 shall not want. 
He provideth me with rest days and vacations, 
So that I may lie down in green pastures. 
Beside the still waters. 
He restoreth my back pay, 
He guideth my welfare without cost to me, 
1 stray in the paths of the non-righteous, 
For my money's sake. 
Yea, though I alibi and pay no dues. 
From generation to generation, 
1 fear no evil for he protects. 
The working conditions which he provides. 
They comfort me. 
He anointeth my head with oil of Worker's 
Compensation, 
Sick pay, annual leave and long service leave. 
And the forty-hour week. 
And my cup runneth over with in-gratitude. 
Surely his goodness aruJ loving kiruiness , 
Shall follow me all the days of my life. 
Without cost to me, 
I shall dwell in his house forever. 
And allow him to pay the bills. 
(From The Shop Assistant, September 1965, with the added dedication "Disrespectfully 
dedicated to all those who take advantage of our labours whilst remaining outside our 
ranks". A s l ightly different vers ion is quoted by McKenna and Easson ( 1 9 9 0 ) ) . 
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required, as a condition of employment, to become union members. 
2. Social Custom. If union membership is a workplace social custom, 
individuals may still choose to become union members even when they 
have a pecuniary incentive to free-ride. This is because when union 
membership is a social custom, membership confers the benefits of a 
good reputation with one's fellow workmates. 
3. Insurance. While unions are largely engaged in supplying collective 
goods, workers may choose to join a union in order to secure the 
private insurance benefits of membership. These include insurance 
against unfair dismissal, assistance with workers' compensation claims, 
and protection against arbitrary managerial decisions. 
4. Union Fringe Benefits. Finally, workers may desire union membership 
in order to receive the fringe benefits supplied by trade unions. 
These four explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, 
there is no apparent reason why voluntary trade unionism might not be 
explained partly by the insurance model and partly by the social custom model. 
Indeed, a complete theory of union membership might encompass all four 
explanations. 
Ideally, the purpose of the following empirical chapters would be to 
establish the contribution, and validity, of each of these explanations of union 
membership. However, as we shall see, data constraints limit our capacity to 
satisfactorily determine these questions. Nevertheless, the theory outlined here 
provides a reference point for specifying the empirical models and for 
interpreting their results. 
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The Determinants of Union Membership: 
A Preliminary Analysis and Empirical Survey 
3.1 Introduction 
The econometric analysis of the determinants of the individual union status of 
Australian workers is still in its infancy; indeed, the first such study of union 
membership was not published until 1987 (Crockett and Hall, 1987). Since 
then further contributions have been made by Miller and Rummery (1989), 
Christie and Miller (1989), Deery and DeCieri (1991), and Christie (1992). 
While comparatively few in number, the pioneering studies have analysed the 
impact of a wide range of variables on the probability of union membership, 
and have laid a solid foundation for further research.' 
This chapter maps the contours of what is already known about the 
determinants of union membership in Australia. However, it is not intended to 
be a passive survey: throughout the chapter, the findings of the previous 
studies are reviewed in the light of new estimates obtained using data from the 
Issues in Multicultural Australia, and the Class Structure of Australia surveys. 
'in addition to the individual level studies of union membership, time series 
studies of union membership have been undertaken by Sharpe (1971) , Kenyon and 
Lewis (1992) , and Borland and Ouliaris (1991). More recently, firm-level data from 
the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey have been used to analyse 
workplace union density (Wooden and Balchin, 1993). 
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As noted earlier, the central aim of this thesis is to build upon and 
extend the previous Australian research into the determinants of union 
membership. To this end, Chapters 4 and 5 develop more detailed models of 
union membership using data which are uniquely available from the IMA and 
CSA surveys. Nevertheless, the parsimonious approach adopted in the 
previous studies, and in this preliminary chapter, provides a useful reference 
point for relating the findings of the later chapters. 
3.2 Modelling Trade Union Membership 
The Membership Decision. 
Let us consider a union that is engaged in supplying union services to the 
workers in a given occupation and establishment.^ As we have already seen, 
the services supplied by unions include both collective benefits (ie. 
improvements in working conditions) and private benefits (ie. protection for 
members against unfair dismissal or arbitrary managerial actions). 
The union's leadership decides the services to be provided, and the 
intensity with which these services are to be delivered to each workplace. For 
example, the leadership decides which establishments are to be visited by 
union organisers and other officials, and the duration and frequency of these 
workplace visits. Of course, the union is constrained in the services that it can 
^Because of the occupational basis of many Australian trade unions, the services 
supplied to workers in different occupations within the same establishment are 
dist inguished here. 
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provide. In particular, financial constraints limit the union's capacity to 
deliver services to workplaces where total organising costs exceed total 
membership revenue (Berkowitz, 1954). Similarly, the union's capacity to 
supply higher wages, better fringe benefits and the like is constrained by 
industrial legislation, the union's bargaining power, and the rents available to 
be extracted from firms. 
Trade union membership is typically modelled as a utility maximising 
decision. It is assumed that an individual i is able to evaluate the utilities 
expected to be derived from membership, V", and non-membership, V". An 
individual is assumed to join the union if he or she expects a net utility gain 
from membership (ie. if V," - > 0). 
The utility derived from union membership is a function of the private 
and collective benefits of membership, the costs of membership and, in 
workplaces where union membership is a social custom, the reputational 
benefits of membership. For convenience, we assume that the utility expected 
to be derived from union membership can be written as an additively separable 
function of these costs and benefits: 
V^ = CB.a^^PB.a^^R^a^^F.a^ O - O 
where CBj and PB^ are vectors which record the collective and private benefits 
of unionism, R, is an index which measures the individual's workplace 
reputation, and Fj is a vector which captures the costs of membership. 
Clearly, a non-member receives none of the private benefits of 
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membership (PB|=0), and does not pay union fees (Fj=0). If we normalise 
the reputation measure such that for a non-union member R , = 0 ^ the expected 
utility from non-membership is 
= CBu^ (3-2) 
Note that we assume that the weights placed on the costs and benefits 
of membership (ie. the alphas) are constant for different individuals. 
However, utility functions are likely to vary across individuals, and we allow 
for this by adding an index, Tj, which is a measure of individual tastes for 
union membership. Therefore, the expected net utility gain from union 
membership is written as 
U; = = (3-3) 
where U / is an unobserved index which measures the expected utility gain (or 
loss) from union membership. If Uj ^ 0 , the individual joins the union 
(U,= l); otherwise the individual does not join (U|=0). 
Typically, the data sources that are used to model union membership do 
not contain direct information about the costs and benefits of membership. For 
example, information on union membership fees, the fringe benefits of 
^More generally, we might set R; = 0 for all non-members and for union members 
employed in locations where union membership is not a social custom. 
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membership, contact with union officials et cetera is usually lacking in the data 
used. Instead, the available data include personal attributes (such as marital 
status and sex), and human capital, workplace and occupational characteristics. 
The specification of an econometric model of union membership must therefore 
be developed with these data constraints in mind. 
A Reduced Form Model of Union Membership. 
The central problem facing researchers wishing to model union membership 
using large individual data sets is that direct information on the private benefits 
and costs of membership (ie. the elements of the vectors PB, and Fj) are 
lacking in the available sources of data. However, theory suggests that the 
collective and private goods supplied by trade unions to workers in occupation 
j and establishment k depend on the net costs of organising the workplace, the 
union's bargaining power, and the rents available to be extracted from the 
firm. In turn, these factors are assumed to be a function of workplace and 
firm characteristics, as well as occupational characteristics. They also depend 
on the extent of union membership in the workplace. 
To keep matters relatively simple, let us assume that the private 
benefits supplied by the union, and the information provided to workers about 
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these benefits, can be summarised by a single unobserved index, PBy^'/ This 
index is modelled as a function of workplace, firm and occupational 
characteristics 
P^m = (3-4) 
where Dy, is a vector of characteristics of the firm and the workplace in which 
the individual is employed, Gy is a vector of occupational characteristics and 
v,i is a randomly distributed error term which captures the unobserved 
determinants of the scale and scope of the private benefits supplied by the 
union. The extent of union membership in the workplace, is given by 
"jt 
E (3.5) 
where n^ ^ is the total number of workers in occupation j at the workplace k. 
As seen in the previous chapter, the social custom model of trade union 
membership postulates that, in workplaces where union membership is a social 
"Clearly, the problem of modelling the myriad services provided by unions is 
finessed here. It would not be difficult to develop a richer specification in which the 
individual elements of the basket of private benefits are modelled separately. 
However, such an approach would entail a great deal of cumbersome notation, and 
would not add much to our understanding of the fundamental issues involved in 
specifying the union membership equation in the absence of detailed data on these 
private benefits. 
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custom, a worker derives a reputational benefit from membership of a trade 
union. The reputation derived from membership is modelled as a function of 
the overall support for the social custom and as a function of the individual's 
personal attributes (particularly his or her attitudes towards trade unionism): 
R* = (Po+Af.<p, + ^.^<P2 + U2, (3.6) 
where Mj is a vector of personal attributes, and 1^21 is a random error term 
which captures the unobserved determinants of the reputational benefits of 
membership. 
In order to receive the private benefits of membership, a worker must 
pay union fees. The method and frequency of the payments, as well as their 
quantum, should be seen as relevant components of the worker's perceived 
costs of membership.^ Once again, researchers rarely have available data on 
union fees, or on the method of payment of those fees. However, we assume 
that the costs of membership can be represented by a single unobserved index, 
Fiji-*, which is a function of workplace and firm characteristics (which are 
assumed to capture the method of payment)^, and which is also a function of 
occupational characteristics (which are assumed to capture the average costs of 
^For example, a worker who has a preference for income smoothing will favour 
regular payroll deductions over annual or semi-annual payments. 
^For example, automatic payroll deductions of union fees may be the result of a 
union exercising its bargaining power to induce a firm to provide these arrangements. 
Alternatively, a firm wishing to facilitate trade union membership may be happy to 
provide payroll deductions without any threat of union action. 
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organising the workers covered by the union): 
where Wj; is a random error term which captures the unobserved determinants 
of the fees to be paid and the method of payment of those fees. 
Finally, the individual's taste for the services provided by the union is 
assumed to be a function of personal and human capital characteristics and is 
modelled as 
t ; = (3.8) 
where T' is an unobserved index and v^ , is a randomly distributed error term. 
Substituting for (3.4)-(3.8) in (3.3) we obtain a reduced form 
membership equation: 
u ; , = (3.9) 
Simplifying the notation, the reduced form model of union membership 
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equation is 
= (3.10) 
- KUld 
where X^^  is a vector of explanatory variables (Xy^ = [DikiGjjiHjrMJ), is a 
vector of parameters to be estimated, and !(•) is an indicator function.^ The 
error term, e^ ,^ captures the unobserved determinants of the worker's 
perception of the costs and benefits of membership. 
The method used to estimate the model depends on the assumed 
properties of the error term. If e is assumed to be normally distributed, then 
probit estimation is used and the probability that the worker i is a union 
'That is, I(U,*)=1 if u ; > 0 , and I(U;') = 0 if Ui'<0. 
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member is^ 
ProbiU.=l) = ProbiU*>0) 
= Probie>-Xfi) 11) 
where <!»(•) is the normal distribution function. 
Union Membership and Wages 
In the previous chapter we argued that, seen from the perspective of workers 
at the plant level, any wage gains that unions secure are collective goods which 
are received by both members and non-members. However, the studies of 
Australian union membership by Miller and Rummery (1989), Miller and 
Christie (1989), and Christie (1992) reveal a wage premium associated with 
union membership. Consequently, they assume that by joining a union a 
worker may obtain an increase in his or her wages. Such a wage increase 
^Probit estimation accounts for the fact that the dependent variable takes only two 
values: U = 1 "worker is a union member"; or U = 0 "worker is not a union member". 
Also, in the probit model, the predicted probabilities of union membership are 
constrained to lie between zero and one. Alternative estimation methods include the 
linear probability model and the logit model. The linear probability model involves 
OLS estimation of the union membership equation. This model has a number of 
shortcomings including the fact that the estimated probabilities are not constrained to 
be in the zero-one interval (for a discussion, see Greene (1990)). 
If the cumulative distribution function of e is assumed to be the logistic 
distribution function, then the logit model is used instead. Because the normal and 
logistic distributions are very similar (except in the tails), it generally does not matter 
much whether a logit or probit model is used (Amemiya, 1981). 
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would, of course, be a major inducement for a worker to join a union. 
Therefore the individual's expected wage gain from membership is included as 
a determinant of the probability of union membership. 
The model estimated in these studies has the same structure as the 
model proposed by Lee (1978) which has been widely employed in studies of 
union membership in North America and elsewhere. In Chapter 4 we will 
argue that it is more appropriate, in the Australian context, for this model to 
be used to explain the individual's choice of employment between unionised or 
non-unionised establishments rather than to model the individual's union 
membership decision. Nevertheless, given the prominence of the model in the 
literature, we shall briefly sketch its structure. 
First, it is assumed that union members and non-members have 
different wage structures. The wage equations applying to union members and 
non-members are written as 
/nH^" = Z.6" + ti; Members (^-^^a) 
InW. = Z.b'^^^l Non-members (3.12b) 
where Z, is a vector of human capital and other wage-determining 
characteristics and TJJ" and TJ" are normally distributed random error terms. 
The parameter vectors (5" and 5") are assumed to be constant across 
individuals. 
Next, it is assumed that the worker's expected utility gain from 
membership is a function of industry and individual characteristics, Xj, and the 
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difference between the log hourly wage received if the worker is a union 
member, InWj", and that received if the worker is not a union member, lnW°: 
where ej is a normally distributed random error term which captures the 
unobserved determinants of union membership (ie. e j -N(0 ,a ,^) ) . 
Now substituting (3.12a) and (3.12b) in (3.12) yields a reduced form 
membership equation: 
u; = (3.14) 
where ij = + 
Assuming joint normality of the error terms, the reduced form equation 
can be used to compute the inverse Mill's ratio terms needed to account for 
potential sample selection bias in the wage equations (Lee, 1978). 
Although the wage gain the individual expects from union membership 
is not observed, it can be estimated using the selectivity-corrected wage 
equation estimates. Substituting the difference in the predicted wages 
( lnW"-lnW°) allows estimation of a "structural" membership equation defmed 
by (3.13). 
Thus far, we have argued, on purely theoretical grounds, that a union 
membership premium is unlikely to be a widespread phenomenon at the plant 
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level. In Chapter 4 we shall present empirical evidence to support this 
proposition (in particular, we show that there is no significant relationship 
between union membership and wages among workers employed in unionised 
establishments). Consequently, we do not believe that it is appropriate to treat 
the union membership wage premium as a determinant of the individual's 
probability of union membership. Therefore, in this chapter, we do not 
estimate a simultaneous equations model of wages and union membership. 
Furthermore, when we review the findings of the previous studies that estimate 
such models, we focus primarily on the reduced form estimates presented in 
those studies. 
3.3 Data 
The data used in this thesis come from two sources. The first source is the 
Office of Multicultural Affairs' 1988 survey, Issues in Multicultural Australia', 
the second is the Class Structure of Australia Survey conducted by the 
University of Queensland in 1986.^ Neither of these data sets have previously 
been used to model the determinants of union membership. 
The reason for choosing these particular data sets is that they contain 
important information which is not available in the data sets that have 
previously been used to model Australian union membership. For instance, 
the IMA survey includes questions on compulsory union membership. In 
^These data are available from the Social Science Data Archives, The Australian 
National University. (IMA: SSDA study numbers 534-537; CSA: S S D A study 
number 493). 
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Chapter 5, w e use this information to model separately the determinants o f 
voluntary and compulsory union membership. Similarly, the C S A survey is a 
unique source of data on union presence. This al lows us (in Chapter 4 ) to 
model union membership as a decision made by workers in unionised 
workplaces. 
The Issues in Multicultural Australia Survey 
The Issues in Multicultural Australia Survey consists o f four samples: The 
General Sample - a sample of the general Australian population aged 15 and 
over (35 percent); The NESB Sample - a sample of non-English speaking 
migrants; The Second Generation Sample - a sample of second generation 
Australians of non-English speaking backgrounds (18 percent); and The New 
Arrivals Sample - a sample of migrants who arrived in Australia after July 
1981 from non-English speaking countries. In total 4502 individuals are 
surveyed. 
'°Note that, in effect, the pooled IMA data constitute an exogenously stratified 
random sample. (In this case the stratification is by migrant status and non-English 
speaking background). 
Because migrant status and non-English speaking background are exogenous 
determinants of union membership, no adjustments need to be made to account for the 
oversampiing of migrants (and individuals with non-English speaking backgrounds) in 
probit estimation (for a discussion of this point see Heckman and McCurdy, 1986: 
p. 1928). However, sample statistics derived from the pooled IMA data, such as the 
sample means, will be biased estimators of the population means. 
Later in this chapter we shall see that migrant status and non-English speaking 
background are entered in the membership equation as a series of dummy variables. 
The parameters of all the other variables (such as job tenure, political affiliation and 
workplace size) are constrained to be equal across workers, irrespective of their 
migrant status or English speaking background. However, if the parameters of the 
other variables were actually to differ for migrants and non-migrants, (or workers 
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The IMA survey has a wide geographical coverage - only the Northern 
Territory, isolated small urban centres, and sparsely populated rural areas are 
excluded. 
In this thesis the data are restricted to currently employed wage and 
salary earners for whom valid data are available for all key variables of 
interest. The purged data set consists of 2088 cases." 
The membership rate in the sample used here is 45.9 percent. This is 
almost four percentage points higher than the union density rate in August 
1988 as reported by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 1989). One 
possible explanation for the difference is that the ABS survey excludes workers 
who are trade union members by virtue of holding a second job. This 
distinction is not made in the IMA survey.'^ 
with English and non-English speaking backgrounds), then the probit estimates would 
be biased. 
It must be stressed that this bias would not be the product of the oversampling 
of migrants, but rather would be the product of a misspeclfied equation (that is, the 
bias would still be present even if a fully representative random sample of the 
population were used instead of the stratified random sample). Nevertheless, the 
presence of a large proportion of migrants in the sample may, in practice, bias the 
estimates further than if the misspecified equation were to be estimated using a sample 
with a smaller, more representative proportion of migrants. 
" A t first glance, it would seem that an unusually large number of observations 
have been lost. However, the number of currently employed wage and salary earners 
in the pooled IMA sample is only 2149. That is, less than 3 percent of observations 
are discarded because of lack of valid data on the key variables of interest. 
'^A further explanation may be that the mean rate of union membership is biased 
because migrants are oversampled. However, the union density rate for the general 
sample, which is a sample of the general Australian population, is 45.5 percent - still 
higher than that reported by the ABS. 
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The Class Structure of Australia Survey 
The Class Structure of Australia Survey, conducted during the second half of 
1986, is a survey of 1195 Australians aged 18 years and over. The survey is 
restricted to males in full-time paid employment (working at least 30 hours per 
week), and females working at least 15 hours per week in regular part-time or 
full-time employment. 
Once again, the self-employed, and respondents for whom data is 
missing for key variables of interest, are excluded from the analysis. This 
leaves a data set consisting of 1009 observations. 
The union density rate in the sample used here is 52 percent, higher 
than the national union density rate of 46 percent reported by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics for August 1986 (ABS, 1989). Undoubtably, part of the 
difference can be explained by the exclusion from the CSA survey of casual 
and part-time males, and also of females who do not regularly work at least 15 
hours per week.'^ 
3.4 Model Specification and Estimation 
Using the data from the IMA and CSA surveys, we estimate two reduced form 
probit models of the determinants of union membership. Subject to data 
'^The ABS reports that in August 1986, only 21 percent of casual employees were 
union members while 50 .8 percent of permanent employees were union members. It 
is interesting to note that the figure for permanent employees is almost identical to the 
union density rate in our sample from the CSA survey. 
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availability, the estimated models include as many as possible of the 
independent variables used in the previous Australian studies (these studies are 
summarised in Table 3.1). The intention is for the equations to be interpreted 
as general models which nest, as far as possible, the more specific 
specifications of the earlier studies. Because the estimated equations contain a 
large number of variables, the probit results are reported in more readily 
digestible portions throughout the next section. Nevertheless, the estimated 
equations are presented in full in Tables A3.1 and A3.2 in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
The IMA and CSA surveys, while being comparatively rich sources of 
data for modelling the determinants of union membership, lack variables that 
theory would suggest are important in a model of union membership. For 
example, both surveys do not record the union density rate in the respondent's 
place of work; they both lack data on the intensity of union activity in the 
respondent's workplace; and neither survey records the price of union 
membership. Consequently, many of the variables included in the estimated 
equations are best interpreted as proxies for unobserved variables which would 
capture the costs and benefits of membership more directly. 
Whenever different data sources are involved, it is almost inevitable 
that there will be variables available in one source which are not available 
from the other, and that similar variables will be coded in different ways. 
Indeed, this is the case with the IMA and CSA data sets and it should be 
noted, therefore, that the estimated equations are not identical. For example, 
the size of the respondent's place of work is recorded in the IMA survey but 
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not the CSA survey. On the other hand, the CSA survey contains rich 
attitudinal data which are not available from the IMA survey. Furthermore, 
while occupation is coded in the IMA survey according to the Australian 
Standard Classification of Occupations, in the CSA survey the earlier 
Classification of Occupations scheme is used instead. 
A Structural Model of Union Membership 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we shall argue that the single index model of union 
membership defined by (3.11) should be interpreted as a reduced form 
approximation to a more complicated (multiple index) structural model of 
union membership (such as that depicted in Figure 3.1). 
FIGURE 3.1 
A Structural Model of Union Membership 
Employed In a Unionised Establishment? 
No Yes 
Join a Union? 
Yes No 
Employed in a Closed Shop? 
No Yes 
Union Member Non-Member Join a Union? Union Member 
Yes No 
Union Member Non-Member 
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TABLE 3.1 
Summary of Major Australian Cross-Section Studies 
of Union Membership 
Study Sample Independent Variables 
Crockett and Hall 
(1987) 
Christie and Miller 
(1989) 
Christie (1992) 
Miller and 
Rummery (1989) 
Deery and DeCieri 
(1991) 
Survey of WAIT graduates 
from late 1970s, 887 males and 
females 
National Social Science Survey, 
1984, 1316 males and females 
Australian Longitudinal Survey 
(ALS), 1985, 1904 males aged 
19-25 
1987 Australian Election 
Survey, 862 males and females 
Gender, marital status, number of 
children, birthplace, full-time 
work experience, unemployment 
duration, industry, sector of 
employment, earnings, job 
satisfaction, job tastes 
Gender, marital status, education, 
location, experience, industry, 
occupation, expected wage gain, 
attitudes towards unions 
Education, qualifications, location, 
industry, occupation, full-time 
status, general labour market 
experience, expected wage gain, 
job satisfaction 
Gender, marital status, dependents 
present, education, age, location, 
white-collar, full-time status, 
sector of employment, social 
status, spouse in union, attitudes 
towards unions 
Source: Miller and Mulvey (1993) 
77 
Chapter 3 
Such a model of union membership would recognise that employment in 
a unionised location - that is, a location where there is an active union 
presence - is a crucial determinant of union membership. Indeed, it can be 
argued that union membership is best modelled as a decision made conditional 
on an individual being employed in a location where there is a union 
present. '" 
A fully specified structural model of union membership would also 
acknowledge that many unionised establishments are closed shops in which 
membership is a compulsory condition of employment. An individual 
employed in a closed shop must either join the union or seek alternative 
employment. '^ However, for an individual employed in an open shop the 
membership decision is a voluntary one insofar as his or her continued 
employment is not dependent on union membership status. 
In short, the union membership equations estimated in this chapter, 
along with those estimated in the previous Australian studies, should be viewed 
as reduced form approximations to a structural model of union membership 
similar to that sketched above. This makes interpretation of the estimated 
'"it should be acknowledged, however, that some individuals employed in non-
unionised locations may still join unions. For example, individuals with a strong 
ideological interest in trade unionism may still join regardless of whether or not there 
is a union present in their workplace. Similarly, some workers may become union 
members in order to protect themselves against unfair dismissal, or to have their 
award conditions enforced, even though there is no union present at their place of 
work. While, as far as we are aware, there are no Australian data on the extent of 
union membership in non-unionised locations, it is our belief that the overwhelming 
majority of union members are, in fact, employed in unionised locations. 
'^Some closed shop agreements allow "conscientious objectors" to be exempted 
from membership. These arrangements are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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coefficients a somewhat hazardous undertaking. Indeed, it implies that, at 
best, only tentative conclusions may be drawn about the estimates. (For 
example, a satisfactory test of the social custom and insurance models of union 
membership requires a model that controls for the supply of union services and 
that also accounts for compulsory membership). 
While recognising that our estimates, and those of the previous studies, 
are derived from reduced form models of union membership, we shall 
nevertheless attempt, in the following section, to provide some interpretation of 
the major findings. However, it is not our intention to treat the estimates as 
providing definitive tests of the various theories of union membership.'^ 
3.5 The Determinants of Union Membership 
A brief inspection of Table 3.1 reveals that the previous Australian studies of 
individual union membership status have investigated the influence of a wide 
range of personal and employment-related characteristics on the probability of 
union membership. In this section, the results from the previous studies are 
reviewed while, at the same time, new evidence from the IMA and CSA 
surveys is presented and weaved into the analysis. 
It must be stressed that the estimates presented in this section are from 
probit models that control for all of the available determinants of membership. 
'^In a similar vein, Booth (1986: p.45) comments that the (single index) model 
estimated in her paper does not explain the choice of whether or not to be a union 
member but, in essence, summarises the data. 
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not just the particular variable of interest. As noted previously, the estimated 
equations are presented in full in the appendix to this chapter (see page 122). 
Workplace Size 
Until recently, Australian data on trade union membership and workplace size 
were not readily available. However, since 1990 the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics has published union density rates for several establishment size 
categories. The data show that, on average, larger workplaces have higher 
rates of union membership than smaller workplaces (ABS, 1990). Looking at 
Table 3.2 we see that a similar pattern is evident in data from the Australian 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS).'^ 
There are several reasons why workplace size might be a determinant 
of an individual's probability of union membership. First, to the extent that 
there is a wider gulf between workers and management in large workplaces, 
there is expected to be a greater demand for the advocacy or voice services of 
trade unions by workers in large establishments. 
'^The AWIRS is a national survey of workplaces with 5 or more employees. 
However, detailed data on union activity are only available for workplaces with 20 or 
more employees. The AWIRS data are described in detail by Callus et. al. (1991). 
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TABLE 3.2 
Union Density Rates by Establishment Size 
Establishment Size (number of employees) Union Density (%) 
ABS (August 1990) AWIRS (1989-1990) 
1-4 employees 
5-9 employees 
10-19 employees 
20-49 employees 
50-99 employees 
100-199 employees 
200-499 employees 
500 or more employees 
16.4 1 
I 20 
30.3 i 
46.0 47 
56 
66 
58.2 
71 
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A second reason might be that workplace size is a proxy for union 
activity. In particular, economies of scale may allow unions to be active in 
larger rather than smaller establishments.'^ As we saw in Chapter 2, theory 
'^Data f rom the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) , for 
instance, show that union delegates (shop stewards) are present in 93 percent of all 
workplaces with 5(X) or more employees but are present in only 39 percent of 
workplaces with 20-49 employees (Callus et. at.: p .271) . Another measure of union 
activity is the frequency workplace visits by full-t ime union officials. T h e AWIRS 
data show that 77 percent of workplaces with 500 or more employees are visited by 
union officials at least once every 3 months, while 50% of workplaces with 20-49 
employees are visited irregularly or not at all (Callus et. at. : p .291) . 
Economies of scale are one explanation for the greater intensity of union 
activity in larger workplaces. Because financial constraints limit the capacity of 
unions to organise those workplaces for which organising costs exceed membership 
revenue, unions are expected to concentrate their resources in large establishments 
which have lower average organising costs. 
Another explanation is that firms have greater incentives to encourage 
unionism in larger establishments. The exit-voice model of unionism, for instance, 
postulates that unions enhance workplace productivity by providing a s tructure for 
identifying and resolving workers ' grievances. To the extent that smaller workplaces 
allow closer personal contact between workers and management there is less scope for 
union voice to raise productivity. However , in larger, more impersonal 
establishments union voice may have a greater role to play in boosting workplace 
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suggests that an individual is more likely to become a union member when 
there is greater union activity in his or her workplace. For instance, when 
unions are more active in the workplace, workers have greater information 
about the benefits of membership and, consequently, are expected to be more 
likely to become union members. Moreover, both the collective and private 
benefits of membership are expected to be greater in establishments with more 
intensive union activity.'^ 
Another reason why workplace size might be a determinant of the 
probability of union membership is that it is a proxy for workplace union 
efficiency. Hence, it can be argued that there is greater incentive for management to 
facilitate union involvement in larger workplaces. 
Employers can encourage union membership in several ways: by establishing 
closed-shop agreements with unions; by allowing union meetings in company time; by 
facilitating workplace visits by union officials; or by allowing payroll deductions of 
union fees. Another way employers can lower the costs of unionism is by allowing 
union delegates to undertake union business during work time. 
The AWIRS data show that in large workplaces employers are more likely to 
allow delegates time off for union business. For instance, in 82 percent of workplaces 
with 500 or more employees delegates are allowed time off for union business, while 
59 percent of establishments with 20-49 workers allow delegates to be paid for time 
spent on union business (Callus et. al.\ p.281). Moreover, 24 percent of all 
workplaces with more than 500 workers have union delegates employed full-time on 
union business, compared with only 5 percent of all workplaces with 20 or more 
employees (Callus et. al.\ p.273). 
'^In an instrumental model of union membership, it is the prospect of greater 
private benefits which provides the individual with a greater incentive to become a 
union member. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, greater collective benefits (that 
is, benefits enjoyed by all workers In the plant irrespective of union status) may 
provide additional Impetus for the emergence and maintenance of a social custom of 
union membership. 
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density.^" Recall that in the social custom model, the reputation derived from 
obeying the social custom is an increasing function of the overall adherence to 
the social custom. Thus, the higher the union density rate in the workplace, 
the greater the reputational benefits of membership and the more likely a given 
individual is to join the union. 
We now have several explanations for why the probability of union 
membership might be a function of workplace size, but what is the empirical 
evidence? 
Unfortunately, data limitations mean that none of the previous 
Australian studies of the determinants of union membership include workplace 
size as an explanatory variable.^' However, using British data, Booth (1986) 
fmds that a worker employed in large plant (with more than 500 workers) has ^ 
a significantly higher probability of union membership than a similar worker 
^^t is, of course, quite likely that workplace union density and union activity are 
endogenous. However, our aim is not to explain workplace union density, but rather 
to model individual union stanis. For our purposes, then, it is sufficient to know that 
unions are more active in large workplaces and that large workplaces have higher 
union density rates. 
^'Christie (1992) reports a positive relationship between the probability of union 
membership and firm size (measured by the number of full-time workers employed 
Australia-wide). Despite her concern that firm size is a less appropriate proxy for 
organising economies than workplace size (workplace size was not available in her 
data), it may be that there are distinct organising economies associated with both f irm 
size and workplace size. For instance, it may be less costly for a union to organise a 
small branch of a large firm (payroll deductions may have already been negotiated 
with head office, for example), than to organise the sole branch of a small f i rm. 
However, we lack suitable data on firm size to include in our membership equation. 
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employed in a very small plant (with less than 25 employees).^^ 
A strength of the IMA survey is that it is one of the few Australian 
sources of individual data which records both union membership and 
workplace size. The size of the establishment in which an individual is 
employed is tabulated in one of five categories (these categories range from 
"just mysel f to "5(X)+"). Therefore, in the membership equation estimated 
using the IMA data, workplace size is entered as a series of dummy variables, 
with establishments employing more than 5(X) workers being the omitted 
category. 
Table 3.3 reports the estimated coefficients on the workplace size 
variables from the reduced form probit model of union membership." The 
coefficients indicate the change in the predicted probability of membership for 
an individual in each of the workplace size categories relative to an individual 
in the omitted workplace size category (5(X)+ workers). An indication of the 
^^Using AWIRS data. Wooden and Balchin (1993) include both establishment size 
and firm size in a model of workplace union density. While firm size is positively 
related to workplace union density, establishment size is found to be an insignificant 
determinant of union density. Wooden and Balchin describe this result as perplexing 
and suggest the greater occupational diversity of large workplaces as one reason for 
the result. The are other possible explanations. 
First, workplaces with fewer than 20 employees are not included in their data. 
However , the aggregate data suggest that the establishment size-union density effect is 
strongest in small establishments (see Table 3.2). That is, workplace organising 
economies might largely be exhausted once an establishment size threshold of around 
20 employees is reached. 
Second, workplaces with no union members are excluded from the analysis. 
However , as these are more likely to be small rather dian large workplaces, the work-
place size effect may be biased downward by the exclusion of these establishments. 
" O n e of the peculiar features of the CSA survey is that workplace size is only 
recorded for respondents who are self-employed. Thus, workplace size is not 
included in the CSA membership equation. 
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magnitude of the estimated coefficients is gained by calculating the marginal 
effect of a one-unit change in the variable of interest on the probability of 
union membership with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
Thus, we see that the estimated probability of membership for an individual 
who is the sole employee in an establishment is approximately 34.5 percentage 
points lower than that of a similar individual employed in a workplace with 
more than 500 employees. 
TABLE 3.3 
Union Membership and Workplace Size: Estimated Coefficients 
and Marginal Effects 
Workplace Size Category Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard Error Margmal Effect on 
Probability of 
Membership (%)' 
Employee works alone -1.12"" 0.31 -34.5 
2-20 employees -0.62™ 0.10 -22.2 
21-50 employees -0 .26" 0.11 -10.0 
51-100 employees -0.12 0.12 -4.6 
101-500 employees 0.06 0.11 2.5 
More than 500 
employees 
-
- -
LR Test of Joint 
Significance (x^) 
80 .04~ 
Notes: 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
"signif icant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union 
membership with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
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It is interesting to note that while workers in smaller establishments 
have a significantly lower probability of union membership, the workplace size 
effect diminishes rapidly. Indeed, a worker employed in an establishment with 
51-100 workers does not have a significantly lower predicted probability of 
membership than a worker with similar attributes employed in an establishment 
with more than 500 employees. 
The estimated workplace size coefficients are consistent with the 
proposition that there are economies of scale associated with larger 
establishments and that, as a consequence, unions are more likely to organise 
larger workplaces, and to offer workers in these workplaces a more extensive 
range of union services. Ultimately, this translates into a higher probability of 
union membership for workers in larger establishments. However, it would 
seem that any organising economies are largely exhausted once a workplace 
size threshold of about 50 employees is reached. 
The social custom model offers a possible explanation for the observed 
drop-off in the magnitudes of the estimated workplace size coefficients. To 
start, recall that a critical mass of union members is required to sustain a non-
zero equilibrium level of union density. Now, it can be argued that unions 
will be more inclined to devote the organising resources necessary to reach the 
critical mass when the potential number of members to be gained is greater. 
However, we might expect the social bonds between workers in larger, more 
impersonal workplaces to be weaker than in smaller workplaces. 
Consequently, workers in large establishments may place less weight on their 
workplace reputations than workers in smaller establishments. 
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Thus, it can be argued that there are countervailing forces operating. 
On the one hand, unions are more likely to organise larger plants because they 
offer the prospect of more members to be gained. But, on the other hand, 
larger workplaces offer a less fertile environment for union membership to be 
sustained by social custom because the bonds between workers in larger plants 
are weaker. 
Industry of Employment 
Industry variables are routinely included in models of individual union status. 
They are usually interpreted as proxying several factors affecting the monopoly 
gains to be made by unions. In particular, they are assumed to proxy variables 
affecting union power, and the rents available to be captured from firms.^^ 
If unions are more successful in extracting rents in a certain industry, 
does this mean that an individual employed in the industry will have a higher 
probability of union membership than one employed in an industry where 
unions are less successful? Many researchers assume that the answer is Yes, 
arguing that when unions capture greater rents, the benefits of union 
'^'In the context of this scenario, the IMA estimates suggest that the organising 
effect dominates intially, but that once an establishment size of around 50 employees 
is reached the organising effect is offset by a diminution of the social bonds between 
workers. It should be noted, however, that estimates to be presented in Chapter 5 
suggest that, in open shops, the economies of scale/organising effect only dominates 
until a workplace size of about 20 employees is reached. 
^^For example, different industries have different concentration and capital-labour 
ratios, and face different product market conditions. These variables are expected to 
influence both the costs and benefits of unionisation (see, for example, Hirsch and 
Berger, 1984). 
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membership are greater and that, consequently, there is a greater incentive for 
workers to join a union. In Chapter 2, however, we argued that the way in 
which the rents are distributed is of crucial importance. If, for instance, the 
rents are distributed as private goods, then the greater monopoly union gains 
give workers an added incentive to join the union. On the other hand, if the 
rents are distributed as collective goods, individuals have an incentive to free-
ride, and the nexus between the magnitude of the monopoly gains and the 
probability of union membership is more tenuous.^^ 
An alternative reason for including industry dummies is that they 
capture variations in the intensity of union activity across industries. 
Assuming that trade union activity is a function of organising costs, unions are 
expected to be less active in those industries which are more costly to 
organise." Thus, workers in industries characterised by small, widely 
dispersed workplaces with high rates of labour turn-over are expected to be 
less likely to become union members because there is less union activity in 
^^Recall, however, that it can be argued that the prospect of greater gains from 
collective action provides additional impetus for a social custom of union membership 
to become established and sustained among a group of workers. 
"Hirsch and Addison (1986: p.31) argue, in the context of unionism in the United 
States, that greater above-competitive rents may not only be associated with higher 
potential benefits of unionisation (through higher wages, for example), but may also 
be associated with higher unionisation costs as firms will resist union organising 
activity more vigorously when there is more at stake. Thus, the existence of greater 
rents in a given industry may not necessarily translate into a higher rate of 
unionisation in that industry. 
While Australian firms may not be able to resist unionisation in the same way 
as American firms, it may nevertheless still be true that firms which feel they have 
more to lose from union activity will be prepared to increase the costs of unionisation 
(for example, by not providing a facility for payroll deductions of union fees, or by 
limiting union access to the workplace strictly to the letter of award requirements). 
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these industries than in other industries. 
Several of the earlier Australian studies have established a statistically 
significant link between industry of employment and probability of union 
membership (Christie, 1992; Miller and Rummery, 1989; and Crockett and 
Hall, 1987). However, we find only tentative support for the proposition that 
the probability of union membership depends on industry of employment (see 
Table 3.4). 
Of all the industry variables included in our estimated equations only 
the transport industry coefficient is significant in both.^^ The wholesale and 
retail industry coefficient is significant only in the CSA equation, while the 
finance and business services coefficient is significant in the IMA equation but 
not the CSA equation. In the IMA equation a worker in the communications 
industry has a significantly higher estimated probability of membership. 
(However, none of the respondents to the CSA survey are employed in the 
communications industry so a communications coefficient is not estimated). 
^^ It should be noted that, in this section, any comparisons between the IMA and 
CSA estimates focus on the significance of the coefficients rather than their signs or 
magnitudes. This is because the estimated equations have different specifications and 
the coefficients are not directly comparable. For example, because workplace size is 
not controlled In the CSA equation, differences In the workplace size may be a source 
of differences in the coefficients If industry of employment Is correlated with 
workplace size. 
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TABLE 3.4 
Industry of Employment: Estimated Coefficients 
Issues in Multicultural Australia Class Structure of Australia 
s.e Marginal 
Effect (%) ' 
0 s.e. Marginal 
Effect (%)'• 
Industry of 
Employment: 
Agriculture 
Mining 
-0.37 
-0.35 
0.28 
0.38 
-13.9 
-13.3 
0.09 0.31 3.7 
Manufacturing 0.03 0.12 1.2 -0.01 0.19 -0.3 
Electricity, gas and 
water 
0.20 0.27 8.1 0.19 0.46 7.3 
Construction 0.28" 0.17 11.0 -0.05 0.32 -2.1 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 
-0.12 0.14 -4.8 -0.48"" -0.22 -18.6 
Transport and 
storage 
0.44"° 0.17 17.4 0.52"" 0.22 19.4 
Communication 0.52"" 0.23 20.3 - - -
Finance, property and 
business services 
0.30"" 0.14 12.0 -0.09 0.18 -3.5 
Public administration - - - - - -
Community services - - - - - -
Recreation and 
personal services 
-0.05 0.16 -2.0 -0.25 0.25 -9.8 
LR test of joint 
significance (x") 
28 .62~ 15.06" 
Notes: 
"significant at 10% (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
"significant at 5% (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
•""significant at 1 % (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union 
membership with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
While only a small number of industry coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level or better, this should not be seen as evidence 
that the influences they are assumed to proxy are not significant determinants 
of union membership. Indeed, this point serves to highlight a shortcoming of 
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the previous studies of union membership which, it should be noted, is also 
shared by this thesis. In particular, theory suggests that a range of firm and 
industrial characteristics will be related to union membership. However, 
typically the only proxies for these variables available in the data are industry 
dummies. Moreover, the industry dummies are conventionally entered in the 
membership equation at such a high degree of aggregation that they are very 
imprecise instruments for the influences they are thought to proxy.^^ 
Public Sector Employment 
A key feature of unionism (not only in Australia but in virtually all OECD 
countries)^'' is that public sector employees have a higher rate of union 
membership than otherwise similar workers in the private sector (Visser, 
1991). In the case of Australia, the Australian Bureau of Statistics reports that 
67 percent of Australian workers in the public sector are union members while 
only 29 percent of private sector workers are union members (ABS, 1993). 
The influence of public sector employment on the probability of union 
membership has previously been investigated by Crockett and Hall (1987) and 
Deery and DeCieri (1991). Both studies find a highly significant and positive 
^^The industry dummies in our membership equations (and in the previous 
Australian studies) are constructed at the 1 digit or major classification level. More 
disaggregated dummy variables could be constructed (at the two or, possibly, 3 digit 
level). However, many of the industry categories would then have too few cases for 
the coefficients to be determined with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 
'^^ n Sweden and Demark union density rates in the private and public sectors are 
approximately equal (Visser, 1991). However, by international standards both of 
these countries have very high overall rates of union membership. 
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relationship. Deery and DeCieri, for example, report that public sector 
employees have a probability of union membership of approximately 40 
percentage points higher than private sector employees with similar attributes. 
We also find that public sector employment is a highly significant 
determinant of an individual's probability of union membership (see Table 
3.5). Both the IMA and CSA estimates suggest that a public sector employee 
has an estimated probability of union membership in the region of 30 
percentage points higher than a similar private sector employee. 
Why are public sector employees more likely to become union 
members? Lower organising costs may be one explanation. For instance, 
because a very high proportion of public sector employees are directly 
employed by state or federal governments, unions representing large number of 
employees need only negotiate with a single employer. (This is also true of 
other large public sector bodies such as Telecom and Australia Post). 
Furthermore, unions wield considerable political power and many governments 
(particularly Labor governments)^' have responded to union pressure to lower 
the costs of unionisation. Automatic payroll deduction of union fees, for 
instance, is a standard practice in the public sector. 
On the demand side, we might speculate that the public sector provides 
a more fertile environment for the social custom of union membership to 
^'A recent series of events in South Australia is an interesting illustration of this 
point. Prior to the election of the Liberal government in November 1993, the South 
Australian government provided automatic deductions of union fees and also provided 
a monthly list of non-members to public sector unions. However, despite the vocal 
opposition of the union movement, the new government has announced that these 
arrangements are to be withdrawn. 
92 
Preliminary Analysis 
emerge. For example, it may be that public sector employees are inclined to 
view collective organisations such as trade unions more favourably than their 
private sector counterparts. Similarly, the large, more impersonal nature of 
the public sector may stimulate greater demand for the advocacy or "voice" 
services provided by trade unions. 
TABLE 3.5 
Union Membership and Sector of Employment: Estimated Coefficients 
Sector of Employment Category Estimated Standard Marginal Effect on 
Coefficient Error Probability of 
Membership (%)' 
IMA Survey 
Employed in public sector 
Employed in private sector 
CSA Survey 
Employed in public sector 
Employed in private sector 
0.74' 0.10 28.0 
0.97" 0.13 32.3 
Notes: 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed r-test for coefficients) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed r-test for coefficients) 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union 
membership with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
Occupation 
Occupation is routinely found to be a statistically significant determinant of an 
individual's probability of union membership. Miller and Rummery (1989), 
for example, estimate that a young male sales worker with average 
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characteristics has a probability of union membership of 40 percent, while a 
manual worker with similar attributes has a probability of membership of 60 
percent. Christie (1992) also reports that occupation is a significant 
determinant of union membership. Similarly, although they lack detailed 
occupational data, Deery and DeCieri (1991) fmd that white-collar workers 
have a probability of union membership of approximately 10 percentage points 
lower than blue-collar workers. They also fmd (in most of their regressions) 
that supervisors are less likely to be union members (although the relationship 
is not statistically significant). 
Why is there a strong link between occupation and probability of union 
membership? One explanation is that the demand for union membership varies 
across different occupations. Senior managers, to take an obvious example, 
are unlikely to demand the services provided by trade unions. Similarly, 
workers in occupations with greater employment security and fewer job 
hazards are expected to place less value on the job protection services of trade 
unions. Finally, those occupations involving greater teamwork, and hence 
stronger social bonds between workers, should provide a more fertile 
environment for unionism to be sustained by a workplace social custom. 
On the supply side, variations in union activity may explain why 
workers in certain occupations have higher or lower probabilities of union 
membership. Assuming, once again, that union activity is a function of 
organising costs, unions are expected to less intensively organise those 
occupations which are most costly to organise. For example, a union 
recruiting workers in an occupation characterised by dispersed employment 
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faces higher organising costs than one which recruits workers from a more 
concentrated employment base. If unions organising a high cost occupation are 
less able, ceteris paribus, to actively organise and deliver union services to the 
workplaces in which workers in the occupation are employed, workers in the 
occupation will be less likely to become union members.^^ 
Earlier we asserted that there are potential economies of scale for 
unions organising large workplaces. Implicitly, the discussion assumed a 
single union engaged in organising a given workplace. However, while there 
are some notable exceptions, most Australian unions draw their membership 
from specific occupations rather than organising workers across a range of 
occupations within a particular industry or firm. This means that several 
unions are often present at the one establishment. Furthermore, even in very 
large establishments some occupations may only be represented in small 
numbers. Clearly, the union responsible for organising these workers will not 
reap significant organising economies." 
Both our estimated equations include occupational dummy variables. 
However, it should be noted that different coding schemes are used. For the 
^^Perhaps an example will help illustrate this point: One group of workers who 
have a low rate of union membership are hairdressers. It may or may not be true that 
hairdressers have a lower desire for membership than other workers. However, it is 
true that the very high costs of organising the small, widely dispersed workplaces in 
which most hairdressers are employed present a formidable barrier to the widespread 
unionisation of hairdressers. 
"Clerical workers are an example. It is not uncommon for only a handful of 
clerks to be employed in a large establishment (a large manufacturing plant, for 
example). Although employed in a large workplace, the clerks' union (now called the 
Australian Services Union) does not reap the benefits of the organising economies that 
would normally be associated with a large plant. 
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IMA equation, the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations is used. 
The occupation dummies in the CSA equation, on the other hand, are 
constructed from the Classification of Occupations categories. 
Looking at Tables 3.6 and 3.7 we see that, as expected, managers and 
administrators have a significantly lower probability of membership than 
labourers (the omitted category in the IMA equation), or tradespersons, 
process workers and labourers (the omitted category in the CSA equation). 
The marginal effect estimates indicate that the probability of union membership 
for a manager or administrator is approximately 35 percentage points lower 
than that of a labourer with similar attributes. 
It should be noted that the CSA equation includes two managerial 
variables. The first is the managerial category in the Classification of 
Occupations. However, one of the weaknesses of the Classification of 
Occupations is that many workers who would normally be thought of as 
holding managerial positions are actually coded in different occupational 
categories. Since the CSA survey also contains separate data on managerial 
status an additional managerial variable is included in the estimated equation. 
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TABLE 3.6 
Occupation and Supervisory Status: Estimated Coefficients -
IMA Survey 
Estimated Standard Marginal Effect on 
Coefficient Error Probability of 
Membership (%)' 
Current occupation: 
Manager, administrator 
Professional 
Para-professional 
Tradesperson 
Clerk 
Salesperson, personal service worker 
Plant and machine operator 
Labourer 
Supervisory status: 
Supervisor 
Non-Supervisor 
- L 1 3 ' 
-0.67' 
-0.53" 
-0.35* 
-0.70' 
-0.33' 
-0.05 
-0.05 
LR test of joint significance of 
occupation dummies (x') 
0.17 
0.13 
0.14 
0.11 
0.12 
0.13 
0.12 
-34.7 
-23.7 
-19.4 
-13.3 
-24.6 
-12.7 
-1.9 
0.07 - 2 . 1 
70.36* 
Notes: 
"significant at 10% (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union 
membership with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
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TABLE 3.7 
Occupation and Supervisory Status: Estimated Coefficients -
CSA Equation 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Marginal Effect 
on Probability of 
Membership (%)' 
Current occupation (CCO classification): 
Manager, administrator -0.86" 
Professional -0.23' 
Clerk -0.40"° 
Salesperson -0.04 
Service, sport and recreation worker -0.08 
Transport, communications worker -0.11 
Tradesperson, process worker, labourer 
Other occupations (agricultural worker, -2.15™ 
mine worker, members of the armed 
services) 
Managerial, supervisory status: 
Manager -0.30" 
Supervisor 0.01 
Non-supervisor 
0.24 
0.18 
0.18 
0.23 
0.23 
0.28 
0.53 
-31.4 
-9.2 
-15.8 
-1.7 
-3.1 
-4.5 
-51.0 
0.18 
0.11 
-12.1 
0.5 
LR test of joint significance of occupation 
dummies (x^) 
54.30" 
Notes: 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed Mest for coefficients) 
"^significant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union 
membership with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
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In order to gain a clearer impression of the magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients it is helpful to look at Table 3.8. In this table we consider the 
predicted probability of membership for a "stylised individual" using the IMA 
e s t i m a t e s . T h e stylised individual is an individual whose attributes are the 
means of all the independent variables in the membership equation except for 
occupation and one other variable of interest. For example, the first column 
of Table 3.8 gives the predicted probabilities of membership by occupation for 
a stylised individual in the manufacturing industry.^^ Thus, we see that the 
stylised manager in the manufacturing industry has an estimated probability of 
membership of 19.4 percent, while the stylised labourer has an estimated 
probability of membership of 60.5 percent. 
The second column of Table 3.8 gives the predicted probabilities of 
membership for a stylised individual across occupations in the transport and 
storage industry. The next two columns compare predicted probabilities for 
the private and public sectors. Finally, in the last two columns, the predicted 
probabilities of membership for the smallest and largest workplace size 
categories are given. 
^''Because the probit equation is non-linear, the marginal effect of a change in an 
independent variable depends on what point in the distribution the calculation is made. 
Any effect will be larger in the middle of the distribution, and smaller in the tails. 
Greene (1990) suggests, therefore, that to get an overall impression of the magnitude 
of an estimated coefficient it is prudent to calculate the marginal effects at different 
points in the distribution. Table 3.8 allows us to make such comparisons. 
^•''This individual has attributes that are the same as the means of all the 
independent variables except for occupation and industry. 
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TABLE 3.8 
Predicted Probabilities of Union Membership by Occupation, Sector 
and Selected Industries and Workplace Sizes (%) 
•I 
U J 
Industry of Employment Sector of Employment Workplace Size 
(No. of Employees) 
Manufacturing Transport and Storage Private Public 1 worker More than 500 
Occupation: 
Manager, administrator 19.4 32.6 15.3 38.8 4.8 29.5 
Professional 34.4 50.3 28.6 56.9 11.5 46.9 
Para-professional 39.6 55.9 33.5 62.3 14.5 52.4 
Tradesperson 46.7 62.8 40.3 68.9 18.9 59.5 
Clerk 33.3 49.1 27.6 55.7 10.9 45.7 
Salesperson, personal service worker 47.3 63.4 40.9 69.5 19.3 60.1 
Plant and machine operator 58.6 73.5 52.2 78.6 28.1 70.6 
Labourer 60.5 75.1 54.1 80.0 29.8 72.2 
Note: 
Predicted probabilities are for a stylised individual who has attributes which are the means of the remaining independent variables. 
Preliminary Analysis 
Job Tenure 
One of the implications of the insurance model of unionism is that a worker 
facing higher dismissal costs is more likely to demand union membership for 
the protection it provides. The argument goes like this: since workers with 
longer tenure in their current job have greater investments in job-specific 
human capital - and thus face higher dismissal costs - workers with longer 
tenure are more likely to become union members. 
Once again, however, a similar prediction may be assembled from the 
social custom model of union membership. For example, to the extent that 
workers with longer tenure have developed greater social bonds with their 
workmates, and are therefore expected to place greater weight on their 
workplace reputation, the social custom model predicts a positive relationship 
between tenure and probability of union membership. 
To date, the only Australian evidence of the relationship between job 
tenure and probability of union membership is provided by Miller and 
Rummery (1989). In their reduced form membership equation, Miller and 
Rummery report that duration of employment has a strong impact on the 
probability of union membership. For example, they estimate that a young 
male with average attributes who has spent one year in his current job has 
probability of membership of 41 percent, and that after 5 years the probability 
rises to 57 percent (Miller and Rummery: p.201)^^ 
^^Coincidently, the average job tenure of respondents in the IMA survey is 
slightly greater than 5 years (5.02 years, to be exact). 
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We also find, in both our estimated equations, that job tenure is a 
significant determinant of a worker's probability of union membership (see 
Table 3.9).'^ Job tenure is included as a quadratic in order to allow 
flexibility in the functional form of the relationship between tenure and 
probability of union membership. In particular, it is likely that the impact of 
an extra year's tenure on the probability of union membership diminishes the 
longer an individual has been employed in his or her current job. For 
example, in the context of the insurance model of union membership, it may 
be argued that the tenure variable captures two effects. On the one hand, 
increased tenure is associated with greater firm-specific skills and, therefore, 
higher expected costs of dismissal. On the other hand, it may be that workers 
with greater seniority feel more secure against dismissal (or other unfair 
mangerial actions). With increasing job tenure, it may be that the job security 
effect eventually comes to dominate the accumulated firm-specific human 
capital effect.^^ 
Figure 3.2 (which uses the IMA estimates) shows that a stylised worker 
who has just commenced employment has an estimated probability of union 
membership of 32 percent. After 5 years in the job, the probability rises to 48 
percent. The probability of union membership peaks at around 76 percent 
after 23 years spent in the current job. 
^ I^n the CSA survey, job tenure is measured as years spent in present job; in the 
IMA survey it is measured as years worked for present employer. 
^^ A similar argument may be constructed in the context of the social custom 
model. In particular, the marginal effect of an extra year's job tenure on the weight 
an individual places on his or her reputation may decline with increasing job tenure. 
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TABLE 3.9 
Job Tenure, Education, Experience and Hours Worked: Estimated Coefficients 
Job Tenure: 
Years in current job 
(Years in current job)" 
Education: 
Years of education 
Potential Experience: 
Experience 
(Experience)^ 
Hours of Work: 
Hours of work 
(Hours)^ 
Issues in Multicultural Australia Class Structure of Australia 
Estimated Standard Error Marginal Effect on Estimated Standard 
Coefficient Probability of Coefficient Error 
Membership (%)' 
0.093"" 
-0 .002*" 
-0.012 
0.006 
0.000 
0.019" 
-0 .000* 
0.013 
0.000 
0.015 
0.011 
0.000 
0.008 
0.000 
3.6 
-0.5 
0.2 
0.7 
0.091~ 
- 0 . 0 0 2 " 
0.014 
0.041*" 
-o.oor 
0.044** 
-0.001* 
0.017 
0.001 
0.026 
0.014 
0.000 
0.021 
0.000 
Marginal Effect on 
Probability of 
Membership (%)' 
3.5 
0.6 
1.6 
Notes: 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union membership with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
Values of 0.000 or -0.000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than +0.001. 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed Mest) 
""significant at 5 % (two-tailed r-test) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test) 
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FIGURE 3.2 
Tenure with Current Employer and Estimated Probability of Membership for a 
Stylised Worker: IMA Estimates 
Estimated Probability of Membership (%) 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Tenure with Current Employer (Years) 
Hours Worked 
It is widely believed that a full-time worker is more likely to be union 
members because he or she has a greater attachment to his or her job than a 
part-time or casual employee. Certainly all the major theones of union 
membership - including the social custom and insurance models - predict a 
positive relationship between hours worked and union membership. 
Miller and Rummery (1989) find that young full-time males have a 
probability of union membership of the order of 14 percentage points higher 
than part-time males. Similarly, Deery and DeCieri (1991) find that part-time 
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workers have a probability of union membership of approximately 10 
percentage points lower than full-time workers. 
Hours worked per week is included in quadratic form in our estimated 
equations. In both equations it is found to be a significant determinant of 
union membership (see Table 3.9). Figure 3.3 (which is drawn using the 
estimation results from the IMA equation) shows that a stylised worker^^ 
employed for 5 hours per week has an predicted probability of membership of 
37 percent. However, a stylised worker, identical in all other respects, but 
working 40 hours per week, has an estimated probability of membership of 49 
percent. 
FIGURE 3.3 
Hours of Work and Estimated Probability of Membership for a 
Stylised Worker: CSA Estimates 
Estimated Probability of Membership (%) 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 
Weekly Hours of Work 
^^The stylised worker has attributes that are the means of all the independent 
variables except hours worked per week. 
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Age/Experience 
One of the most striking features of Australian unionism is the much lower 
rate of union membership among younger workers. For example, employees 
in the 15-19 years age group have a membership rate of 23 percent, half the 
rate of those aged 55-59 years (which is 46 percent) (ABS, 1993). The 
strongest evidence that age (or, alternatively, years of labour market 
experience) has an independent impact on an individual's probability of union 
membership is provided by Christie (1992). She finds that the probability of 
union membership increases each year for about 35 years of potential labour 
market experience before declining. (Incidentally, the drop-off in union 
membership rates for workers in their 60s is clearly evident in ABS statistics: 
workers in the 65 years and over group, for instance, have a membership rate 
of just 12.7 percent). 
There are two leading explanations for the relationship between age and 
union membership. First, it can be argued that an age or experience variable 
captures a cohort effect: older workers who have spent much of their lives in a 
more highly unionised labour market may have a higher demand for union 
membership, or be "locked into" union membership (through payroll 
deductions, for instance). A second explanation is that older workers are less 
mobile and face greater costs if dismissed than younger workers. Accordingly, 
older workers are more inclined to insure themselves against dismissal by 
joining a union. 
Notwithstanding these possible theoretical explanations, there is still 
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some doubt as to whether age has an independent effect on the probability of 
union membership. Deery and DeCieri (1991), for instance, find that the 
relationship is statistically insignificant. This may be due, however, to a 
misspecified equation as a quadratic term is not included in their estimated 
equation."" Similarly, Miller and Rummery (1989) fail to find a significant 
relationship between labour market experience and the probability of union 
membership in their reduced form membership equation. However, Miller and 
Rummery suggest that this finding might be explained by the fact that their 
sample consists only of young male workers aged between 19 and 25 years.'*' 
Both of our probit equations include potential experience (defined, in 
the conventional manner, as age minus years of education minus five) as an 
independent variable. Interestingly, our estimation results are also ambiguous. 
On the one hand, the IMA estimates do not show a statistically significant 
relationship between experience and union membership. On the other hand, the 
CSA probit estimates show a statistically significant relationship. In particular, 
noted above, the ABS data indicate that the relationship between 
experience/age is likely to be non-linear (in fact, to be an inverse U). If, controlling 
for the other determinants of union membership, there is indeed a non-linear 
relationship between union membership and age, an attempt to model the relationship 
as a linear relationship may well yield an insignificant coefficient. 
"^'There is, however, an intriguing feature of Miller and Rummery 's study about 
which they make no comment. That is, the strong significance attached to the 
coefficient of the experience variable in their structural equations. While we can only 
speculate on the reason for this, one explanation may be that a duration of 
employment (job tenure) variable is included in their reduced form equation but not 
their structural equations. The duration of employment variable more accurately 
measure a worker 's mobility and the investment a worker has made in job specific 
skills. Since experience and job tenure are correlated, when the duration of 
employment variable is excluded the experience variable will, in part, capture the 
mobility effect. With the duration of employment variable included, the experience 
variable will now be a stronger measure of a cohort effect. 
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the estimates indicate that at the mean of all independent variables, an extra 
year of labour market experience increases a worker's probability of 
membership by 1.6 percentage points. Furthermore, the estimates indicate that 
the relationship is non-linear with the estimated probability of membership for 
a stylised worker peaking after approximately 25 years of potential labour 
market experience (see Figure 3.4). 
FIGURE 3 .4 
Experience and Estimated Probability of Membership for a 
Stylised Worker: CSA Estimates 
Estimated Probability of Membership (%) 
60 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
Potential Experience (Years) 
40 
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Education 
Education variables are routinely included in models of union membership. 
However, the relationship between education and union membership is not well 
understood. Some researchers, such as Deery and DeCieri (1991), find that 
there is no significant relationship between the two. Similarly, in our 
equations neither of the estimated education coefficients are statistically 
significant (See Table 3.9)."^ On the other hand, Miller and Rummery (1989) 
report that young workers with post-secondary qualifications have a higher 
probability of union membership. Occupying the middle ground is Christie 
(1992) who finds that only workers with diploma level qualifications have a 
significantly higher probability of union membership. 
Similarly contradictory results have been found using U.S. data. 
Hundley (1988) provides an explanation for this by noting: (i) that jobs with 
lower educational requirements are more likely to be unionised; and (ii) among 
jobs with similar educational requirements, unionised jobs are likely held by 
more educated workers. Underpinning Hundley's explanation is a queuing 
model of union membership: union wage premiums generate an excess 
demand for unionised employment, and unionised employers (who must pay 
higher wages) choose the best educated workers from the queue. However, in 
the following chapters, education is found to be a statistically insignificant 
determinant of an individual's probability of unionised employment and closed 
"•^Because education and occupation are correlated, it may be that the education 
coefficient is insignificant because the effect is being captured, in part, by the 
occupation variables. 
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shop employment, as well as an insignificant determinant of union 
membership. 
Location and State of Residence 
Miller and Rummery (1989) report that young male workers living in locations 
outside the major capital cities have an estimated probability of union 
membership of approximately 8 percentage points higher than those resident in 
the major urban locations. Some limited support for this finding is provided 
by Christie (1992) who finds that workers living in rural communities of less 
than 1000 people are more likely to be union members (albeit with a marginal 
level of statistical significance). In neither study is a substantial theoretical 
explanation advanced to explain why the size of the location in which a worker 
lives should matter."*^ A priori, theory does not provide a simple answer. On 
the one hand, it might be thought that it is more costly for unions to provide 
services to workers in small rural locations. On its own, this suggests that 
rural workers should be less likely to be union members than city workers 
who, it is expected, will receive a wider, more frequent union service. On the 
other hand, there may be variations in the demand for union membership 
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan workers. For example, to the 
extent that workers in non-metropolitan areas face more limited job 
opportunities, they face higher costs of dismissal than similar workers in 
"'^Eariy in their paper, Miller and Rummery (p. 191) suggest that attitudes towards 
unions will vary across regions, but they give no explanation for, nor give any 
evidence of this. 
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metropolitan areas. Therefore, non-metropolitan workers are expected to have 
a greater desire for union membership in order to be insured against job loss. 
In addition to size of residential area, Christie also includes state of 
residence as an explanatory variable. However, Christie reports that only 
Tasmanian workers have a significantly different probability of union 
membership to workers in other states. 
One reason why state of residence might be included is that it captures 
differences in state industrial relations legislation. Indeed, in Chapter 5 we 
show that there is some evidence that an individual's probability of closed shop 
employment varies across states. We argue that this may be due to differences 
in the treatment of union preference and compulsory unionism across state 
jurisdictions. 
Size of location of residence variables are included in the IMA probit, 
but are found to be insignificant (see Table A3.1 in the appendix to this 
chapter). In addition, state of residence variables are included in both our 
equations (see Table 3.10). We find that workers in Western Australia have a 
lower estimated probability of membership (albeit with only marginal 
significance in the CSA equation). As discussed further in Chapter 5, this 
result may be due to preference to unionists clauses being disallowed under 
Western Australian industrial law. 
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TABLE 3.10 
State of Residence: Estimated Coefficients 
Issues in Multicultural Australia Class Structure of Australia 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard Error Marginal Effect on 
Probability of 
Membership (%)' 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Marginal Effect on 
Probability of 
Membership (%)' 
State of residence: 
New South Wales - - - - -
Victoria 0.03 0.08 1.3 -0.12 0.12 -4.9 
Queensland -0.02 0.11 -0.7 -0.23 0.15 -9.1 
South Australia 0.16 0.12 6.6 0.05 0.17 2.2 
Western Australia -0.27" 0.12 -10.6 -0.39* 0.17 -15.5 
Tasmania 0 .56" 0.26 21.8 -0.18 0.30 -7.3 
Australian Capital Territory -0.39* 0.21 -14.8 -0.63* 0.33 -23.9 
LR test of joint significance of state 
of residence dummies (x^) 
18.80"* 10.54 
9 
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Notes: 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union membership with all independent variables set at their mean values, 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed r-test) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed /-test) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test) 
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Other Personal Characteristics 
In addition to variables measuring an individual's education or experience, a 
wide variety of other personal characteristic variables have been included in 
the previous Australian studies of union membership. These include sex, 
country of birth, marital status, and variables measuring political affiliation and 
a worker's attitudes towards unionism. Some of these variables have been 
included in only one study, while those that are included in more than one 
study often yield mixed evidence of their significance. Sex is one example of 
the latter. 
For instance, ABS statistics show that women are, on average, about 25 
percent less likely to become union members than men (45 percent of male 
workers are union members while only 34.6 percent of female workers are 
union members (ABS, 1991)). However, Deery and DeCieri (1991) find that, 
controlling for the other determinants of union membership, being female has 
an insignificant impact on the estimated probability of union membership. 
Christie (1992), on the other hand, finds that women are significantly less 
likely to be union members than men with similar characteristics by an average 
of about 11 percentage points. 
Our estimated equations also yield ambiguous results. In the IMA 
probit, being female is estimated to reduce a worker's probability of union 
membership by approximately 6 percentage points (although it should be noted 
that the female coefficient is only significant at the 10 percent level). In the 
CSA equation, however, the female dummy has a positive but insignificant 
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estimated coefficient. In Chapter 6 we explore the origins of the male-female 
membership differential in greater detail. In brief, we find that the differential 
is largely due to the different employment patterns of men and women, rather 
than to a lower desire by women for union membership. 
The impact of a worker's country of birth has previously only been 
investigated by Crockett and Hall (1987). They find some evidence that 
women bom in Asia are less likely to become union members. However, little 
weight can be placed on this finding given the very small number of Asian 
women in the sample used by Crockett and Hall."^ 
The IMA survey is an ideal data source for investigating the 
relationships between ethnic origin, migrant status and probability of union 
membership. Accordingly, in the estimated membership equation we include 
the following variables: (i) a dummy variable for workers from non-English 
speaking backgrounds; (ii) dummy variables for migrants who arrived in 
Australia before 18 years of age and after 18 years of age; and (iii) separate 
dummy variables for migrants' region of origin. None of the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant (see Table A3.1). Migrant status 
variables are also included in the CSA equation, but again they are found to be 
statistically insignificant. 
''^There are a total of 11 females born in Asia in Crockett and Hall's sample. 
Only 3 of these women are union members. 
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TABLE 3.11 
Selected Personal Characteristics: Estimated Coefficients 
Issues in Multicultural Australia 
^ s.e. Marginal 
Effect (%)' 
Class Structure of Australia 
ff s.e. Marginal 
Effect (%)« 
Sex." 
Female -0.12 0.08 -4.8 0.02 0.12 1.0 
Marital status: 
Married 0.00 0.09 0.1 -0.18 0.14 -7.1 
Separated, divorced, widowed 0.29* 0.15 11.5 -0.39*** 0.20 -15.3 
Never married - - -
Migrant status: 
Migrated to Aust. 18 years or younger -0.27 0.38 -10.5 -0.12 0.15 -4.7 
Migrated to Aust. after 18 years of age -0.18 0.36 -6.9 -0.13 0.14 -5.3 
Non-English speaking background (NESB) 0.13 0.23 5.1 - - -
(Migrated to Aust. 18 years or younger)*(NESB) -0.24 0.31 -9.4 - - -
(Migrated to Aust. after 18 years)*(NESB) 0.15 0.26 5.8 - - -
LR test of joint significance of marital status dummies (x^) 12.94° 4.39 
LR test of joint significance of migrant status dummies (x^) 4.69* 1.52 
LR test of joint significance of region of birth dummies (x^) 11.79 -
Notes: 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union membership with all independent variables set at their mean 
values. 
"significant at 10% (two-tailed Mest) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed f-test) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed r-test) 
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Christie (1992) considers the impact of marital status on union 
membership and finds that it is insignificant. Similarly, Deery and DeCieri 
(1991) find that only blue collar workers who are married with a dependent 
spouse and children have a significantly higher probability of union 
membership. We obtain contradictory results. In the CSA equation workers 
who are married or who are separated, divorced or widowed have a lower 
estimated probability of union membership than single workers. However, in 
the IMA equation widowed, divorced or separated workers have a higher 
estimated probability of membership than single or married workers. 
Deery and DeCieri (1991) investigate the relationship between union 
membership and a range of variables which measure a worker's socioeconomic 
status and political attitudes. Several of these variables, (including class status, 
attitude towards wealth distribution, sociopolitical background, and spouse in 
union), are found to have a marginally significant or an insignificant impact on 
a worker's probability of union membership. However, there is some 
evidence (particularly for white collar workers) that individuals identifying 
themselves as being left-wing are significantly more likely to become union 
members. 
One of the strongest findings to emerge from the previous studies of 
Australian union membership is that workers who have anti-union attitudes are 
significantly less likely to become union members. Christie and Miller (1989), 
and Deery and DeCieri (1991) both devise indexes which measure an 
individual's attitude towards unions and find that workers with anti-union 
attitudes have a significantly lower estimated probability of union membership 
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than those with positive attitudes towards unionism/^ 
The CSA survey is also a rich source of attitudinal data, and we also 
have constructed an index of union sentiment/^ However, as there are only 
834 respondents for whom valid attitudinal data are available, the estimated 
equation reported in Table A3.2 is re-estimated for the smaller sample, but 
with the index of union sentiment included as an additional explanatory 
variable. Confirming the previous research, we fmd that workers with very 
strong anti-union attitudes have a significantly lower estimated probability of 
union membership (see Table 3.12). At one extreme, a stylised worker with 
the strongest possible anti-union score has an estimated probability of 
membership of 18 percent. While at the other extreme, a stylised worker who 
has the strongest possible pro-union score has an estimated probability of union 
membership of 72 percent. 
"^^The indexes are based on very similar questions in two different surveys. Deery 
and DeCieri seem to have constructed their index unaware of the previous research by 
Christie and Miller. 
''^The index of union attitudes is derived from a worker 's response to one question 
and four statements. 
The first question is: "Imagine that workers in a major industry are out on 
strike over working conditions and wages. Which of the following outcomes would 
you like to see occur?". The four possible responses range from "The workers win 
their most important demands" (scored as 1) to "The workers go back to work without 
winning any of their demands" (scored as 4). 
Responses to the statements "The trade unions in this country have too much 
power" and "Workers often go on strike for no good reason" are coded f rom 
"strongly agree" (scored as 4) to "strongly disagree" (scored as 1). 
Finally, the responses to the statements "On many occasions strikes are the 
only effective means for achieving workers ' objectives" and "Trade unions are 
necessary to protect the workers" are coded from "strongly agree" (scored as 1) to 
"strongly disagree" (scored as 4). 
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Political affiliation: 
Labor voter 
Coalition voter 
No political 
affiliation or minor 
party voter 
Attitude to unions: 
Anti-union attitude 
LR test of joint 
significance of 
political affiliation 
dummies (x^) 
TABLE 3.12 
Political Affiliation and Attitudes to Unioas: Estimated Coefficients 
Isxues in Multicultural Australia Class Structure of Australia 
(I) (II) 
ff s.e Marginal Effect on 
Probability of 
Membership (%) ' 
a s.e. Marginal Effect 
on 
Probability of 
Membership (%) ' 
s.e. Marginal Effect on 
Probability of 
Membership (%) ' 
0 .20" 
-0 .02 
0.07 
0.09 
7.8 
-0.9 
0 . 3 6 " 
-0.42"° 
0.11 
0.12 
13.9 
-16.4 
0.33*" 
-0 .30 ' 
0.12 
0.14 
12.7 
-11.8 
-0.09* 0.02 -3.6 
10.9* 35.08* 
Notes: 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union membership with all independent variables set at their mean values, 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed Mest) 
"significant at 5% (two-tailed /-test) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test) 
9 I 
Preliminary Analysis 
Both of our membership equations include two political affiliation 
variables. The first is for workers who identify themselves as Labor voters, 
the second is for Coalition voters. In both equations Labor voters are found to 
have a significantly higher estimated probability of union membership than 
Coalition voters, or workers with no political affiliation or who vote for a 
minor party (the omitted political affiliation category). However, the marginal 
effects of the political affiliation variables are strongest for the CSA estimates. 
The estimates indicate that being a Labor voter increases a worker's 
probability of membership by about 13 percentage points, and that being a 
Coalition (conservative) voter reduces the probability of membership by a 
similar amount. Since it is expected that political affiliation is correlated with 
union attitudes it is not surprising that the inclusion of the attitude index 
reduces the magnitude of the political affiliation coefficients (see column III of 
Table 3.12). 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we derive and estimate a simple, single index model of union 
membership. Similar models have been estimated in the previous Australian 
studies of union membership by Crockett and Hall (1987), Miller and 
Rummery (1989), Deery and DeCieri (1991), and Christie (1992). Indeed, the 
model is so pervasive in the literature that it can safely be characterised as the 
"standard model" of union membership. We argue, however, that this model 
is best thought of as a reduced form approximation to a more complicated 
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structural model of union membership. 
In the following chapters, we shall see that data limitations prevent the 
estimation of a fully specified structural model of membership. Nevertheless, 
we shall attempt to extend and improve upon the standard model in two ways. 
In Chapter 4, union membership is modelled as a decision made by an 
individual conditional on the individual being employed in a unionised 
location. In Chapter 5, we account for compulsory membership by modelling 
the union membership decision of workers in open shops where union 
membership is not a condition of employment. 
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APPENDIX 3 
TABLE A3.1 
Probit Model of Union Membership: 
Issues in Multicultural Australia Survey^ 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
s.e. Marginal 
Effect ' 
Experience 
(Experience)' 
Education (years) 
Tenure in current job 
(Tenure)' 
Hours of work 
(Hours)= 
Current occupation: 
Manager, administrator 
Professional 
Para-professional 
Tradesperson 
Clerk 
Salesperson 
Plant and machine operator 
Supervisory status: 
Supervisor 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 
Workplace size: 
Employee works alone 
2-20 employees 
21-50 employees 
51-100 employees 
101-500 employees 
Workplace size not known 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Transport and storage 
Communication 
Finance, property and business services 
Recreational and personal services 
Importance of job security: 
Job security important in a job 
Political affiliation: 
Labor voter 
Coalition voter 
0.006 
0.000 
-0.012 
0.093"" 
- 0 . 0 0 2 " 
0.019" 
0 . 0 0 0 " 
- 1 . 1 3 " 
- 0 . 6 7 " 
-0.53"" 
- 0 . 3 5 " 
- 0 . 7 0 " 
-0.33" 
-0.05 
-0.05 
0 . 7 4 " 
- 1 . 1 2 " 
- 0 . 6 2 " 
- 0 . 2 6 " 
-0.12 
0.06 
-0.37' 
-0.37 
-0.35 
0.03 
0.20 
0.28" 
-0 .12 
0 . 4 4 " 
0.52" 
0 .30" 
-0.05 
0.12" 
0 . 2 0 " 
-0 .02 
0.011 
0.000 
0.015 
0.013 
0.000 
0.008 
0.000 
0.17 
0.13 
0.14 
O.Il 
0.12 
0.13 
0.12 
0.07 
0.10 
0.31 
0.10 
0.11 
0.12 
0.11 
0.21 
0.28 
0.38 
0.12 
0.27 
0.17 
0.14 
0.17 
0.23 
0.14 
0.16 
0.07 
0.07 
0.09 
-0.002 
-0.005 
0.036 
0.007 
-0.35 
-0.24 
-0.19 
-0.13 
-0.25 
-0.13 
- 0 . 0 2 
- 0 . 0 2 
0.28 
-0.35 
- 0 . 2 2 
-0.10 
-0.05 
0.03 
-0.14 
-0.14 
-0.13 
0.12 
0.08 
0.11 
-0.05 
0.17 
0.20 
0.12 
-0.02 
0.05 
0.08 
- 0 . 0 1 
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Location of residence: 
Other urban location 
Rural location 
State of residence: 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
Australian Capital Territory 
Migrant status: 
Non-English speaking background (NESB) 
Migrated to Aust. 18 years or younger 
Migrated to Aust. after 18 years of age 
(Migrated to Aust. 18 Years or younger) 
*(NESB) 
(Migrated to Aust. after 18 years of age) 
*(NESB) 
Sex: 
Female 
Marital status: 
Married, defacto 
Widowed, divorced, separated 
Region of birth: 
Southern Europe 
Other Europe 
East Asia 
South East Asia 
South Asia 
Latin America and the Carribean 
Africa 
Oceania (excluding N.Z.) 
Principal English-speaking countries 
Constant 
0.14 
0.12 
0.03 
-0 .02 
0.16 
-0.27" 
0.56"" 
-0.39' 
0.13 
-0.27 
-0.18 
-0.24 
0.15 
-0.12 
0.00 
0.29* 
0.39 
0.13 
-0.15 
0.22 
0.10 
0.49 
0.40 
0.26 
0.06 
-0.39 
0.11 
0.11 
0.08 
0.11 
0.12 
0.12 
0.26 
0.21 
0.23 
0.38 
0.36 
0.31 
0.26 
0.08 
0.09 
0.15 
0.38 
0.38 
0.40 
0.37 
0.38 
0.43 
0.42 
0.41 
0.39 
0.33 
0.05 
0.05 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.07 
-0.11 
0.22 
-0.15 
0.05 
- 0 . 1 0 
-0.07 
-0.09 
0.06 
-0.05 
0.00 
0.11 
0.15 
0.05 
-0.06 
0.09 
0.04 
0.19 
0.16 
0.10 
0.02 
Number of cases 
Log-likelihood 
2(lnL-lnU) (x') 
Pseudo R- (1-lnL/lnLc) 
2088 
-1103.94 
673.16"°" 
0.23 
Notes: 
Values of 0.000 or -0.000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ±0.001 
"significant at 10% (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
""significant at 5% (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
"""significant at 1 % (two-tailed r-test for coefficients) 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union 
membership with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
^Base categories for dummy variables: Occupation - Labourer; Sector - Private sector; 
Establishment size - 500 or more employees; Industry - Public administration and defence, 
and community services industries; Political affiliation - no party affiliation or minor party 
affiliation; Location of residence - major urban centre (100,000+ residents); State of 
residence - New South Wales; Migrant status - Australian bom, English-speaking background; 
Mantal status - Never married; Region of birth - Australia. 
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TABLE A3.2 
Probit Models of Union Membership: 
Class Structure of Australia Survey^ 
I II 
Estimated s.e. Marginal Estimated s.e. 
Coefficient Effect^ Coefficient 
Experience 0 . 0 4 1 " 0.014 • 
0.016 
0 . 0 5 1 " 0.016 
(Experience)- -O-OOl"" 0.000 . - 0 . 0 0 1 " 0.000 
Education (years) 0.014 0.026 0.006 0.006 0.029 
Tenure in current job 0 . 0 9 1 " 0.017 0 . 1 0 5 " 0.019 
(Tenure)^ -0.002™ 0.001 0.035 - 0 . 0 0 2 " 0.001 
Hours of work 0.044"" 0.021 
•0.017 
0.014 0.024 
(Hours)^ - o . o o r 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Current occupation: 
Professional -0.22 0.18 -0.09 -0.13 0.20 
Manager, administrator - 0 . 8 5 " 0.24 -0.31 - 0 . 7 4 " 0.26 
Clerk -0.39" 0.18 -0.16 -0.26 0.20 
Salesperson -0.04 0.23 -0.01 0.11 0.27 
Transport, communications worker -0.10 0.28 -0.04 0.08 0.31 
Service, sport and recreation worker -0.07 0.23 -0.03 0.21 0.25 
Other occupations (agricultural worker. - 2 . 1 4 " 0.53 -0.51 -1.45" 0.61 
mine worker, member of the armed 
services) 
Managerial status: 
Manager -0.30' 0.18 -0.12 -0.18 0.19 
Supervisor 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.12 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 0 . 9 7 " 0.13 0.32 0 . 9 8 " 0.15 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture, mining 0.09 0.31 0.04 0.05 0.32 
Manufacturing -0.01 0.19 -0.00 -0.06 0.21 
Electricity, gas and water 0.19 0.46 0.07 0.05 0.49 
Construction -0.05 0.32 -0.02 -0.01 0.37 
Wholesale and retail trade -0.48" 0.22 -0.19 -0.49" 0.25 
Transport and storage 0.52" 0.22 0.19 0.47' 0.25 
Finance, property and business services -0.09 0.18 -0.04 -0.04 0.20 
Recreational and personal services -0.25 0.25 -0.10 -0.37 0.28 
State of residence: 
Victoria -0.12 0.12 -0.05 -0.12 0.14 
Queensland -0.23 0.15 -0.09 -0.24 0.16 
South Australia 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.18 
Western Australia -0.39"" 0.17 -0.15 -0.44" 0.20 
Tasmania -0.18 0.30 -0.07 -0.14 0.30 
Australian Capital Territory -0.63' 0.33 -0.24 -0.62' 0.36 
Migrant status: 
Migrated to Aust. < 18 years -0.12 0.15 -0.05 -0.15 0.18 
Migrated to Aust. > 18 years -0.13 0.14 -0.05 0.03 0.16 
Personal characteristics: 
Female 0.02 0.12 0.01 -0.05 0.13 
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Married -0.18 0.14 -0.07 -0.14 0.15 
Separated, divorced, widowed -0.39"* 0.20 -0.15 -0.47" 0.23 
No. of children 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 
Political affiliation: 
Labor 0.36*" 0.11 0.14 0 . 3 3 " 0 .12 
Coalition - 0 . 4 2 " 0.12 -0.17 -0.30" 
OK 0.14 
Attitude to unions: 
Anti-union attitude - - - -0.09" 0.02 
Constant -1 .50 - 0.62 - 0.13 0.78 
Number of cases 1001 834 
Log-likelihood -510.39 -409.23 
2( lnL-lnU) (x ') 365.54"" 336.64*" 
Pseudo R ' (1-lnL/lnLo) 0.26 0.29 
Notes: 
Values of 0 .000 or -0.000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ± 0 . 0 0 1 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
""significant at 5 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
"""significant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union 
membership with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
^ a s e categories for dummy variables: Occupation - Tradesperson, process worker, labourer; 
Managerial status - non-manager, non-supervisor; Sector - Private sector; Industry - Public 
administration and defence, and community services industries; Political affiliation - no party 
affiliation or minor party affiliation; State of residence - New South Wales; Migrant status -
Australian bom; Marital status - Never married. 
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Trade Union Coverage, Union Membership 
and the Union Wage Premium 
4.1 Introduction 
Several scholars (ie. Bain and Elsheikh, 1976; Spilsbury et. al. 1987; Payne, 
1989; Green, 1990; Visser, 1992) argue that when modelling union 
membership one needs to consider separately the individual's "propensity to 
unionise" from his or her "opportunity to unionise", where the opportunity to 
unionise means that there is a union present at the individual's place of work. 
The logic of the argument is self-evident: In some workplaces unions are 
actively engaged in providing a service to workers - union officials visit the 
workplace; there are workplace union delegates (shop stewards); workers are 
informed of the existence of the union, and are aware of the functions that it 
performs. In other workplaces, however, there is no active union presence -
union officials do not visit the workplace; there are no union delegates; and 
workers may not even be aware that there is a union which they are eligible to 
join. Clearly, a worker is much more likely to join a union if he or she is 
employed in a workplace with an active union presence rather than in one 
without an active union presence. 
In this chapter, we model union membership as a decision made by an 
individual conditional on the individual being employed in a location where 
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there is a union present. However, such a model of union membership must 
contend with the possibility of sample selection bias arising from the non-
random assignment of workers to unionised and non-unionised 
establishments.' Accordingly, we propose a two-stage model of unionised 
employment and union membership which allows us to address the issue of 
potential sample-selection bias. 
In the first stage, it is envisaged that utility-maximising workers choose 
between two sectors of employment: the unionised sector (which is comprised 
of workplaces which have an active union presence), and the non-unionised 
sector (which is comprised of establishments without an active union presence). 
We assume that workers may observe differences in the structures of 
compensation in the two sectors, or they may observe differences in working 
conditions in the two sectors or both. 
Workers who have secured employment in a unionised establishment 
are then assumed to be faced with the decision to join or not to join a union. 
That is, the decision to join a union is made conditional on the individual being 
engaged in unionised employment. 
Another issue addressed in this chapter is the question of what 
constitutes the most appropriate way to model union membership and wages. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 we argued that individuals with similar attributes and who 
'Formally, sample selection bias arises if the unobserved variables which Influence 
the probability of unionised employment are correlated with the unobserved determinants 
of union membership. For example, consider individuals with unmeasured attributes 
which indicate that the individuals are relatively more risk averse than other workers. 
Sample selection bias may arise if individuals with these unmeasured attributes are more 
likely to choose unionised employment, and are also more likely to choose to join a 
union. 
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perform similar tasks will, within a given plant, be remunerated on an equal 
basis irrespective of their union membership status. That is, we reject the 
proposition (which has gained some currency in the Australian literature) that a 
worker joining a union in a unionised establishment can, under normal 
circumstances, expect a wage gain just because he or she has become a union 
member. 
If this argument is correct, conventional membership-based estimates of 
the union wage premium will be biased downward, a point now explained. In 
the conventional approach, the union wage premium is measured by the 
coefficient of a union membership dummy in a standard wage regression. 
Alternatively, it is measured by estimating separate wage equations for 
members and non-members, and then by calculating the difference in the 
average predicted wages using the estimated parameters from the two wage 
equations. However, if unions increase the wages of all workers in unionised 
establishments, an estimate of the average union wage premium that is based 
on the union membership status of workers will be biased downward. This is 
because those non-union members employed in unionised workplaces receive 
the same wages as members and, therefore, also receive a wage premium. 
In this chapter, we fmd that there is a wage premium associated with 
unionised employment, and that this premium is approximately twice as large 
as a conventionally measured union membership wage premium. In addition, 
we find that there is no significant difference in the wages received by 
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members and non-members in unionised employment.^ 
Following Abowd and Farber (1982), we recognise that if there is a 
limited supply of unionised jobs, the existence of a wage premium raises the 
potential for there being an excess demand for unionised employment. The 
excess demand is manifested as a queue for unionised employment, and an 
individual only secures a unionised job if she is selected by a unionised 
employer from the queue. We assume that a single latent variable may be 
specified to model the joint outcome of these two decisions. 
Green (1990) has developed (for the U.K.) a model of union 
availability and membership which is similar to our model of unionised 
employment and union membership. However, our model is differentiated in 
two key respects. First, Green models union availability as a latent branch 
formation process. However, we believe that it is inappropriate to model this 
process using individual data. Rather we treat the stock of unionised jobs as 
being exogenously determined, and we focus instead on the process by which 
workers are allocated to these jobs. 
The second difference is that Green allows the structure of wages to 
differ for members and non-members in unionised employment, but does not 
consider differences in wages between the unionised and non-unionised sectors. 
In contrast, we allow the wage structures to differ between the two sectors. 
However, within the unionised sector, we assume that the wage structures are 
identical in the sense that the wage received by a worker in a unionised 
I^t must be stressed, however, that a detailed investigation of the union impact on 
wages is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather we focus on the specific question of 
whether or not union members in unionised establishments receive a wage premium. 
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establishment is assumed to be independent of his or her membership of a 
trade union. 
4.2 Union Density and the Extent of Unionised Employment 
Before elaborating our model of unionised employment and union membership, 
it is helpful to analyse some sample statistics using data from the Class 
Structure of Australia Survey and compare these statistics with those obtained 
from the Australian Industrial Relations Workplace Survey. 
The Class Structure of Australia Survey 
A unique feature of the CSA survey is that all employees are asked the 
question: "Is there a union at the place where you work?". Respondents who 
answer "yes" are then asked "Are you currently a union member?". Those 
who answer "no" to the membership question are asked a further question: 
"Are you eligible for membership in a union at the place where you work?". 
These questions allow workers' union coverage to be classified in 
several ways (see Figure 4.1). At the broadest level, workers can be classified 
according to whether or not they are employed in establishments with a union 
presence. In this chapter, individuals who are employed in such establishments 
are said to be engaged in unionised employment. 
A narrower measure is one based on eligibility for union membership. 
Eligible unionised workers are those who are employed in unionised 
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establishments, and who are eligible for membership of one of the trade unions 
present. Finally, in the conventional way, workers can be categorised 
according to their union membership status. 
FIGURE 4.1 
CSA Union Membership and Coverage Questions: An Overview 
/s tfjera a union at the 
place where you work? 
No (32%) Yaa (68%) 
Worker in norvunionised 
employment 
Wof1(er in unionised 
emptoyment 
Are you currently 
a union nwmber? 
Y0S (52%) No (16%) 
Union member in unionised Are you eligible for membership in 
employment a union at the place where you work? 
No (5%) Yes (11%) 
Worker in unionised Worker In unionised 
emptoyment, not eligible employment, eligible 
for membership for membership 
Corresponding to these categories, are three measures of union density. 
The first is the union membership density; that is, the proportion of all 
workers who are union members. This is the conventional measure of 
unionisation and it is also the narrowest. A broader measure is the unionised 
employment density; that is, the proportion of all workers who are employed 
in establishments where unions are actively present. Finally, we can measure 
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unionisation as the proportion of workers who are employed in unionised 
establishments and who are eligible for membership in one of the unions 
present at their place of work. Rather inelegantly, we call this the eligible 
unionised employment density. 
Table 4.1 reports the three different measures of union density for the 
full CSA sample, selected occupations and industries, and the private and 
public sectors. Perhaps the most striking finding is that only 68 percent of all 
respondents are employed in unionised locations.^ 
A central argument of this chapter is that union membership 
determination is a two-stage process. Seen this way, the union membership 
density rate is the product of: (i) the proportion of all workers in unionised 
employment who are eligible for union membership; and (ii) the union 
membership take-up rate by eligible unionised employees. 
I^t should be recalled, however, that the CSA survey covers only a sub-sample of the 
general workforce; namely, males regularly employed for 30 hours or more per week, 
and females working at least 15 hours per week in regular employment. Consequently, 
the sample means should be treated as biased estimates of the population means. In the 
particular, it is our expectation that the mean rate of unionised employment is biased 
upward because workers who are not in regular employment, or who work short part-
time hours are expected to be less likely to be in unionised employment than regularly 
employed part-time and full-time employees. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Measures of Trade Union Coverage: Selected Categories 
Unionised 
Employment Density 
(%) 
Eligible Unionised 
Employment 
Density (%} 
Union 
Membership 
Density (%) 
Full Sample: 68.1 62.8 52.0 
Sector: 
Private Sector 52.9 44.5 35.3 
Public Sector 87.5 86.2 73.0 
Industry: 
Manufacturing 67.3 52.8 44.0 
Electricity, gas and water 84.2 84.2 84.2 
Construction 60.0 52.0 48.0 
Wholesale and retail trade 44.1 34.2 22.5 
Transport and storage 84.4 83.3 75.6 
Finance, property and 
business services 
44.2 40.7 36.3 
Community services 82.6 81.2 67.1 
Recreational and personal 
services 
50.9 43.6 30.9 
Occupation: 
Managers and 
administrators 
60.7 40.4 23.6 
Professionals 75.7 70.7 59.5 
Clerks 65.1 60.6 46.3 
Salespersons 50.0 42.4 36.4 
Service, sport and 
recreation workers 
67.7 64.5 51.6 
Transport and 
communications workers 
80.4 80.4 74.5 
Tradespersons, process 
workers and labourers 
69.4 67.8 60.3 
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If union membership is available, workers tend to join unions in large 
numbers. (Table 4.2 shows that the average take-up rate of union membership 
among eligible unionised workers is more than 80 percent). This observation 
is consistent with the social custom model of union membership. Recall that 
one of the predictions of the social custom model is that an equilibrium union 
density rate is only maintained if a very substantial proportion of individuals in 
a workplace adhere to the social custom of union membership. If union 
membership falls below a critical threshold level, the workplace union density 
falls to zero. Thus, the social custom model predicts that workplace union 
density will either be zero or above some relatively high threshold rate. 
However, Table 4.2 also reveals that membership take-up rates vary 
considerably across different industries. For example, the average take-up rate 
exceeds 90 percent in the construction, transport and storage, and electricity, 
gas and water industries." On the other hand, the recreational and personal 
services, and wholesale and retail trade industries both have average take-up 
rates below 75 percent. 
"•Because of the small number of respondents in some of the industry categories, it 
should be borne in mind that these statistics are not precise estimates. 
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TABLE 4.2 
Membership Take-Up Rates: Selected Categories 
(Employees in Unionised Establishments 
Eligible for Membership Only) 
Membership Take-Up Rate 
(%) 
Full Sample: 
Sector: 
Private Sector 
Public Sector 
Industry: 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Transport and storage 
Finance, property and business services 
Conununity services 
Recreational and personal services 
Occupation: 
Managers and administrators 
Professionals 
Clerks 
Salespersons 
Service, sport and recreation workers 
Transport and communications workers 
Tradespersons, process workers and labourers 
82 .6 
79.3 
84.7 
83.3 
100.0 
92.3 
65.8 
90.7 
89.1 
82.5 
70.8 
58.3 
84.1 
76.4 
85.7 
80.0 
92.7 
88.9 
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The statistics reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide new insights into 
the determinants of union density rates for different groups of workers. As an 
example, consider managers and administrators. Managers and administrators 
have the lowest union membership rate of any occupation. Looking at Table 
4.1 we see that this very low membership rate can be partly explained by the 
fact that many managers, even when they are employed in unionised locations, 
are not eligible to become members of one of the unions present at their place 
of work. Nevertheless, as expected, even those managers who are employed 
in unionised establishments, and who are eligible for membership, are less 
likely to become union members than other workers: for example, 83 percent 
of all eligible unionised employees become union members, but only 58 
percent of eligible unionised managers take-up union membership. One of 
the most striking features of Australian unionism is the much higher incidence 
of union membership in the public sector. Until now, it has not been clear to 
what extent the difference is due to a higher level of unionised employment in 
the public sector, or due to a higher take-up rate of membership by public 
sector employees. The CSA survey reveals that almost all of the differential is 
attributable to the higher incidence of unionised employment in the public 
sector.^ Indeed, private sector workers who are employed in unionised 
'If V and V® are the proportions of workers who are employed in unionised 
establishments in the private and public sectors, and c^ and a® are the membership take-
up rates for these groups, then the membership differential between public and private 
sectors can be written as (V^a® - VaP). This differential can be decomposed as follows: 
(V a^® - VaP) = (V a^® - V^a^) + {V'a.^ - VcvP) 
The first term on the right hand side of this expression measures the part of the differen-
tial which can be attributed to the higher rate of eligible unionised employment in the 
public sector. The second term measures the part of the differential which is due to the 
higher take-up rate of union membership in the public sector. Using the statistics 
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establishments, and who are eligible for membership, have a membership rate 
which is only slightly lower than their public sector counterparts. 
The AWIRS Survey 
The only other major source of data on unionised employment in Australia is 
the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS). Significantly, 
the picture which emerges from the AWIRS confirms many of the features of 
the CSA data, although differences between the two surveys prevent exact 
comparisons being made. 
One such difference is the definition of what constitutes a unionised 
establishment. In the AWIRS, a unionised workplace is defined as an 
establishment with at least one employee who is a union member. However, 
using the CSA data, a unionised establishment is defined according to an 
individual's assessment of whether there is a union present in his or her 
workplace. 
Despite differences in the scope of the su^veys^ and in the definitions 
used, both the CSA and the AWIRS data paint very similar pictures of the 
patterns of unionised employment. For example, using the AWIRS data. 
Callus et. al. (1991) report that 77 percent of all workers in establishments of 
reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, it can be calculated that of the overall differential of 37.7 
percentage points, 35.3 percentage points are due to the higher rate of eligible unionised 
employment in the public sector, and 2.4 percentage points are due to the higher take-up 
rate of union membership by public sector workers. 
^Recall that the AWIRS is a survey of workplaces with at least 5 employees. 
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more than 5 employees are employed in unionised establishments. This is 
somewhat higher than the 68 percent of respondents to the CSA survey who 
report that there is a union present at their place of work, but nevertheless the 
two statistics are of similar orders of magnitude. 
The AWIRS data also confirm that the take-up rate of union 
membership among workers in unionised establishments is very high. Callus 
et. al. (1991) calculate that the average membership take-up rate in unionised 
workplaces with more than 20 employees is 71 percent. This is remarkably 
close to the average take-up rate for all unionised employees of 74.5 percent in 
the CSA survey.'''^ 
The AWIRS data also show that in 57 percent of all Australian 
workplaces with at least 5 employees, there are no union members. However, 
the non-unionised workplaces are heavily concentrated among very small 
establishments - only 73 percent of establishments with 20-49 employees are 
unionised, while 97 percent of establishments with 200-499 employees are 
unionised. Therefore, the lower rate of unionised employment reported by the 
respondents to the CSA survey might be explained, in part, by the fact that 
very small establishments are included in the CSA survey, but are excluded 
from the AWIRS. 
Finally, according to the AWIRS data, only 1 percent of public sector 
workplaces with more than 5 employees are not unionised, and 100 percent of 
^Note that this is the take-up rate among all unionised employees, not just those 
eligible for membership. 
^It might be added that it is almost the same as union membership rate reported by 
Drago et. al. (1992: p. 190) for a sample of Business Council of Australia workplaces. 
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public sector establishments of more than 20 employees are unionised. 
Although the rate of unionised employment reported by public sector 
respondents to the CSA survey (87.5 percent) is very high it is still somewhat 
lower than this. 
4.3 The Union Impact on Wages 
In recent years, there have been several studies of the impact of unions on 
individual wages in Australia.^ The union wage effect is typically estimated 
by the coefficient of a union membership dummy variable in a conventional 
semi-logarithmic wage equation. In some cases, separate wage equations are 
estimated for members and non-members. The estimates are then used to 
calculate the average wage gain associated with union membership. While the 
estimates vary considerably, the existing studies point to an average union 
membership differential somewhere in the order of 5 to 10 percent (for a 
comprehensive survey of the previous studies, see Miller and Mulvey, 1993). 
Given the widespread regulation of wages through the award system"'. 
^The major studies include Mulvey (1986), Miller and Rummery (1989), Christie 
(1992), and Kornfeld (1993). 
'°As discussed in Chapter 2, in Australia the basic wages and conditions of 80 
percent of employees are governed by the provisions of industrial awards and 
agreements. These awards are set by state and federal industrial tribunals. Most awards 
are minimum rates awards which prescribe minimum rates of pay and conditions for 
employees. Firms are legally obliged to pay these rates but may, if they wish, pay above 
the award. Such payments are called over-award payments. Some awards, principally 
those applying in the public sector, are paid rates awards. Employers bound by a paid 
rates award are legally required to remunerate their employees at precisely the award 
rate. 
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the source of the union membership wage premium is the source of much 
conjecture (Miller and Mulvey, 1993). There are, however, several possible 
explanations including the following: 
7. Over-award payments. One explanation for the union membership 
wage premium is that unions secure over-award payments for their 
members. These payments may be the product of unions exercising 
their bargaining power to extract from firms wages above the minimum 
award rates. Alternatively, in the context of an exit-voice or 
productivity model of unionism, the payments may be a form of rent-
sharing, where the firm shares with its workers the extra rents which 
come from higher levels of productivity associated with union voice 
effects. 
2. Over-time payments. If union members work more overtime than non-
members, union members will have, on average, a higher hourly wage 
rate than non-members because overtime is paid for at premium 
rates." 
3. Distribution of union members across awards. Historically, award rates 
of pay have been shaped by a range of forces including trade union 
strength. While there does not seem to be any research on this issue, it 
is likely that the award wages paid to workers covered by strong unions 
" Miller and Mulvey (1991) adjust the hourly rate of pay to account for overtime 
payments. However, they find that only a small part of the union wage premium 
estimated using a standard measure of hourly wages can be attributed to the failure to 
adjust for overtime payments. 
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are higher than those paid to workers covered by weaker unions. For 
example, it is usually thought that one determinant of a union's strength 
is the extent of its membership coverage. That is, it is thought that 
unions with high rates of membership are likely to be stronger than 
those with low rates of membership. It is likely, then, that union 
members are concentrated in those occupations and industries with the 
strongest unions. Consequently, the union wage premium may be the 
result of union members being distributed across awards in such a way 
that the average award rate of pay of members is higher than that of 
non-members. 
4. Compensating wage differentials. A further explanation for the union 
membership wage premium is that it is actually a compensating wage 
differential. For example, Duncan and Stafford (1980) hypothesise that 
unions are more likely to be present in establishments with shared 
working conditions, and that such settings are characterised by 
structured work arrangements, inflexible hours, employer-set overtime 
and a faster pace of work. They argue, therefore, that the higher 
wages paid to union members represent a compensating wage 
differential for undesirable working conditions. 
5. Union monitoring and enforcement of awards. While it may be a legal 
requirement for firms to pay award wages, it does not necessarily 
follow that all firms actually obey the award; indeed, firms may pay 
their workers less than award rates. However, trade unions act to 
ensure that their members are informed of the provisions of awards and 
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are remunerated in accordance with those awards. Thus, a union 
membership wage premium may arise because union members are paid 
in accordance with awards while some non-members are paid under-
award wages. 
In Chapter 2 we briefly outlined some theoretical arguments to support 
the proposition that, within a unionised plant (and, possibly, firm), any wage 
premium enjoyed by union members is also enjoyed by non-members. First, 
we argued that, in order to avoid harming the employment prospects of their 
members, unions have an incentive to see that non-members are remunerated 
on an equal footing with union members. Similarly, we argued that 
(particularly in teamwork settings) firms seeking to maintain worker harmony 
and cooperation, have an incentive to pay workers who perform similar tasks 
equal rates. 
An examination of the different explanations of the conventionally 
estimated union membership wage premium reinforces this argument. For 
example, if the measured premium relates to differences in the distribution of 
members and non-members across awards, then it does not follow that a 
worker, simply by joining a union will be able to improve his or her wage. 
After all, the worker is already covered by a particular award and joining a 
union does not change that fact. Similarly, if the premium is really a 
compensating wage differential, joining a union does not change the fact that 
the worker is already employed under unpleasant conditions and is 
compensated for these conditions. 
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In short, we endorse Alison Booth's (1986) argument that, at the 
margin, workers do not expect a wage gain from joining a union. 
However, whether this argument is correct is ultimately an empirical question. 
In Section 4.6 we shall produce empirical evidence which suggests that: (i) 
workers in unionised establishments receive a wage premium compared to 
those in non-unionised establishments, and (ii) there is no wage advantage 
associated with union membership in unionised establishments. 
4.4 A Model of Unionised Employment, Union Membership and Wages 
Following the approach adopted in Chapter 3, a worker is assumed to join a 
union if he or she expects a net utility gain from doing so. Recall that the 
estimated model consists of the following equations: 
= ^ ( 4 1 ) 
u, = Ku;) 
where U'j is unobserved index which measures the individual's expected utility 
gain from membership, X,; is a vector of characteristics which reflect the costs 
and benefits of union membership, and I(-) is an indicator function. If U*i>0 
'^Booth (1986: p.43) expresses her argument in the following terms: 
" . . . I believe that the level of wages in a plant is unaltered by an 
individual 's decision to join at the margin, although it is affected by the 
relevant un ion ' s bargaining strength, which is closely related to the 
overall t rade union density for the particular bargaining unit ." 
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the worker joins the union ( U i = l ) , otherwise the worker does not join ( U i = 0 ) . 
Finally, the error term, e,;, is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean 
of zero (ie. eii~N(0,(Ti^)). 
In this chapter, we seek to model union membership as a decision made 
conditional on unionised employment. However, before doing so we shall 
elaborate our model of unionised employment. 
First, we assume that the stock of unionised jobs is a function of the 
demand for and supply of union services. Focussing on the supply side, if it is 
assumed that the union's objective is to maximise its profits, the union will 
maintain a presence in an establishment so long as the marginal revenue 
derived from the establishment is greater than, or equal to, the marginal cost 
of maintaining a presence in that establishment. Alternatively, (and perhaps 
more plausibly), if the union's objective is to maximise its membership, the 
union will maintain a presence in those plants that deliver the greatest number 
of members consistent with the overall constraint that total union costs do not 
exceed total revenue. 
The costs of organising and maintaining a presence in a given 
workplace are assumed to be a function of, among other things, the size and 
location of the plant as well as the degree of employer resistance to 
unionisation. While Australian firms cannot prevent unionisation in the same 
way as firms in the United States can, they can still influence the costs of 
union organisation. As we noted in Chapter 3, employers can encourage union 
membership in several ways: for example, by allowing union meetings in 
company time, by facilitating workplace union visits by union officials, or by 
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allowing automatic payroll deductions of union fees. 
At the establishment level, the demand for and supply of union services 
are endogenous. However, to simplify, we shall assume that the process 
which determines whether a workplace is unionised or not is exogenous to the 
individual's decision to join a union. That is, seen from the individual's 
perspective, whether a job is unionised or not is independent of his or her 
individual desire for union representation. 
We now assume that workers are able to observe differences between 
unionised and non-unionised workplaces. These differences may be manifested 
in the wage and fringe benefit structures offered, or in other conditions of 
employment. Following Farber (1983a), workers are assumed to evaluate the 
expected utilities derived from employment in each sector, and seek unionised 
employment if it yields a net utility gain over non-unionised employment.'^ 
Assume that the utility individual i expects to derive from employment 
in a given sector j is a function of the wage received in the sector as well as a 
function of the other pecuniary and non-pecuniary job characteristics. The 
utility function can be represented by 
(4.2) 
'^ It might be argued that many workers making the employment decision are not 
aware of the unionisation status of the different jobs they are considering. However, a 
model which envisages workers choosing between employment in the unionised and non-
unionised sectors is still appropriate as long as there differences in the conditions offered 
by unionised and non-unlonlsed establishments that are observed by workers. 
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where w/ is the log hourly wage received in the yth sector ( j=UE indicates 
employment in the unionised sector; j = N E indicates employment in the non-
unionised sector), and B/ is a vector of other pecuniary and non-pecuniary job 
characteristics. 
The difference in the utilities expected to be derived in the two sectors 
is modelled as a function of the differentials in wage and non-wage 
characteristics between the two sectors and, because utility functions are likely 
to vary across individuals, as a function of personal attributes, ie. 
^ ^ (4.3) 
where M, is a vector of personal characteristics and is a random error term. 
Now assume that individual i has a wages function of the form 
where Z; is a vector of human capital and other wage-determining 
characteristics, ^^  is a parameter vector which is assumed to be constant across 
individuals in a given sector, and TJ/ is a random error term. Substituting (4.4) 
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into (4.3) yields 
Information on non-wage job characteristics is not available in the data used 
here (this is also true of most other individual data sources). Therefore, we 
must either assume that the differences are captured by the error term, or that 
the individual does not believe that there are any differences in the non-wage 
characteristics (ie. B"^- = 0). Now (4.5) is written in compact form as 
where Jj is a vector that includes wage-determining and other personal 
characteristics, and u^ is assumed to be a normally distributed random error 
term. 
If there are sufficient unionised jobs so that every worker who desires a 
unionised job is offered one, then an individual is observed in unionised 
employment if the difference in his or her expected utilities is positive (ie. 
Ii*>0). However, if there is an excess demand for unionised employment, 
then the desire for a unionised job alone is not sufficient for the individual to 
hold such a job (Abowd and Farber, 1982). In this situation, there is a queue 
for unionised employment, and an individual only secures a unionised job if he 
or she is selected from the queue. 
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If there is an excess demand for unionised employment, it will pay 
unionised employers to select the most productive workers from the queue. 
Conditional on the individual i being in the queue, the employer's decision to 
hire that worker is modelled as 
where C' is an unobserved index which captures the propensity of the 
individual to be chosen from the queue, and Qj is a vector of variables which 
influence the probability that the individual is chosen from the queue. These 
variables include personal and human capital attributes (which signal the 
worker's productivity to the unionised employer), and industry and occupation 
variables (which capture the relative supplies of unionised jobs to workers in 
different segments of the labour market). 
If there is a queue for unionised employment, then the probability that 
the worker is observed in such a job is 
Pr(C/£. = l) = Pr(/. = 1 & C. = l) 
= />r(C. = l | / .= l ) / ' r ( / . = l) 
(4.8) 
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Substituting from (4.6) and (4.7) we have 
Pr{UE, = 1) = />r(/; >0) P^C* >0) ( 4 9 ) 
If Uii and U2i are independently distributed normal variables then (4.9) can be 
estimated using a partially observable bivariate probit model. Poirier (1980) 
discusses the estimation of a model of this type. In general, the model is 
identified if there is at least one variable that is included in one of the 
equations but excluded from the other. 
If there is no queue for unionised employment, then the process by 
which workers sort into unionised employment is described by (4.6) and can 
be estimated as a independent probit model. On the other hand, if there is a 
queue then the partially observable bivariate probit model described by (4.9) is 
estimated instead. In preliminary work, the estimation of several different 
specifications of the partially observable bivariate probit model was attempted. 
However, these attempts were characterised by convergence problems and 
unstable parameter estimates. Therefore, faced with being unable to estimate 
the queue model (given the constraints of the available data), we follow Farber 
(1983b) and assume that the propensity to be in unionised employment can be 
represented by a single unobserved index, UE*. The "reduced form" equation 
describing the allocation of workers to unionised employment is written as a 
function of the independent variables in (4.6) and (4.7); that is 
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where Xj; is a vector which contains the elements of J; and Q,, jSj is a vector of 
parameters that determine an individual's probability of unionised employment, 
and eji is a normally distributed zero mean random error term (ie, 
Returning to the union membership equation, recall that the union 
membership decision is made conditional on the worker being employed in a 
unionised establishment. If e,i is distributed as a standard normal random 
variable conditional on the worker being employed in a unionised establishment 
(that is, conditional on ej.^-XjiiSj), then standard probit estimation of the union 
membership equation is consistent. However, if there are unobserved 
variables common to both the union membership and unionised employment 
equations, then the errors are likely to be correlated. For example, if it is 
assumed that €y, and ejj are distributed as bivariate normal random variables, 
the conditional density of e,i is (Farber, 1983b) 
J —00 
where 4>2(-) and ^>2(-) are, respectively, the bivariate normal density and 
distribution functions; and a,2 is the covariance between the errors of the two 
equations. Note that if the errors are independent, (ie. if (7,2 = 0), (4.3) 
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collapses to the standard normal density function, and a standard probit model 
estimates the membership equation consistently. 
If, however, the errors are correlated then standard probit estimation of 
the membership equation will yield biased parameter estimates. Intuitively, the 
selection bias arises if the group of workers in unionised employment have 
unobserved attributes which make them more likely, (or perhaps less likely), to 
join unions than the general population of workers. Following van de Ven and 
van Praag (1981) and Farber (1983b), the likelihood function which accounts 
for potential sample selection bias under the assumption of normally distributed 
errors can be derived in a straight-forward manner. 
First, the contribution of the individual who joins a union in a unionised 
establishment is given by 
PriU. = l ,C/£, = 1) = ^4^2) 
while the contribution of the individual who does not join the union is 
' W - 1'' (4.13) 
Finally, U; is not observed for workers in non-unionised employment. The 
contribution of these workers is therefore 
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Pr{UE=0)=r ^ ) d e , (4.14) 
= 
Using the above information the likelihood function can be written as 
, , I ^ ^ 
where N, is the number of union members in unionised employment, N is the 
total number of unionised workers, and M is the total number of workers in 
both unionised and non-unionised employment. The model defined by (4.15) 
is often referred to as a "bivariate probit with sample selection", or a "probit 
with probit sample selection". 
Estimation of the Reduced Form Model of Union Membership 
Thus far, we have not distinguished unionised and eligible unionised 
employment. However, the distinction is important, and it is the source of 
some potential complications. For example, is the individual's job decision 
based on whether or not the workplace is unionised, or whether the job that he 
or she is interested in is unionised? 
If unions improve the remuneration and/or the employment conditions 
of all workers in unionised establishments, irrespective of their eligibility for 
membership, then a model which envisages workers sorting into unionised 
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employment would be preferred. If, however, unions only improve the 
conditions of employment and remuneration of their members and potential 
members, then a model which envisages workers sorting into eligible unionised 
employment would make more sense. 
Of course, whether workers make their employment decision on the 
basis of unionised or eligible unionised employment has implications for the 
estimation of the structural model. For example, if unions only improve the 
conditions of workers who are employed in locations where a union is actively 
represented and who are also eligible for membership of a represented union, 
then the approach to be taken is clear. The bivariate probit model of unionised 
employment and membership would be specified such that only workers who 
are eligible for membership of a union in their unionised workplace are 
assumed to make the union membership decision. 
However, assume that the following are true: (i) the conditions of 
employment in unionised establishments are improved equally for both eligible 
employees and non-eligible employees; and (ii) only workers eligible for 
membership in a union which is active in their workplace define the pool of 
potential union members. In this case, a more complicated multiple index 
model would be preferable to the double index model defined by (4.15). Such 
a model would consist of at least three equations: (i) an equation modelling 
'"•That is, the model would consist of two stages. First, it would be assumed that 
workers choose between being employed in a unionised establishment in which they 
would be eligible for membership of one of the unions present, or being employed in a 
non-unionised establishment or a unionised establishment in which they would not be 
eligible for membership. If selected by a unionised employer, they would then choose 
whether to join the relevant union. 
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the sorting of workers into unionised employment; (ii) an equation capturing 
eligibility for union membership; and (iii) a union membership equation. 
This scenario gives rise to an unusual estimation problem. The first 
stage decision creates the potential for sample selection bias in the union 
membership equation. However, the intervening eligibility step is almost 
certainly an independent selection criterion'^ and, taken by itself, will not 
impart bias in the union membership equation. It is not clear how the potential 
bias from the first equation should now be handled in the presence of this 
intervening exogenous selection process. Consequently, no attempt is made to 
estimate this unusually structured model. 
4.5 Estimation Results 
To start, we estimate the bivariate probit model of unionised employment and 
union membership defined by (4.15). The estimates are presented in Table 
4.3. Column I gives the estimates of the reduced form model of unionised 
employment while column II gives the estimated parameters of the union 
membership equation. For comparison, column III reports the independent 
probit estimates of the determinants of union membership using the sub-sample 
of workers in unionised employment. 
'^For example, it does not seem likely that job seekers make job choice decisions on 
the basis of whether they will be eligible for membership of a particular union or not. 
Presumably, what matters are the conditions of employment offered In different jobs. 
Therefore, once a worker has secured employment in a unionised location, the issue of 
eligibility is taken as given: it is something over which the worker has no control. 
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TABLE 4.3 
Bivariate Probit Model of Unionised Employment and Union Membership 
Bivariate Probit 
(1001 cases) 
I 
Unionised Employment 
Pr(UE=l ') 
B s.e. 
II 
Union Membership 
P r ( U = l ) 
0 s.e. 
Independent Probit 
(680 cases) 
m 
Union Membership 
P r ( U = l | U E = l ) 
0 s.e. Marginal 
Effect' 
Experience 0.031* 0.016 0.036 0.027 0.036" 0.018 
0.009 
(Experience)^ 0.000 0.000 -o .oo r 0.000 - o . o o r 0.000 
Education (years) 0.006 0.025 0.002 0.037 0.002 0.035 0.000 
Tenure in current job - - 0.097"° 0.024 0.097"" 0.022 
(Tenure)^ - - -0.002"" 0.001 -0 .002" • 0.001 0.024 
Hours of work 0.020 0.032 0.020 0.031 
• 0.005 
(Hours)^ - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Current occupation: 
Professional 0.09 0.18 -0.74"" 0.29 -0.74 '" 0.26 -0.25 
Manager, administrator 0.01 0.20 -1.58"" 0.32 -1.58 '" 0.31 -0.57 
Clerk -0.07 0.18 -0.96"" 0.25 - 0 . 9 6 " 0.25 -0.34 
Salesperson -0.04 0.22 -0.26 0.34 -0.26 0.35 -0.08 
Transport, -0.16 0.30 -0.15 0.41 -0.15 0.42 -0.04 
communications worker 
Service, sport and 0.15 0.22 -0.71" 0.34 -0.71" 0.30 -0.24 
recreation worker 
Other occupations - 2 . 0 3 " 0.43 -1.43 2.54 -1.43 1.08 -0.52 
Managerial status: 
Manager - - -0.39 0.24 -0.39' 0.22 -0.12 
Supervisor - - 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.15 0.01 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 1.24"" 0.14 0.27 0.95 0.27 0.18 0.06 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture, mining 0.41 0.31 -0.23 0.61 -0.23 0.49 -0.07 
Manufacturing 0.52''" 0.18 -0.83 0.56 - 0 . 8 3 " 0.27 -0.29 
Construction 0.12 0.28 -0.53 0.57 -0.53 0.48 -0.17 
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Wholesale and retail 
trade 
-0.11 0.21 -0.71- 0.35 - o . 7 r 0.32 -0.24 
Transport and storage 0.72" 0.28 0.28 0.46 0.28 0.29 0.06 
Finance, property and 
business services 
-0.38*" 0.19 0.41 0.45 0.41 0.28 0.09 
Recreational and 
personal services 
-0.15 0.21 -0.29 0.42 -0.29 0.35 -0.09 
Personal characteristics 
Migrated < 18 years -0.22 0.14 -0.07 0.29 -0.07 0.21 -0.02 
Migrated > 18 years -0.25' 0.15 -0.03 0.28 -0.03 0.19 -0.01 
Female 0.10 0.11 -0.24 0.19 -0.24 0.15 -0.07 
Married -0.01 0.14 -0.15 0.18 -0.15 0.17 -0.04 
Separated, divorced, 
widowed 
-0.44" 0.21 -0.04 0.45 -0.04 0.27 -0.01 
No. children -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.01 
Political affiliation: 
Labor - - 0.23 0.15 0.23' 0.14 0.05 
Coalition - - -0.46"" 0.18 -0.46"" 0.16 -0.15 
Constant -0.39 0.39 0.77 1.83 0.77 0.84 -
0.07 (1.63) -
Log-Likelihood -791.895 -289.68 
2(lnL-lnLo) (x') 251.69-"+ 165.00™ 
Pseudo R^ (1-lnL/lnLo) 0.20+ 0.22 
Notes: 
Values of 0.000 or -0.000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ±0.001 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
""significant at 5 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
•""significant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
^Estimated from an independent probit model of unionised employment. 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union 
membership with all other variables set at their mean values. 
Base categories for dummy variables: Occupation - Tradesperson, process worker, labourer; 
Managerial status - non-manager, non-supervisor; Sector - Private sector; Industry - Public 
administration and defence, public utilities, and community services industries; Political 
affiliation - no party affiliation or minor party affiliation; Migrant status - Australian bom; 
Marital status - Never married. 
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The parameter estimates in column I determine the individual's 
estimated probability of unionised employment.'^ Several of the estimates are 
worthy of comment. 
First, with the exception of the other occupations' coefficient'^ none 
of the occupational coefficients are statistically significant. This indicates, for 
example, that a manager or administrator does not have a significantly lower 
estimated probability of unionised employment than a tradesperson or a process 
worker (the base occupations). Moreover, it implies that the significant 
differences in the probabilities of union membership across occupations 
reported in Chapter 3 are not the product of strong differences in the 
availability of union membership across occupations. Rather, it would seem 
that workers in different occupations have different propensities for union 
membership. 
There is some evidence that workers with longer experience are more 
likely to be employed in unionised establishments (in particular, the estimated 
coefficient indicates that an extra year's experience increases an individual's 
probability of being employed in a unionised workplace by approximately 1 
percentage point). This suggests that part of the reason why younger workers 
' t e n u r e , hours of work and managerial status are excluded from the unionised 
employment equation. These variables are excluded for two reasons. First, tenure, 
hours of work and managerial status are assumed to be independent of the individual's 
decision to seek unionised employment (and also to be independent of the unionised 
employer's decision to offer such employment). The second reason is that the bivariate 
probit model is not identified if the unionised employment and union membership 
equations contain the same variables. 
'^Recall that the other occupations dummy variable is for agricultural workers, mine 
workers and members of the armed services. Less than 3.5% of all respondents are in 
this occupational category. 
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are less likely to be union members than older workers is because they are less 
likely to be employed in unionised establishments. Interestingly, researchers 
investigating youth membership in Britain also find that young employees are 
less likely to be employed in unionised workplaces than older employees 
(Spilsbury et. al. 1987; Payne, 1989). 
One of the strongest determinants of unionised employment is public 
sector employment. In particular, the estimated coefficient indicates that the 
probability of unionised employment is approximately 30 percentage points 
higher for a public sector employee than it is for a similar private sector 
employee.'^ 
The covariance between the unobserved determinants of unionised 
employment and union membership, a,2, is positive (0.07) but statistically 
insignificant (indeed, the standard error is more than 20 times larger than the 
estimated covariance). 
Note that the estimated covariance provides a test of sample selection 
bias in the union membership equation. Because the covariance is 
insignificant, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no sample 
selection bias. However, this result must be treated cautiously. First, the test 
'^As in Chapter 3, we evaluate the marginal effect at the sample means of all of the 
independent variables. 
'^If the estimate were significant, a positive covariance would imply that individuals 
with unmeasured characteristics that indicate that they are more likely to be in unionised 
employment are also more likely to join unions. 
^"In addition to the bivariate probit model of unionised employment and union 
membership reported in Table 4 .3 we also estimated a bivariate probit model of eligible 
unionised employment and union membership. However, the estimated covariance was 
also insignificant (ff i2=-0.45, s .e = 0.81) . 
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is sensitive to the assumption that the error terms are normally distributed. 
Second, as outlined earlier, the sample selection process may be best modelled 
as a two-stage process with workers first choosing employment in a unionised 
establishment, and with their eligibility for membership being determined by 
an exogenous process. Notwithstanding these cautions, our discussion now 
focuses on the indep)endent probit estimates of union membership presented in 
Table 4.4. 
In column I of Table 4.4 the membership equation is estimated, in the 
standard manner, using the full sample of all workers. In column II the 
sample is restricted to workers in unionised employment only. (That is, the 
probability of union membership is estimated conditional on unionised 
employment). Finally, column III gives the independent probit estimates of 
union membership using the sub-sample of eligible unionised employees. 
Because the estimates in the first column of Table 4.4 have already 
been discussed in detail in Chapter 3,^' we focus here on the changes in the 
estimates arising from the conditional union membership equations. However, 
before discussing the changes, it is interesting to note that the signs and 
significance of many of the estimates do not vary greatly. For example, the 
coefficients on the managerial/administrative and clerical dummies are 
significant and negative in each of the estimated equations. Similarly, the job 
^'Note that there are some minor differences in the specifications. First, because of 
the small number of Individuals in the electricity, gas and water industry, we have 
included this industry in the omitted base category (along with the public administration 
and community services industries). Second, state of residence variables are not included 
in the membership equation reported in Table 4.4. These specification changes have no 
appreciable effect on the estimated coefficients. 
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tenure coefficient is significant and positive in each equation. Finally, in all 
equations the Coalition voter dummy has a significantly negative coefficient. 
(The Labor coefficient is positive in all equations, but insignificant conditional 
on eligible unionised employment). 
There are, however, some notable changes in the estimates. One 
example is the coefficient on the female dummy. Consistent with the results of 
many previous studies, the female coefficient is insignificant when the 
membership equation is estimated using the full sample. However, when the 
sample is restricted to workers in unionised employment, the coefficient is 
negative and marginally significant. If the sample is restricted further to 
workers in eligible unionised employment, the coefficient is significant at the 5 
percent level and negative. That is, conditional on being engaged in eligible 
unionised employment, a female worker has a lower estimated probability of 
union membership than a male worker with similar attributes. As we shall see 
in Chapter 5 this result probably reflects the fact that far fewer women are 
employed in closed shops than men. 
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TABLE 4.4 
Independent Probit Models of Union Membership 
Full Sample 
(1001 cases) 
I 
P r ( U = l ) 
Unionised 
Employment 
(680 cases) 
II 
P r ( U = l | U E = l ) 
Eligible Unionised 
Employment 
(627 cases) 
ffl 
P r ( U = l | E U E = l ) 
0 s.e. P s.e. 0 s.e. 
Experience 0.040" 0.014 0.036" 0.018 0.042" 0.020 
(Experience)^ -0.001"" 0.000 - o . o o r 0.000 -0.001" 0.000 
Education (years) 0.015 0.025 0.002 0.035 0.020 0.038 
Tenure in current job 0 .091" 0.017 0 . 0 9 7 " 0.022 0 . 1 1 5 " 0.027 
(Tenure)- -0.002™ 0.001 -0.002" " 0.001 -0.002" 0.001 
Hours of work 0.041" 0.021 0.020 0.031 0.012 0.034 
(Hours)^ - o . o o r 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Current occupation: 
Professional -0.24 0.18 -0 .74" 0.26 -0.19 0.29 
Manager, administrator -0 .91" 0.24 -1 .58" 0.31 - 1 . 1 9 " 0.37 
Clerk -0.42~ 0.18 -0 .96" 0.25 -0.56" 0.28 
Salesperson -0.03"" 0.23 -0.26 0.35 0.61 0.49 
Transport, communications 
worker 
-0.09 0.28 -0.15 0.42 -0.02 0.44 
Service, sport and recreation 
worker 
-0.08 0.22 -0.71" 0.30 -0.30 0.32 
Other occupations -2 .12" 0.52 -1.43 1.08 -1.97' 1.10 
Managerial status: 
Manager -0.27 0.18 -0.39' 0.22 -0.04 0.27 
Supervisor 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.15 0.12 0.17 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 0 . 9 4 " 0.13 0.27 0.18 0.14 0.20 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture, mining 0.12 0.31 -0.23 0.49 0.20 0.59 
Manufacturing -0.01 0.19 -0 .83" 0.27 -0.18 0.32 
Construction -0.08 0.31 -0.53 0.48 0.18 0.63 
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Wholesale and retail trade -0.49" • 0.22 -0.71' " 0.32 -0.68* 0.39 
Transport and storage 0.53*" 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.37 0.31 
Finance, property and business -0.11 0.18 0.41 0.28 0.91** 0.36 
services 
Recreational and personal -0.26 0.25 -0.29 0.35 -0.16 0.39 
services 
Personal characteristics 
Migrated < 18 years -0.12 0.15 -0.07 0.21 -0.24 0.23 
Migrated > 18 years -0.15 0.14 -0.03 0.19 -0.11 0.22 
Female 0.02 0.12 -0.24 0.15 -0.35** 0.17 
Married -0.16 0.13 -0.15 0.17 -0.04 0.19 
Separated, divorced, widowed -0.36* 0.20 -0.04 0.27 0.06 0.29 
No. children 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 
Political affiliation: 
Labor 0 .34" ' 0.11 0.23* 0.14 0.25 0.16 
Coalition -0 .43~ 0.12 -0.46' •** 0.16 -0 .51" 0.18 
Constant -1.51" 0.61 0.77 0.84 0.16 0.94 
Log-Likelihood - 515.66 - 289.68 -232.37 
2(lnL-lnLJ (X*) 355.00"" 165.00*** 111.40" 
Pseudo (1-lnL/lnLo) 0.26 0.22 0.19 
Notes: 
Values of 0.000 or -0.000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ±0.001 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed Mest for coefficients) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed Mest for coefficients) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed Mest for coefficients) 
Base categories for dummy variables: Occupation - Tradesperson, process worker, labourer; 
Managerial status - non-manager, non-supervisor; Sector - Private sector; Industry - Public 
administration and defence, public utilities, and community services industries; Political 
affiliation - no party affiliation or minor party affiliation; Migrant status - Australian bom; 
Mantal status - Never married. 
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One of the most robust findings from standard models of unionism is 
the very strong impact of public sector employment on an individual's 
estimated probability of union membership. However, conditional on eligible 
unionised employment, the estimated coefficient on the public sector 
employment dummy is insignificant. In other words, provided that they are 
employed in unionised establishments, private sector employees have the same 
estimated probability of joining a union as their public sector counterparts. 
This is an interesting and important finding. 
However, it cannot be concluded that public and private sector 
employees have commensurate desires for union membership once the 
availability of membership is controlled. For example, in Chapter 5 we report 
that less than 50 percent of union members in the public sector are compulsory 
members, while 68 percent of private sector union members are employed in 
closed shops. Therefore, it is probable that if we were able to control for both 
union availability and compulsory membership, we would find that public 
sector employees would still be more likely to become union members than 
private sector employees. Nevertheless, the estimates presented here indicate 
that a substantial part of the overall difference in union membership rates 
between the two sectors is due to the lower availability of union membership in 
the private sector. 
In the standard model of union membership, (that is, the model 
estimated using the full sample), the hours of work coefficient is positive and 
significant. This finding is usually interpreted as full-time workers having a 
greater attachment to their jobs, and therefore placing more value on the job 
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protection and social custom benefits of union membership. However, 
conditional on unionised employment, the hours of work coefficient is 
insignificant. This indicates that permanent part-time employees^^ are less 
likely to be in unionised establishments than full-timers. It also indicates that, 
given the availability of membership, there is no significant difference in the 
propensities of full and permanent part-time employees to become union 
members. 
The finance and business services industry coefficient also provides an 
example of how modelling union membership using the full sample obscures 
important relationships. Using the full sample, the coefficient is insignificant. 
However, conditional on being in eligible unionised employment, a worker in 
the finance and business services industry has a significantly higher probability 
of union membership than a worker with similar attributes employed in one of 
the base industries (public administration and defence, and community 
services). 
In short, the insignificant finance industry coefficient in the standard 
union membership equation masks two significant effects. First, employees in 
the industry are significantly less likely to be in unionised employment than 
those in the base industries (see Table 4.3). But, given the availability of 
union membership, finance industry employees are significantly more likely to 
become union members than similar employees in the base industries. 
^^Recall that the CSA data only include employees who are in regular employment. 
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4.6 Union Coverage and the Union Wage Differential 
Our model of unionised employment is based on the assumption that workers 
are able to observe differences in the working conditions and compensation 
packages offered by unionised and non-unionised firms. That is not to say, 
however, that unions, particularly through the award system, do not influence 
the working conditions or remuneration of non-unionised workers. Rather, it 
assumes that a union presence has an additional impact which is manifested as 
differences in working conditions or rates of compensation, or both. In 
particular, our model of unionised employment allows (but does not require) 
the wage structure to differ between the two sectors. 
The union wage differential is conventionally estimated by including a 
union membership dummy in a wage equation, or by allowing full interactions 
and estimating separate wage equations for union members and non-members. 
Throughout the thesis we have argued, at some length, that the wage received 
by an individual in a unionised plant will be independent of his or her union 
membership status. However, whether this argument is correct is ultimately 
an empirical question. Accordingly, in this section, we seek to answer three 
questions: (i) Is there a wage differential associated with unionised 
employment? (ii) If so, is the unionised employment differential greater than 
the conventional union membership differential? and (iii) Do members in 
unionised establishments receive higher wages than non-members? 
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Modelling Wages and Union Coverage 
Recall that we assume that the individual i has a wages function of the form 
where Wj is the log hourly wage, and Z, is a vector of human capital and other 
wage-determining characteristics. The superscript j indicates the union status 
of the worker.^^ 
If we follow the conventional approach by categorising workers 
according to their membership status, and allow only the intercept term to vary 
between union members and non-members, the wage equation to be estimated 
is 
^NU TT/SiU iNU. ^ = 60 - So ) 6 1 + 6 3 . 
where Uj is a union membership dummy, Z,"^  contains the same elements as Zj 
but excludes the constant, and the 61 is a row vector of parameters excluding 
the intercept parameter. The union membership differential, d, is measured by 
^^Categorising workers by union membership status: j = U for union members and 
j = NU for non-union members. Categorising workers by both union membership and 
unionised employment status: j = UUE for union members, j = NUE for non-union 
members in unionised establishments, and j = NE for workers in non-unionised employ-
ment. 
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the coefficient of the union membership dummy (ie. 
It is often assumed that there the error term in (4.17), €3; (eji = 
and the union membership dummy, conditional on Z,, are 
correlated. If this is so, the OLS estimate of d (given by the coefficient of the 
union membership dummy) is biased. However, consistent estimates may be 
obtained by using instrumental variables estimation (Duncan and Leigh, 1985), 
or by using the Heckman's (1979) control function approach. For the control 
function approach the model to be estimated is 
= (4-18) 
where Ri = ((/)i(U,-4'i))/(<i'i(l-^i)) is the generalised residual from a reduced form 
probit model of union membership (Gourieroux et. al. 1987; Vella and 
Verbeek, 1993), and a^ is the covariance between the error term in the 
membership probit equation, 6,i, and the error term in the wage equation, 63,. 
However, Poirier (1980) has shown that the standard control function 
approach is incorrect if the selection mechanism consists of more than one 
decision, such as when workers who have secured unionised employment 
subsequently choose whether to join the union. Under these circumstances, the 
•^^ The percentage union-non-union wage differential, D, is given by D = e''-1. 
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full model consists of a wage equation and two selection equations. 
v: 
UE-
w; ; _ 3i 
Union Membership Equation 
Unionised Employment Equation 
Wage Equation 
(4.19) 
Note that the wage equation has been specified so as to allow all of the 
parameters to vary for union members, non-members in unionised 
employment, and non-unionised workers. Assuming the errors in the model 
are trivariate normally distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix^^ 
1 ^12 ^13 
s = 1 ^23 
^31 ^32 O 3 3 
(4.20) 
then, following Tunali (1986) and Main and Reilly (1992), the double selection 
extension of the conventional control function approach can be derived as 
follows. 
First, separate wage equations are specified for the three different 
25 We have assumed the usual probit normalisation for the two selection equations (ie. 
. 2 
2 
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groups of workers. The regression equations to be estimated are^^ 
E(yv^^\U=\,UE=\) = Z 6 ^ ^ + £ ( e 3 | f / ' > 0 , f / £ : ' > 0 ) U n i o n M e m b e r s 
I ( / = 0 , C / £ = 1 ) = Z b ^ ^ ^ + £ ( € 3 1 W < . 0 , UE'>0) N o n - U n i o n M e m b e r s ( 4 . 2 1 ) 
Eiw"^^ I UE=0) = \ UE'^0) N o n - U n i o n i s e d W o r k e r s 
Now, the conditional means of e^ , for the three different groups of workers can 
be written as 
Eie^\U=l,UE=l) = OjjA-j, + o^^X^^ 
Eie,\U=0,UE=l) = 0,3X2, + (4.22) 
E(e,\UE-0) = 0,3X0 
where 
Z—TTT A,--
(4.23) 
^21 A o V o N '^ •22-
P 12) P 12) 
^^The subscript i is omitted in order to avoid notational clutter. 
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and 
Finally, the conditional mean of the error term for workers in non-unionised 
workplaces incorporates a standard Mill's ratio term as there is only a single 
selection mechanism for these workers. 
X . iMlW (4.25) 
Consistent estimation of the wage equations now proceeds by using a 
modified form of Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure. First, the bivariate 
probit model of unionised employment and union membership defined by 
equations (4.1) and (4.10) is estimated. This provides the estimates of jS,, jSj 
and (7,2 which are necessary to calculate the selection terms in each of the wage 
equations. The selection terms are included in the wage equations which are 
then estimated using OLS. 
Estimation of the Union Impact on Wages 
Using ordinary least squares, we estimate the union wage differential by 
including a single union status dummy variable in a standard hourly wage 
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equation.^^ In fact we separately estimate three union wage differentials - the 
union membership differential, the unionised employment differential, and the 
eligible unionised employment differential. The estimated differentials are 
presented in the first row of Table 4.5 (also, see Appendix 4, page 180, for 
the computer output of selected wage equations reported in full). 
The union membership differential is given by the coefficient of a 
conventional union membership dummy variable. The estimated coefficient 
indicates that, controlling for the other determinants of wages, a union member 
enjoys a positive wage differential of approximately 4 percent. However, the 
estimate is not statistically significant. 
Replacing the union membership variable with a unionised employment 
variable, we estimate the unionised employment differential. The estimated 
coefficient of the unionised employment dummy is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. The estimate implies that the wage 
differential associated with unionised employment is approximately 11%. 
Finally, we estimate the wage equation with a unionised employment dummy 
variable. The estimated coefficient, while significant at the 5 percent level, 
drops to 0.06 indicating that the wage differential for eligible unionised 
employment is approximately 6 percent. 
" T h e wage equation is specified in a conventional human capital framework. The 
estimated model includes experience (and its square), tenure (and its square), education, 
sex, marital status dummies, migrant status dummies and industry of employment 
dummies. Education is entered as years of full-time education. Experience is potential 
labour market experience calculated as age minus years of education minus five. 
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TABLE 4.5 
Union Wage Differentials: Zero Slope Interactions^ 
Union Membership Unionised Employment Eligible Unionised 
Differential Differential Employment Differential 
JUM s.e. JUE s.e. d^ E^ s.e. 
OLS 0.04 0.03 0 .11" 0.03 0 .06" 0.03 
IV 0.04 0.06 0 .18" 0.07 0.03 0.07 
Control function 0.03 0.06 0 .14" 0.07 0.04 0.06 
Notes: 
^n addition to a single union dummy, the estimated wage equations include the following 
independent variables: experience, experience squared, years of education, tenure, tenure 
squared, female dummy, marital status dummies, migrant dummies, and industry of 
employment dummies. 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed f-test) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed r-test) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed f-test) 
These estimates are consistent with the proposition that all workers in 
unionised establishments, members and non-members alike, receive a wage 
differential compared to workers in non-unionised establishments. 
For example, if unions were to increase only the wages of union 
members, then we would expect the union membership differential to be the 
largest. This is because the other two union variables would include non-
members who were not receiving the wage differential. 
If, on the other hand, unions were to increase the wages of all workers 
who are eligible for membership, but not the wages of those who are ineligible 
for membership, then we would expect the eligible unionised employment 
coefficient to be the largest. The membership-based estimate would be smaller 
because those non-members who were eligible for union membership would 
also receive a wage differential, but would be counted as part of the non-union 
group of workers. The unionised employment-based estimate would also be 
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smaller because those workers employed in unionised locations, but ineligible 
for membership, would be counted as union workers even though they did not 
enjoy the wage differential. 
Finally, if unions were to increase the wages of all workers in 
unionised settings, including non-members and those workers not eligible for 
membership, then we would expect the unionised employment differential to be 
the largest. This is because the other two union variables would exclude some 
workers in unionised locations who would, in fact, be receiving the wage 
differential associated with unionised employment. 
As previously noted, if the union status variable included in the wage 
regression is endogenous, the OLS estimate of the union wage differential will 
be biased. One way of accounting for potential endogeneity bias is by using 
instrumental variables to estimate the three union wage differentials (see the 
second row of Table 4.5). First, we estimate a linear probability model of 
union membership. The linear prediction of the union membership dummy, 
Uj, is included in the wage equation to give a consistent estimate of the union 
membership differential. Similarly, linear probability models of unionised 
employment and eligible unionised employment are estimated in order to 
obtain the instrumental variables estimates of the unionised employment and 
eligible unionised employment differentials. 
A second way of accounting for the potential endogeneity bias is by 
using the control function approach discussed above. This involves estimating 
a probit model of union status (ie. union membership, unionised employment 
or eligible unionised employment) and then including the generalised residuals 
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in the estimated wage equation. 
Both the control function and IV estimates display a similar pattern to 
the OLS estimates. The IV estimates suggest, however, that the unionised 
employment wage differential could be as high as 20 percent.^^ 
The central purpose of this section is to determine whether there is a 
wage advantage associated with union membership among individuals in 
unionised establishments. To this end, an examination of Table 4.6 is 
instructive. Here we estimate a standard wage equation with a union 
membership dummy variable. We then add the two unionised employment 
dummies in a stepwise fashion. 
In column (I) we include a single union membership dummy variable. 
As noted previously, the coefficient implies a statistically insignificant union 
wage differential of about 4 percent. In column (II) we include both a union 
membership dummy and a unionised employment dummy. The union 
membership coefficient is now negative, but again it is not statistically 
significant. Finally, in column (IV) we include all three union coverage 
dummies. The union membership coefficient is -0.001 and is statistically 
insignificant. These estimates suggest that when unionised employment is 
controlled, union membership has an insignificant wage effect. 
^^A coefficient of 0.18 implies a percentage wage differential of approximately 20 
percent. 
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TABLE 4.6 
Estimated Union Status Coefficients: OLS^ 
I II III IV 
Union status dummy 6 s.e. 6 s.e. b s.e. 6 s.e. 
variable: 
Union 0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
membership 
Umomsed - - 0.15"~ 0.03 - - 0 . 2 4 ~ 0.05 
employment 
Eligible . . . . o .OV 0.04 -0.13" 0.06 
unionised 
employment 
Notes: 
^In addition to the union status dummies, the estimated wage equations include the following 
independent variables: experience, experience squared, years of education, tenure, tenure 
squared, female dummy, marital status dummies, migrant dummies, and industry of 
employment dummies. 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed r-test) 
"significant at 5% (two-tailed /-test) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed f-test) 
The OLS estimates presented in Table 4.6 will be biased if the 
unobserved characteristics that influence wages are correlated with the 
unobserved determinants of unionised employment or union membership or 
both. In order top account for potential sample selection bias, we estimate the 
double selection model defined by (4.19). using the parameter estimates for 
members and non-members (ie. and the average wage differential 
associated with union membership in unionised employment can be estimated 
using the mean wage-determining attributes of union members in unionised 
employment (X™^) or the mean wage-determining attributes of non-union 
members in unionised employment (X^"^). That is, the two estimates are 
given by x^^e^^uue^nue) ^ ^ xnue^^uue^nue) ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 4 ^ 
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estimates are negative and statistically insignificant.^^ 
TABLE 4.7 
Average Union Membership Wage Differential: 
Estimates from a Model with Two Selection Criteria 
d^ lll^  Standard Error 
Average union membership differential for 
workers in unionised employment: 
Union base (X '^JE^guuE.gNUE)) .Q Q3 Q 
Non-union base -0.01 0.02 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed/-test) 
""significant at 5% (two-tailed f-test) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test) 
In summary, the estimates presented in this section are consistent with 
the proposition that there is no wage differential associated with joining a 
union in a unionised establishment. We do, however, find that workers in 
unionised establishments enjoy a wage advantage compared with workers in 
non-unionised establishments. Our estimates of the unionised employment 
wage differential range from approximately 10 to 20 percent. However, we 
have made no attempt to determine the source of the unionised employment 
differential. Whether the differential arises from over-award payments, union 
enforcement of award rates, as a compensating wage differential, or from some 
other source is an issue which is left for future research. 
^^The standard errors of the estimates are calculated using the approach suggested by 
Stewart (1987). 
177 
Chapter 4 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we develop a sequential choice model of union membership. 
First, we assume that workers are confronted with the choice of being 
employed in a unionised or a non-unionised establishment. However, we 
recognise that it is not always sufficient for an individual to desire a unionised 
job in order to secure such a job. In particular, if there is an excess demand 
for unionised employment an individual will only be observed in unionised 
employment if: (i) he or she desires a unionised job; and (ii) he or she is 
employed by a unionised employer. Unfortunately, data constraints mean that 
we cannot model the employee's and employer's decisions separately. We 
therefore assume that the individual's propensity to be employed in a unionised 
establishment can be approximated by a single unobserved index. 
Our model of unionised employment allows the structure of wages to 
differ between unionised and non-unionised establishments. Indeed, we fmd 
that there is a significant wage premium associated with employment in a 
unionised establishment. However, consistent with the arguments presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3, we find that there is no wage premium associated with union 
membership in unionised establishments. 
Having secured unionised employment, we then assume that the 
individual is confronted with the decision to join the relevant trade union. In 
short, union membership is modelled as a decision that is conditional on the 
individual being employed in a unionised establishment. 
Modelling union membership in this way allows us to determine 
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whether certain groups of workers are more likely to become union members 
because: (i) they are more likely to have unionised jobs; or (ii) they are more 
likely to join unions, given that they are employed in unionised locations. 
For example, there is no significant difference in the probability of 
unionised employment across the major occupations. Therefore, differences in 
the probability of union membership across these occupations arise because 
workers in the different occupations have different propensities to join unions. 
Conversely, we fmd that public sector employees are more likely to be 
employed in unionised locations than private sector employees. However, 
conditional on unionised employment, there is no significant difference in the 
propensities of public and private sector employees to become union members. 
This implies that substantial part of the overall public sector - private sector 
membership differential is due to a lower availability of union membership in 
the private sector. 
It must be stressed, however, that the conditional membership equation 
cannot be interpreted as a structural demand equation. In particular, we are 
unable to identify those individuals who become union members because it is a 
compulsory condition of their employment. This means, for example, that we 
are unable to judge whether, conditional on unionised employment, public and 
private sector employees have an commensurate desire for union membership. 
For example, the matching union membership propensities of private and 
public sector workers may be the result of a greater incidence of compulsory 
union membership in the private sector, rather than being the result of a 
commensurate desire by public and private sector employees for union 
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membership. 
The important distinction between compulsory and voluntary union 
membership is the theme of the next chapter. 
APPENDIX 4 
ST AT A (v.3.0) and LIMDEP (v. 5.0) Computer output for selected wage 
equations. 
This appendix reports the full computer output for the major union wage 
differential estimates presented in the chapter: 
1. Union Membership Differential, OLS, (Table 4.5) 
2. Union Membership Differential, Control Function, (Table 4.5) 
3. Unionised Employment Differential, OLS, (Table 4.5) 
4. Unionised Employment Differential, Control Function (Table 4.5) 
5. Union Membership and Unionised Employment Differentials (Column 
IV, Table 4.6) 
Variable Definitions: 
Dependent Variable: 
Inpay Log hourly wage 
Independent Variables: 
mexp Potential experience (Age-years of education-5) 
mexp2 Experience squared 
yrsed Years of full-time education 
tenyr Tenure in current job 
tenyr2 Tenure squared 
sex Female dummy variable 
married Married 
sepdw Separated, divorced, widowed 
mbl8 Migrated to Aust. <18 years 
malB Migrated to Aust. >18 years 
agmine Agriculture, mining 
manuf Manufacturing 
constr Construction 
wrsal Wholesale and retail trade 
trans Transport and storage 
finb Finance, property and business services 
recsv Recreational and personal services 
union Union membership dummy 
unpres Unionised employment dummy 
ununelg Eligible unionised employment dummy 
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1. Union Membership Differential, OLS, (Table 4.5) 
MODEL COMMAND: 
REGRESS,•LHS=LNPAY;RHS=X3,UNIONS 
Ordinary least 
Observations 
Mean of LHS 
StcDev of residua I s= 
R-squared = 
F[ 18, 966] 
Log-Iikelihood 
Amemiya Pr. Criter.= 
ANOVA Source 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Durbin-Watson stat.= 
squares regression. 
985 
= 0.2222808E+01 
0.3575243E+00 
0.2852976E+00 
0.2142286E+02 
-0.3749380E+03 
0.7998741E+00 
Variation 
0.4929026E+02 
0.1234776E+03 
0.1727679E+03 
1.9522374 
N[0,1] used for significance levels. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Prob|t|>x Mean 
Dep. Variable = 
Weights = 
Std.Dev of LHS 
Sum of squares = 
Adjusted R-squared: 
Prob value 
Restr.(B=0) Log-l = 
Akaike Info.Crit. = 
Degrees of Freedom 
18. 
966. 
984. 
Autocorrelation = 
: LNPAY 
: ONE 
: 0.4190192E+00 
^ 0.1234776E+03 
: 0.2719802E+00 
0.3217295E-13 
: -0.5403633E+03 
: 0.1302893E+00 
Mean Square 
0.2738348E+01 
0.1278236E+00 
0.1755771E+00 
0.0238813 
of X Std.Dev.of X 
MEXP 0.17663E-•01 0.3464E-•02 5.099 0.00000 17.715 11.665 
MEXP2 -0.23288E-•03 0.7309E-•04 -3.186 0.00144 449.74 524.76 
YRSED 0.67759E-•01 0.5336E-•02 12.698 0.00000 13.018 2.3915 
TENYR 0.30302E-•02 0.4273E-•02 0.709 0.47821 5.4010 6.7190 
TENYR2 -0.52341E-•04 0.1416E-•03 -0.370 0.71165 74.270 193.40 
SEX -0.13452 0.2474E-•01 -5.438 0.00000 0.46091 0.49872 
MARRIED 0.63508E-•01 0.3124E^ •01 2.033 0.04204 0.68325 0.46545 
SEPDW 0.95471E-•01 0.4835E-•01 1.975 0.04831 0.93401E-•01 0.29114 
MB18 -0.11377E-•02 0.3810E-•01 -0.030 0.97618 0.10355 0.30483 
MA18 -0.47139E-•01 0.3533E-•01 -1.334 0.18209 0.13604 0.34301 
AGMINE 0.11987 0.7397E-•01 1.620 0.10513 0.26396E--01 0.16039 
MANUF -0.62081E-•01 0.3607E^ •01 -1.721 0.08526 0.15635 0.36337 
CONSTR -0.39896E-•01 0.7522E^ •01 -0.530 0.59585 0.25381E-•01 0.15736 
WRSAL -0.19026 0.4087E-•01 -4.656 0.00000 0.10863 0.31133 
TRANS -0.75993E-•01 0.4458E-•01 -1.705 0.08828 0.84264E-•01 0.27792 
FINB 0.78348E-•01 0.4061E^ •01 1.929 0.05370 0.10254 0.30351 
RECSV -0.13762 0.5369E^ •01 -2.563 0.01037 0.53807E^ •01 0.22575 
Constant 1.1497 0.8783E-•01 13.090 0.00000 
UNION 0.39601E -01 0.2500E -01 1.584 0.11318 0.52081 0.49982 
2. Union Membership Differential, Control Function, (Table 4.5) 
MODEL COMMAND: 
SELECT;LHS=LNPAY;RHS=X3,UNION;ALLS 
Sample Selection Model 
Probit selection equation based on UNION 
Sample is all observations. 
Results of selection: 
Data set 
Data points 
985 
Sum of weights 
985.0 
Selected sample 985 
Sample Selection Model 
Two stage least squares regression. 
985.0 
Observations = 985 
Mean of LHS = 0.2222808E+01 
StdDev of residuals= 0.3540552E+00 
R-squared = 0.2853142E+00 
PC 19, 965] = 0.2027598E+02 
Log-Iikelihood = -0.3648236E+03 
Amemiya Pr. Criter.= 0.7813678E+00 
Standard error corrected for selection 
Correlation of disturbance in regression 
and Selection Criterion (Rho) 
N[0,13 used for significance levels. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
Dep. Variable = 
Weights 
Std.Dev of LHS 
Sum of squares = 
Adjusted R-squared= 
Prob value 
Restr.(B=0) Log-l = 
Akaike Info.Crit. = 
. 0.35408 
LNPAY 
ONE 
0.4190192E+00 
0.1209677E+03 
0.2712426E+00 
0.3217295E-13 
-0.5403633E+03 
0.1279004E+00 
0.16517E-01 
ProbI Mean of X Std.Dev.of X 
MEXP 
MEXP2 
YRSED 
TENYR 
TENYR2 
0.17722E-01 
-0.23443E-03 
0.67709E-01 
0.33075E-02 
-0.58110E-04 
0.3453E-02 
0.7310E-04 
0.5295E-02 
0.4612E-02 
0.1453E-03 
5.133 
-3.207 
12.787 
0.717 
-0.400 
0.00000 
0.00134 
0.00000 
0.47332 
0.68928 
17.715 
449.74 
13.018 
5.4010 
74.270 
11.665 
524.76 
2.3915 
6.7190 
193.40 
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SEX -0.13449 0.2450E-•01 -5 .490 0.00000 0.46091 0.49872 
MARRIED 0.63272E-•01 0.3098E-•01 2 .043 0.04109 0.68325 0.46545 
SEPDW 0.94890E-•01 0.4804E-•01 1, .975 0.04824 0.93401E' •01 0.29114 
MB18 -0.15627E-•02 0.3783E-•01 -0, .041 0.96705 0.10355 0.30483 
MAI 8 -0.47243E-•01 0.3499E-•01 -1, .350 0.17700 0.13604 0.34301 
AGMINE 0.11866 0.7369E-•01 1, .610 0.10735 0.26396E^ •01 0.16039 
MANUF -0.63809E-•01 0.3751E-•01 -1, .701 0.08893 0.15635 0.36337 
CONSTR -0.41263E-•01 0.7504E-•01 -0, .550 0.58242 0.25381E-•01 0.15736 
WRSAL -0.19362 0.4615E-•01 -4, .195 0.00003 0.10863 0.31133 
TRANS -0.75 0 71E-•01 0.4457E-•01 -1, .684 0.09214 0.84264E-•01 0.27792 
FINB 0.76245E-•01 0.4256E-•01 1, .791 0.07322 0.10254 0.30351 
RECSV -0.14014 0.5573E-•01 -2, .515 0.01192 0.53807E-•01 0.22575 
Constant 1.1544 0.9248E-•01 12.482 0.00000 
UNION 0.31384E--01 0.5975E •01 0. .525 0.59938 0.52081 0.49982 
LAMBDA 0.58485E-•02 0.3870E-•01 0, ,151 0.87989 -0.16060E-•07 0.70379 
3. Unionised Employment Differential, OLS, (Table 4.5) 
MODEL COMMAND: 
REGRESS,•LHS=LNPAY;RHS=X3,UNPRES$ 
Ordinary least 
Observations 
Mean of LHS 
StdDev of residual 
R-squared 
F[ 18, 966] 
Log-1i kelihood 
Amemiya Pr. Criter 
ANOVA Source 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
Durbin-Watson stat 
N[0,1] used for si 
Variable Coeffici 
Dep. Variable = 
Weights = 
Std.Dev of LHS = 
Sum of squares = 
Adjusted R-squared: 
Prob value 
Restr.(B=0) Log-l = 
Akaike Info.Crit. = 
Degrees of Freedom 
18. 
966. 
98A. 
Autocorrelation = 
squares regression 
985 
= 0.2222808E+01 
s= 0.3548715E+00 
0.2958645E+00 
0.2254972E+02 
-0.3676020E+03 
0.78A9787E+00 
Variation 
0.5111587E+02 
0.1216520E+03 
0.1727679E+03 
1.9592458 
gnificance levels, 
ent Std. Error t-ratio Prob'tlix Mean of X Std.Dev.of X 
: LNPAY 
: ONE 
: 0.4190192E+00 
: 0.1216520E+03 
0.2827439E+00 
0.3217295E-13 
-0.5403633E+03 
0.1283629E+00 
Mean Square 
0.2839771E+01 
0.1259338E+00 
0.1755771E+00 
0.0203771 
MEXP 0.17414E -01 0.3436E -02 5.068 0.00000 17.715 11.665 
MEXP2 -0.22800E -03 0.7246E -04 -3.147 0.00165 449.74 524.76 
YRSED 0.67089E' -01 0.5295E -02 12.670 0.00000 13.018 2.3915 
TENYR 0.22848E-•02 0.4188E' -02 0.546 0.58538 5.4010 6.7190 
TENYR2 -0.51241E-•04 0.1396E' -03 -0.367 0.71365 74.270 193.40 
SEX -0.13981 0.2459E--01 -5.686 0.00000 0.46091 0.49872 
MARRIED 0.62069E^ •01 0.3100E--01 2.002 0.04524 0.68325 0.46545 
SEPDW 0.10094 0.4800E^ -01 2.103 0.03548 0.93401E -01 0.29114 
MB18 0.64522E^ •02 0.3786E-•01 0.170 0.86469 0.10355 0.30483 
MA18 -0.40231E-•01 0.3511E-•01 -1.146 0.25184 0.13604 0.34301 
AGMINE 0.12862 0.7342E-•01 1.752 0.07979 0.26396E -01 0.16039 
MANUF -0.58733E^ •01 0.3554E-•01 -1.653 0.09838 0.15635 0.36337 
CONSTR -0.27540E^ •01 0.7469E^ •01 -0.369 0.71233 0.25381E -01 0.15736 
WRSAL -0.16830 0.4035E^ •01 -4.171 0.00003 0.10863 0.31133 
TRANS -0.79388E-•01 0.4421E-•01 -1.796 0.07251 0.84264E--01 0.27792 
FINB 0.10533 0.4081E-•01 2.581 0.00985 0.10254 0.30351 
RECSV -0.12071 0.5321E^ •01 -2.269 0.02330 0.53807E--01 0.22575 
Constant 1.1053 0.8752E^ •01 12.629 0.00000 
UNPRES 0.10882 0.2636E^ •01 4.128 0.00004 0.68223 0.46584 
4. Unionised Employment Differential, Control Function, (Table 
4.5) 
MODEL COMMAND: 
SELECT; LHS=LNPAY,-RHS=X3,UNPRES; ALLS 
Sample Selection Model 
Probit selection equation based on UNPRES 
Sample is all observations. 
Results of selection: 
Data points Sum of weights 
Data set 985 985.0 
Selected sample 985 985.0 
Sample Selection Model 
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Two stage least squares regression. 
Observations = 985 
Mean of LHS = 0.2222808E+01 
StdDev of residuals= 0.3513894E+00 
R-squared = 0.2960360E+00 
F[ 19, 9653 = 0.2135836E+02 
Log-likelihood = -0.3573791E+03 
Amemiya Pr. Criter.= 0.7662519E+00 
Standard error corrected for selection... 
Correlation of disturbance in regression 
and Selection Criterion (Rho) 
N[0,1] used for significance levels. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-rat 
Dep. Variable = 
Weights = 
Std.Dev of LHS 
Sum of squares = 
Adjusted R-squared= 
Prob value 
Restr.(B=0) Log-l = 
Akaike Info.Crit. = 
.. 0.35167 
LNPAY 
ONE 
0.4190192E+00 
0.1191529E+03 
0.2821756E+00 
0.3217295E-13 
-0.5403633E+03 
0.1259816E+00 
.. -0.59106E-01 
io Prob|t|>x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X 
MEXP 0.17266E-•01 0.3418E-•02 5.051 0.00000 17.715 11.665 
MEXP2 -0.22459E-•03 0.7214E-•04 -3.113 0.00185 449.74 524.76 
YRSED 0.66971E• •01 0.5253E-•02 12.749 0.00000 13.018 2.3915 
TENYR 0.17079E-•02 0.4314E •02 0.396 0.69221 5.4010 6.7190 
TENYR2 -0.43231E-•04 0.1393E-•03 -0.310 0.75637 74.270 193.40 
SEX -0.14131 0.2456E-•01 -5.754 0.00000 0.46091 0.49872 
MARRIED 0.61986E-•01 0.3072E •01 2.018 0.04360 0.68325 0.46545 
SEPDW 0.10323 0.4780E-•01 2.160 0.03080 0.93401E-•01 0.29114 
MB18 0.91234E -02 0.3792E -01 0.241 0.80986 0.10355 0.30483 
MA18 -0.38179E-•01 0.3504E •01 -1.089 0.27596 0.13604 0.34301 
AGMINE 0.13265 0.7322E -01 1.812 0.07005 0.26396E-•01 0.16039 
MANUF -0.55498E •01 0.3583E-•01 -1.549 0.12141 0.15635 0.36337 
CONSTR -0.22290E •01 0.7479E •01 -0.298 0.76569 0.25381E-•01 0.15736 
WRSAL -0.15774 0.4544E -01 -3.472 0.00052 0.10863 0.31133 
TRANS -0.81560E -01 0.4403E -01 -1.852 0.06398 0.84264E-•01 0.27792 
FINB 0.11562 0.4557E -01 2.537 0.01118 0.10254 0.30351 
RECSV -0.11266 0.5524E -01 -2.039 0.04141 0.53807E^ •01 0.22575 
Constant 1.0866 0.9472E -01 11.472 0.00000 
UNPRES 0.13897 0.6691E -01 2.077 0.03780 0.68223 0.46584 
LAMBDA -0.20786E -01 0.4245E •01 -0.490 0.62438 0.32748E-•07 0.67638 
5. Union Membership and Unionised Employmen-t Differentials, OLS, 
(Column IV, Table 4.6). 
Source 
Model 
Residual 
Total 
SS df MS 
52.0181371 
120.749724 
20 2.60090686 
964 .125259049 
172.767861 984 .175577094 
Number of obs = 985 
F( 20, 964) = 20.76 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-square = 0.3011 
Adj R-square = 0.2866 
Root MSE = .35392 
Inpay j Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
mexp 1 .0175251 .0034293 5.110 0.000 .0107954 .0242549 
mexp2 j -.0002325 .0000724 -3.213 0.001 -.0003744 -.0000905 
yrsed 1 .0657999 .0053028 12.408 0.000 .0553934 .0762063 
tenyr j .0031453 .0042315 0.743 0.457 -.0051586 .0114493 
tenyr2 | -.0000856 .0001404 -0.610 0.542 -.0003611 .0001898 
sex 1 -.138573 .0245828 -5.637 0.000 -.1868148 -.0903311 
married ] .0550442 .0310313 1.774 0.076 -.0058524 .1159409 
sepdw \ .095596 .0479195 1.995 0.046 .0015573 .1896346 
mb18 1 .0091307 .0377774 0.242 0.809 -.0650047 .0832661 
ma18 1 -.0348949 .0350718 -0.995 0.320 -.1037208 .0339311 
agmine | .1202875 .0732842 1.641 0.101 -.0235275 .2641025 
manuf | -.0805043 .0363593 -2.214 0.027 -.1518569 -.0091517 
constr j -.0410906 .0746859 -0.550 0.582 -.1876564 .1054751 
wrsal 1 -.1890448 .0409888 -4.612 0.000 -.2694823 -.1086072 
trans j -.0783118 .0441448 -1.774 0.076 -.1649427 .0083191 
finb 1 .0952332 .0409324 2.327 0.020 .0149063 .1755601 
recsv ] -.1342748 .0533214 -2.518 0.012 -.2389142 -.0296354 
union | -.0100714 .0387212 -0.260 0.795 -.0860589 .0659161 
inpres j .2369964 .0547888 4.326 0.000 .1294773 .3445155 
ununelg j -.1349865 .0622607 -2.168 0.030 -.2571685 -.0128044 
_cons ] 1.134376 .0879836 12.893 0.000 .9617145 1.307037 
m 

5 
Voluntary and Compulsory Union Membership 
5.1 Introduction 
Of all of the aspects of trade union organisation, compulsory membership is 
perhaps the one which arouses the most passion in public debate. It is often 
attacked as being oppressive, anti-democratic and an abuse of human rights. 
On the other hand, the proponents of compulsory membership defend it as 
necessary to prevent free riders from enjoying what they believe to be the 
"hard won" gains of unionists. Surprisingly, despite all the heat generated by 
this debate, comparatively little empirical research has been conducted into the 
nature and consequences of compulsory membership. In particular, very little 
is known about the impact of compulsory union membership arrangements on 
the level of union membership. However, some clues as to what the effect 
might be may be gleaned from some of the previous studies of the 
determinants of union membership. 
In their study of professional union members, Crockett and Hall (1987) 
analyse data on the main reasons given by union members for joining a union. 
They find that, while compulsory unionism is comparatively widespread, 
existing members would still join their union even if membership were 
voluntary (mainly so as to safeguard their conditions of work). Unfortunately, 
the very restrictive sample used by Crockett and Hall limits the extent to which 
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their results might be generalised to the workforce as a whole.' 
Miller and Rummery (1989) also consider the issue of compulsory 
union membership. Using a multinomial logit model they conclude, (for their 
sample of young male workers), that the failure to consider compulsory 
unionism is not likely to bias the estimates obtained from a standard 
dichotomous choice model of union membership. Nevertheless, they note that 
by separately distinguishing compulsory members, some further insights may 
be gained into the determinants of union membership. 
Implicit in the studies by Crockett and Hall, and Miller and Rummery 
is the conclusion that compulsory unionism does not have a strong influence on 
overall union density. In contrast, we present estimates which suggest that the 
effect is substantial. In particular, we estimate that as few as 35 percent of 
compulsory union members would still join a union if membership were 
voluntary. Furthermore, on the basis of this figure, it is suggested that the 
overall rate of union membership in Australia could fall below 25 percent if 
compulsory unionism were completely abolished. Of course, there are some 
caveats to be placed on these results and these are addressed later in this 
chapter. 
In recent years, there has been a vigorous debate both within the trade 
union movement and also in the academic literature on the reasons for the 
decline in the overall rate of union membership. In the academic literature, at 
least, the possibility that the decline in union membership might be due to 
'Recall that the sample used by Crockett and Hall consists only of graduates of the 
Western Australian Institute of Technology. 
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falling rates of compulsory membership has not been explored.^ However, we 
demonstrate that there is prima facie evidence to suggest that as much as 70 
percent of the overall decline can be attributed to falling rates of compulsory 
membership (although we acknowledge that the decline in the rate of 
compulsory unionism may ultimately be a symptom of underlying structural 
change in the labour market). 
5.2 The Extent of Compulsory Unionism 
Compulsory Membership Arrangements 
Before proceeding, it should be made clear that there are some difficulties in 
providing a satisfactory definition of compulsory unionism. At the most 
fundamental level it can be argued that there is no such thing as "compulsory 
unionism" (McKenna and Easson, 1990). Certainly it is true that, strictly 
speaking, there is no such thing as formal, legally sanctioned compulsory 
unionism in Australia. Nevertheless, informal arrangements, augmented in 
some cases by formal preference awards, have ensured that effective 
compulsory unionism is a prominent and widespread feature of Australian 
industrial relations (Wright, 1981; Zappala, 1992). 
^Peetz (1990: p.215) speculates that part of the decline in Australian union 
membership may be due to a change in public attitudes towards unions. He then 
advances the hypothesis that such a change in union attitudes will be manifested initially 
as a decline in union membership in industries with low levels of compulsion. 
Subsequently, it is expected that union membership will decline in industries with high 
levels of compulsion. However, Peetz does not consider the possibility that the decline 
in union membership is a product of failing rates of compulsory membership. 
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One of the principal difficulties in modelling compulsory membership is 
that it arises in a variety of contexts. There are pre-entry closed shops, post-
entry closed shops, and modified post-entry closed shops. In some 
establishments there is 100 percent coverage of all non-managerial occupations, 
while in others only workers in a particular occupation are required to be 
union members. Unfortunately, in the data used here these variants of 
compulsory membership are not separately distinguished. Consequently, we 
use the term "closed shop employment" loosely and synonymously with the 
term "compulsory membership". 
Preference to Unionists 
In the federal jurisdiction (and the jurisdictions of most of the states) there is 
formal statutory provision for industrial tribunals to make clauses granting 
preference to unionists in awards.^ Typically, such clauses provide for union 
members to be given preference in both engagement and retention in 
employment (Australian Labour Law Reporter, 1991: 131-940).'^ In principle, 
this means that when faced with the choice of employing two workers of equal 
^The state industrial tribunals of Victoria and Western Australia do not have the 
power to award preference (Australian Labour Law Reporter, 1991: 131-945) . However , 
unionists who are employed under federal awards in both of these states may still be 
granted preference. 
"^ The federal Industrial Relations Act provides specific examples of matters in which 
preference may be ordered. In addition to engagement and retention in employment, the 
matters include: promotion, transfer, overtime, and vocational training. A survey 
conducted by the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW revealed, however, that only a 
small proportion of preference clauses contained provisions beyond engagement and 
retention in employment (Anti-Discrimination Board, 1983: p. 77). 
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qualifications and ability, an employer must engage a union member before a 
non-union member. It also means that in a downturn non-union workers must 
be retrenched before union members. 
In a survey of the large body of case law established around the issue 
of preference, Latimer (1981) identifies several general principles that have 
been established by the various industrial tribunals. In addition to the principle 
that preference clauses cannot provide for compulsory unionism, there are two 
related principles. The first of these is that preference clauses should not 
provide for a union to have a monopoly over the supply of labour. The second 
is that preference clauses shall not apply to conscientious objectors. 
The second principle ensures that a worker who has a moral objection 
to union membership can be exempted from the provisions of a preference 
clause. In practice, however, there are several reasons why the conscientious 
objector provisions do not provide a convenient loophole for potential free-
riders. First, a certificate establishing conscientious objector status can only 
be obtained by formal application to the industrial registrar of the relevant 
jurisdiction (state or federal). While the process of applying for a certificate 
need not be excessively burdensome, it does entail a measure of inconvenience 
for the applicant. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is unlikely that 
many workers are aware of the conscientious objector provisions in the 
industrial relations legislation. Finally, when such certificates are granted it is 
typically on the proviso that the applicant pays an amount equivalent to union 
fees to consolidated revenue or some other fund (Australian Labour Law 
Reporter, 1991: 131-960). 
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While, in a strict sense, compulsory unionism is not legally 
enforceable, it is generally acknowledged that the practical effect of many 
preference arrangements is to give rise to a de facto closed shop (Australian 
Labour Law Reporter 1991: 131-955). Indeed, Latimer (1981: p . l84) notes 
that awards which effectively provide for compulsory unionism have been 
made in the past, although these awards have usually only been made when 
they have been supported by both management and unions. 
Informal Membership Arrangements 
It should be recognised that many closed shop arrangements arise from 
agreements which have not been scrutinised by an industrial tribunal. These 
arrangements may take the form of a written agreement or may be the result of 
long-standing "custom and practice". In recognition of this Wright (1981: 
p. 133) defines a "closed shop practice" as "any arrangement, formal or 
informal, written or unwritten, where, except for mutually agreed exemptions, 
membership of the appropriate union is a condition of the worker's 
employment". 
Measuring the Extent of Compulsory Unionism 
Evidence from Previous Studies 
In the IMA survey union members are asked the following question: "Is your 
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union membership compulsory for your job?". As early as 1967, and again in 
1969, an almost identical question was asked in two national surveys of the 
political attitudes of Australian voters. In both years, the proportion of 
unionists answering "yes" was 63 percent (Aitkin, 1978; Rawson, 1978). 
In 1976, as part of a detailed investigation of the relationship between 
unionism and political attitudes, Rawson (1978) conducted a national telephone 
survey of 4046 Australians, 1003 of whom were current union members. In 
total, approximately 70 percent of unionists reported that membership was 
compulsory. Early in 1990 Rawson arranged for a similar survey to be 
conducted. Over the intervening 14 years the proportion of compulsory union 
members had fallen to 54 percent (Rawson, 1990).^ 
There are, of course, some practical problems in measuring compulsory 
unionism using an individual's response to a question of the sort asked in the 
IMA survey. In particular, while some respondents may believe that unionism 
is a condition of employment, in reality this may not be correct. For example, 
in their study of professional union members, Crockett and Hall (1987: p.62) 
note that approximately 14 percent of teachers reported compulsion as the main 
reason for joining the union. However, they point out that at the time the 
survey was conducted, there was no such formal requirement for teachers in 
Western Australia. 
Unfortunately, the existing national sources of individual-level data 
^In a further study of the differences In attitudes held by compulsory and voluntary 
union members, Dufty (1981) conducted a survey of 338 electors in the Perth metropoli-
tan area. While most of Dufty's analysis fails to distinguish present and past union 
members, it can be deduced from figures given in his paper that 39 percent of all 
employed unionists were compulsory members. 
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(including the IMA survey) do not contain separate information from 
employers or unions to confirm whether membership is, in fact, compulsory 
for the individual's job. In the absence of such information it is difficult to 
judge just how widespread the misreporting of compulsory union membership 
might be. 
One way to avoid the misreporting problem is to use information on the 
time at which a worker became a union member. Information of this sort is 
available in the Australian Longitudinal Survey (ALS) (although explicit 
information on compulsory unionism is not available). 
Using data from the ALS, Miller and Rummery (1989) employ the rule 
of thumb that workers who join a union either before or at the same time as 
they commence employment are likely to be compulsory union members. 
With this measure Miller and Rummery estimate that almost 63 percent of 
young male unionists can be categorised as being compulsory members. Of 
course, a measure of this sort brings with it problems of its own. Principally, 
not all workers who join before or on commencement of employment need do 
so because membership is compulsory. 
There are now several studies of the dimensions of compulsory 
unionism which use data obtained from firms or unions. The first of these was 
by Wright (1981) who conducted a survey of 109 unions and 34 major 
employers and employer associations. Wright's study confirmed that 
compulsory membership was a widespread feature of Australian unionism. 
While the coverage of Wright's survey was extensive, it lacked detailed 
information on smaller unions and unions operating solely in Queensland, 
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South Australia, Tasmania, or the Territories. Nevertheless, Wright's study 
remains a major source of information on the incidence of the closed shop in 
Australia. 
A second important study was conducted by Zappala (1992) using data 
from the Australian Industrial Workplace Survey (AWIRS). While the AWIRS 
does not explicitly identify compulsory membership arrangements, it does 
provide information on the percentage of each major occupational group 
organised at the plant level. Using this information, Zappala estimated that 57 
percent of all workers in unionised establishments were covered by a 
compulsory union membership arrangement.'^ 
Evidence from the IMA Survey 
In his study, Zappala (1992) lists several key variables that appear to be 
related to the incidence of closed shop employment. In particular, he identifies 
workplace size, industry, occupation and sector of employment as determinants 
of compulsory union membership. 
^Two further studies of closed shop employment have been conducted by employer 
associations. In 1986 the MTIA found that approximately 20 percent of companies in the 
metal industry had some form of closed shop arrangement. Since these arrangements 
were concentrated in larger firms Zappala (1992: p.3) has estimated that this would mean 
that about 80 percent of all employees in the industry are employed in closed shops. In 
1988, the Business Council of Australia also conducted a survey which found that there 
was some active closed shop arrangement in 81 percent of unionised establishments. 
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TABLE 5.1 
Union Membership and Closed Shop Employment Densities for Selected Categories 
All Workers in Selected Category Union Members 
in Category Only 
Union Closed Shop Closed Shop 
Membership Employment Employment 
Density (%) Density (%) Density (%) 
Current occupation: 
Manager, administrator 
Professional 
Para-professional 
Tradesperson 
Clerk 
Salesperson, personal service 
worker 
Plant and machine operator 
Labourer 
Industry of employment: 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Transport and storage 
Finance, property and business 
services 
Public administration and 
defence 
Community services 
Recreational and personal 
Services 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Workplace size category: 
1-20 employees 
21-50 employees 
51-100 employees 
101-500 employees 
More than 500 employees 
Sex: 
Female 
Male 
Total: 
22.7 
52.8 
58.9 
46.8 
35.2 
29.9 
59.6 
56.7 
45.1 
40.5 
26.7 
71.1 
39.2 
61.8 
52.8 
32.0 
69.5 
34.3 
27.0 
55.2 
58.1 
55.4 
61.6 
37.0 
51.7 
45.5 
9.1 
22 .8 
24.7 
47.6 
11.7 
18.4 
46.2 
43.3 
36.8 
28 .6 
19.8 
51.1 
14.9 
25.4 
20.2 
26.0 
31.7 
23.4 
14.2 
25.9 
31.2 
40.0 
36.0 
19.3 
30.9 
26.0 
40.0 
43.1 
41.9 
72.5 
33.3 
61.5 
77.4 
76.4 
81.5 
70.6 
74.2 
71.9 
37.9 
41.2 
38.3 
81.3 
45.6 
68.2 
52.6 
46.9 
53.7 
72.2 
58.4 
52.1 
59.8 
57.2 
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Using IMA data, Table 5.1 shows how rates of closed shop 
employment vary across different categories of wage and salary earners. The 
table has three columns. The first column reports the union density rate for 
employees in each selected category. The second column gives the closed 
shop employment density; that is, the proportion of employees for whom union 
membership is compulsory. The final column reports the percentage of union 
members in each category who are compulsory members. In total, 45.5 
percent of employees are union members, and 26 percent of workers are 
employed in closed shops. This implies that 57.2 percent of union members 
are employed in closed shops.^ 
Among occupations, compulsory union membership is most prevalent 
for manual workers. Tradespersons have the highest rate of closed shop 
employment (47.6 percent) followed by plant and machine operators (46.2 
percent) and labourers (43.3 percent). While salespersons and personal service 
workers have a relatively low level of closed shop employment (18.4 percent), 
61.5 percent of union members in this occupational category are compulsory 
members. As expected, managers and administrators have a very low rate of 
compulsory membership (9.1 percent). However, almost half of all managers 
who are union members are employed in closed shops. 
Workers in larger establishments are more likely to be compulsory 
union members. In the smallest workplace size category (1-20 employees) 
only 14.2 percent of employees are compulsory union members, while in the 
I^t is encouraging to note that this is very close to the rate of compulsory 
membership reported by Rawson (1990). Using data collected early in 1990 Rawson 
reports that 54 percent of union members were compulsory members. 
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largest category (more than 500 workers) the rate of compulsory union 
membership is 36.0 percent. Interestingly, there is no appreciable relationship 
between establishment size and the percentage of union members in closed 
shops (52.6 percent of union members in the 1-20 employees category are 
compulsory members, while 58.4 percent of union members in the 500+ 
category are in closed shop employment). This means that not only are 
workers in large workplaces more likely to be in closed shops, but those 
individuals who are employed in large open shops are more likely to become 
union members than their counterparts in small oj)en shops. 
The overall rate of union membership in the public sector is almost 
twice that of the private sector. However, private sector unionism is 
underpinned by closed shop arrangements to a much greater extent: 68.2 
percent of all union members in the private sector are compulsory members 
while 45.6 percent of public sector union members are compulsory members. 
Finally, there is a substantial gap between the closed shop employment 
densities of men and women (30.9 percent of men are employed in closed 
shops, 19.3 percent of women are employed in closed shops). 
5.3 Econometric Modelling Issues 
Consider the model of union membership elaborated in the previous chapter. 
This model views union membership as the outcome of a sequence of decisions 
(see Figure 5.1). First, a utility-maximising worker is assumed to be faced 
with the choice of employment in the unionised or non-unionised sectors of the 
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labour market. Then, conditional on having secured a unionised job, the 
worker chooses to join or not join a union. 
FIGURE 5.1 
Two Stage Model of Unionised Employment and 
Union Membership 
Employed in 
unionised 
establishment? 
Non-member 
No Yes 
Join a union? 
No Yes 
Non-member Union member 
However, some of the unionised establishments are closed shops. For 
workers in these establishments union membership is a characteristic that "goes 
with the job". In effect, then, workers in closed shops make a joint decision: 
(i) to be employed in the closed shop; and (ii) to join the relevant trade union. 
In contrast, workers in unionised open shops are not required to join a union. 
Clearly, union membership can now be modelled as a three stage 
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process (see Figure 5.2). First, a worker is employed in either a unionised or 
non-unionised establishment. If the unionised establishment is a closed shop, 
the worker joins the relevant union because membership is a required condition 
of employment. Finally, if the unionised establishment is an open shop the 
worker makes a separate decision to join or not join the union. 
FIGURE 5.2 
Three Stage Model of Unionised Employment and 
Compulsory and Voluntary Union Membership 
Employsd in 
Unionised 
EstaWlshment? 
Non-member 
No Yes 
Employed in ckjsed 
shop? 
No Yes 
Join a union? 
No Yes 
Compulsory member 
Non-member Voluntary member 
Data limitations prevent the three stage model from being estimated. In 
particular, the CSA survey records unionised employment status but not 
compulsory membership. The IMA survey, on the other hand, records 
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compulsory membership but not unionised employment. Faced with these data 
constraints, closed shop employment and voluntary union membership are 
modelled as a two-stage process (see Figure 5.3). 
FIGURE 5.3 
Two-Stage Model of Closed Shop Employment and 
Voluntary Union Membership 
Employed In closed 
shop? 
No Yes 
Join a union? 
No Yes 
Non-member Voluntary member 
Compulsory 
member 
A Simple Model of Compulsory Membership 
The specification of a structural model of closed shop employment is 
potentially a complicated undertaking. Nevertheless, we shall sketch a simple 
model in order to gain some insight into the appropriate specification of a 
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reduced form equation which can be estimated given the available data. 
Following the approach adopted in Chapter 4, workers are assumed to 
seek employment in a unionised establishment if they expect a utility gain from 
doing so (ie. if I ' > 0 , where I ' is the expected utility gain from employment 
in the unionised sector). If there is a queue for unionised employment, the 
worker is selected from the queue if C,* > 0, where Cj' is an unobserved index 
which captures the propensity of the individual to be chosen from the queue. 
Thus, the probability that the worker is employed by a unionised firm is 
PiiUE. = 1) = Prii; >0 & C; > 0) 
= Pr(I. = l & C. = l) (5-1) 
= Pr(C. = l | / . = l ) P r ( / . = l) 
Now, we assume that a fixed proportion of the unionised jobs that the 
individual is interested in, a,, are in closed shops. The probability that the 
worker is selected by a closed shop employer is therefore 
a.Pr(C. = l . Conversely, the probability of being selected by 
a unionised open shop employer is (1 -a) Pr(C. = 1 | /. = l)Pr(I. ^ 1). 
To simplify the analysis, assume that there are no pre-entry closed 
shops (that is, workers are only required to become a union members after 
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securing employment in a closed shop)^ Now if the worker i is selected from 
the queue by a closed shop employer, he or she must either accept or reject the 
offer. A worker who expects a net utility gain from membership (ie. for 
whom U j ' > 0 ) will always accept the offer of employment in a closed shop, 
and he or she will also always accept an offer of open shop unionised 
employment. 
A worker who expects a net utility loss from membership, but a utility 
gain from unionised employment, will always accept an offer of employment 
in a unionised open shop. However, if such a worker is offered employment 
in a closed shop he or she will only accept the offer if the expected utility gain 
from being certain of unionised employment is greater than the utility loss 
from membership. 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from estimating a structural 
model of closed shop employment. As an alternative, we assume that the 
propensity to be employed in a closed shop is approximated by an unobserved 
index, CS,*, which is a function of personal and human capital characteristics 
(which we assume capture the worker's desire for unionised employment and 
union membership, as well signalling the worker's productivity to unionised 
employers), and as a function of job-related characteristics (which are assumed 
to capture variations in the supplies of unionised and closed shop employment 
across different segments of the labour market); that is 
^This assumption is not unduly restrictive as only a small proportion of closed shops 
are pre-entry closed shops. (As noted in Chapter 3, Wright (1981) reports that only 3.3 
percent of compulsory union members are employed in pre-entry closed shops). 
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CS- = 7;.k + Vj. (5-2) 
where T, is a vector of characteristics and Py, is a normally distributed random 
error term (ie. N(0,a,^)). The probability that the individual / is employed 
in a closed shop is therefore 
PriCS; = l) = PriT. 
= Pr(v^.>-T.K) (5.3) 
where is the normal distribution function. 
Open Shop Union Membership 
Recall from Chapter 3 that the expected utility gain from union membership is 
assumed to be a function of personal and job-related characteristics: 
(5.4) 
where Vj^  is a normally distributed random error term (ie. N(0,a2^)). 
Ideally, we would like to model the individual's union membership 
decision conditional on the individual being employed in a unionised open 
shop. However, as we lack data on union presence, the decision is modelled 
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conditional on open shop employment only. 
Conditional on open shop employment, the expected utility gain from 
membership is 
(u; IC5. =0) = (X. IC5. =0)P + 1C5,. =0) (5 5) 
If P2\ is distributed as a standard normal variable conditional on the worker 
being employed in an open shop, then independent probit estimation of (5.5) is 
consistent. However, in general, the conditional density of (1^21 I CS j *=0 ) is 
(5.6) 
If and Vji ^rc correlated the conditional density function is non-normal and 
independent probit estimation applied to (5.5) is not consistent. However, if 
Py, and are independently distributed (ie. cri2=0), (5.6) collapses to the 
standard normal density function, and standard independent probit estimation is 
consistent. 
As in Chapter 4, if the errors are correlated then standard probit 
estimation of the union membership equation will yield biased parameter 
estimates. The selection bias arises if workers have unmeasured attributes 
which indicate not only that they are more (or less) likely to be employed in 
open shops, but which also indicate that they are more (or less) likely to 
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become union members. 
If I'll and V2, are correlated, the appropriate bivariate probit likelihood 
function can be derived in a similar fashion to the likelihood function derived 
in the previous chapter: 
"I N U 
L = n<I>j(-r;K,X.p;a,2) n $2(-7'.K,-X.p;ai2) 0 «I»,(r.K) (5.7) 
where Nj is the number of union members in open shops, N is the total 
number of workers in open shops and M is the number of workers in both 
open and closed shops. 
5.4 Empirical Analysis 
Table 5.2 reports the bivariate probit estimates for the model of open shop 
employment and union membership defined by equation (5.7). Column I gives 
the open shop employment estimates and column II gives the union 
membership estimates. For comparison, the table also reports the simple 
independent probit estimates of the union membership equation using the sub-
sample of workers employed in open shops. 
Consider, first, the open shop employment estimates presented in 
column I. Note that because the estimated model is a reduced form 
approximation of a more complicated structural model, a great deal of caution 
needs to be exercised in interpreting the estimates. In particular, we cannot be 
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certain to what extent the estimates reflect the desire of workers for open shop 
employment or to what extent they reflect variations in the availability of open 
and closed shop jobs. 
In preliminary work, a more general specification of the open shop 
employment equation (than that reported in Table 5.2) was estimated. In 
addition to the variables included in the reported equation, the general 
specification also included political affiliation and hours of work. Using 
likelihood ratio tests (see Table 5.3) these variables were found to be 
insignificant and were dropped from the reported equation.^ 
The estimates presented in column I of Table 5.2 show that closed shop 
employment is largely a blue-collar phenomenon. This is evidenced by the 
positive coefficients of the professional, clerical and managerial variables 
which indicate that workers in these occupations are more likely to be in open 
shop employment than manual workers (plant and machine operators or 
labourers). In particular, a marginal effect calculation indicates that a 
manager's probability of open shop employment is approximately 21 
percentage points higher than a labourer's. 
^One further variable which is not included in the reported equation is employment 
tenure. At first glance, it would seem that this variable should not be included as a 
determinant of open shop employment because it is not relevant at the time of the 
employment decision. But In establishments with less than 100 percent union 
membership it can be argued that those workers with longer tenure are more likely to 
have been promoted to jobs which are less likely to be covered by closed shop 
arrangements. On balance, however, tenure Is omitted because the seniority effect is also 
captured by the experience, occupation and supervisory variables. 
205 
Chapter 5 
TABLE 5.2 
Union Membership and Open Shop Employment: Probit Estimates* 
Bivariate Probit 
(D (ID 
Independent 
Probit 
(HI) 
Open Shop Employment Union Membership Union Membership 
P r ( C = 0 ) P r ( U = l | C = 0 ) P r ( U = l | C = 0 ) 
s.e. Marginal 
Effect 
(%) ' 
& s.e. h s.e. 
Experience -0.001 0.011 
1 -0.0 
0.028" 0.015 0 .028 ' 0 .015 
(Experience)- 0.000 0.000 -0 .001" 0.000 -0 .001" 0 .000 
Education (years) 0.021 0.016 0.6 -0.003 0.020 -0.005 0 .020 
Tenure in current job - - - 0 .095" ' 0.018 0 . 0 9 6 " ' 0 .017 
(Tenure)- - - - -0 .002" ' 0.001 -0 .002" ' 0.001 
Hours of work - - - 0.054"" 0.015 0 .054"" 0.013 
(Hours)^ - - - -0.001"" 0.000 -0.001"" 0 .000 
Current occupation: 
Manager , administrator 1 . 0 7 - 0.17 20.9 -0 .72" 0.34 - 0 . 8 4 " 0.22 
Professional 0 . 7 3 - 0.14 17.1 -0.32 0.24 - 0 . 4 1 " 0 .17 
Para-professional 0 . 6 6 - 0.14 15.8 -0.25 0.24 -0 .33 ' 0.18 
Tradesperson 0 . 1 9 " 0.11 5.7 -0 .37" 0.18 - 0 . 4 0 " 0.16 
Clerk 0 . 7 4 - 0.13 17.1 -0.38 0.24 - 0 . 4 7 - 0.16 
Salesperson 0 . 3 0 " 0.14 8.6 -0.32 0.22 -0 .36 ' 0 .19 
Plant and machine operator -0.05 0.12 -1.7 -0.14 0.19 -0.13 0.19 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector - 0 . 4 6 - 0.11 -16.6 0 . 6 5 ' " 0.16 0 . 7 0 ' " 0 .12 
Workplace size: 
2-20 employees 0 .66"" 0.10 15.9 -0.31 ' 0.18 -0 .38"" 0 .13 
21-50 employees 0 . 4 0 - 0.12 10.7 0.07 0.16 0.03 0 .14 
51-100 employees 0.15 0.12 4.5 -0.01 0.16 -0.03 0.16 
101-500 employees -0.08 0.11 -2.7 -0.06 0.15 -0.05 0 .14 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture, mining -0.20 0.26 -6.6 -0 .98" 0.39 -0 .99"" 0.39 
Manufacturing -0 .47" ' 0.14 -16.6 -0 .45" 0.18 -0 .41"" 0.16 
Electricity, gas and water -0 .55" 0.26 -20.0 0.08 0.35 0.14 0.34 
Construction -0 .69" ' 0.18 -25.1 -0.42 0.26 -0.36 0.23 
Wholesale and retail trade -0.3 r 0.16 -10.2 - 0 . 6 1 ' " 0.20 -0 .61"" 0.19 
Transport and storage -Q.15'" 0.15 -27.8 -0.04 0.26 0.04 0.22 
Communication -0.65"" 0.20 -23.7 0.39 0.36 0 .47 ' 0 .28 
Finance, property and -0 .35" 0.16 -12.1 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.16 
business services 
Recreational and personal -0.31- 0.18 -10.8 -0 .48" 0.22 - 0 . 4 7 " 0.22 
services 
Location of residence: 
Other urban location 0.13 0.12 3.8 0 . 3 7 " 0.14 0 . 3 6 ' " 0.14 
Rural location 0.07 0.11 2.3 0 . 3 5 " 0.14 0 . 3 5 ' " 0.13 
State of residence: 
Victoria -0.02 0.08 -0.5 _ 
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Queensland -0.11 0.11 -4.0 - - - -
South Australia -0.09 0.12 -2.9 - - - -
Western Australia 0.38™ 0.13 10.3 - - - -
Tasmania -0 .68"- 0.26 -24.9 - - - -
Australian Capital Terri tory 0.34 0.22 8.3 - - - -
Migrant status: 
Non-English speaking 
background (NESB) 
-0 .47 ' 0.25 -16.8 -0.30 0.36 -0.27 0.36 
Migrated to Aust. 18 years 0.08 0.12 2.4 -0.12 0.15 -0.14 0.14 
or younger 
Migrated to Aust. after 18 0.10 0.10 3.1 0.00 0.13 -0.02 0.13 
years of age 
(Migrated to Aust. 18 years 
or younger)*(NESB) 
0.45 0.33 11.8 0.13 0.46 0 .10 0 .47 
(Migrated to Aust. after 18 
years of age)*(NESB) 
0.23 0.27 6.8 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.39 
Sex: 
Female 0 . 2 4 ' " 0.08 6.9 0.02 0.11 0.00 0 .10 
Importance of job 
security: 
Job security important in a 
job 
-0.06 0.08 -2.0 0 . 2 2 " 0.11 0 . 2 3 " 0 .10 
Political affiliation: 
Labor voter - - - 0 . 2 9 ' " 0.10 0 . 2 9 " ' 0.10 
Coalition voter - - - 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12 
Constant 0.14 0.29 - - 2 . 3 8 ' " 0.56 -2 .23"" 0 .48 
0.25 0.43 - - - - -
Log-likelihood -1633.87 -601.77 
2(lnL-lnL«) ( r ) 435.68" '* 437.40 ' 
Pseudo R- 0.17* 0 .27 
Number of cases 2085 1486 
Notes: 
Values of 0.000 or -0.000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ±0 .001 
"significant at 10% (two-tailed Mest for coefficients) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
" 's ignif icant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
^Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union membership 
with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
^Base categories for dummy variables: Occupation - Labourer; Sector - Private sector; 
Establishment size - 500 or more employees; Industry - Public administration and defence, and 
community services industries; Political affiliation - no party affiliation or minor party affiliation; 
Location of residence - major urban centre (100,000-1- residents); State of residence - New South 
Wales; Migrant status - Australian born, English-speaking background. 
Estimated equations also include marital status and supervisory dummies. 
'Estimated from an independent probit model of open shop employment. 
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TABLE 5.3 
Likelihood Ratio Tests of Joint Significance - Open Shop Emplojuient Probit 
Category X' Degrees of Freedom 
Occupation 79.99"" 1 
Workplace size 7 9 . 9 0 ~ 5 
Industry of employment 3 4 . 6 9 " 9 
Location of residence 1.35 2 
State of residence 2 3 . 3 4 " 6 
Migrant status 13.64° 5 
Political affiliation 1.78 2 
Marital status 4 . 9 2 " 2 
"significant at 10% 
""significant at 5 % 
""significant at 1 % 
The industry coefficients axe probably best interpreted as measuring 
variations in the relative supplies of open and closed shop jobs. All the 
coefficients are negative indicating that a worker employed in one of the 
omitted industries - community services or public administration - has a higher 
probability of being in open shop employment than if he or she were employed 
in another industry. Employees in the construction, and transport and storage 
industries have the lowest estimated probability of open shop employment, 
holding all other characteristics constant. 
The estimated public sector coefficient is negative. This indicates that, 
controlling for the other determinants of open shop employment, public sector 
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employees are less likely to be in open shop employment than similar private 
sector employees. (On average, the difference is approximately 17 percentage 
points). 
In Chapter 3 we saw that data from the Australian Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (AWIRS) show that unions are more likely to be present in 
larger workplaces. The estimates presented here suggest that there is also a 
greater incidence of compulsory membership arrangements in larger 
establishments. 
There are several explanations for the higher rate of closed shop 
employment in larger workplaces. 
The first explanation is that unions are more likely to devote the 
necessary resources to pressure for and maintain compulsory membership 
arrangements when these arrangements promise to deliver a large number of 
members. In other words, it may simply be uneconomic for a union to 
maintain a closed shop in a workplace where the number of members at stake 
is small. 
A second, less compelling, explanation is that in larger groups there is 
greater scope for free-riding. Therefore, in order to overcome the free-rider 
problem, unions are more inclined to seek compulsory membership 
arrangements in larger workplaces. Finally, it can be argued that the 
collective voice benefits are greater in larger workplaces and that management 
in these plants may be more inclined to promote union membership, (including 
support for closed shop arrangements), in order to reap the productivity 
benefits from union involvement at the workplace. 
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At the time the IMA data were collected (1988), approximately 50 
percent of Australian employees were covered by state awards or industrial 
agreements. There is some evidence that differences in the treatment of 
compulsory unionism across the different state jurisdictions impact on the 
individual's probability of open shop employment. 
For example, Tasmania was the only state in which awards could 
sanction closed shop arrangements (Weeks, 1987). Indeed, the negative 
coefficient on the Tasmania dummy variable indicates that a Tasmanian 
employee has a lower probability of open shop employment than a similar 
worker in another state. 
In 1988 two states, Western Australia and Victoria, prohibited any form 
of preference arrangement in awards. However, only the Western Australia 
coefficient is positive and significant. Interestingly, prior to 1979 Western 
Australia had a history of official preference and compulsory unionism, while 
Victoria has never had any formal preference or closed shop arrangements 
(Weeks, 1987). It seems that informal closed shop practices were better 
entrenched in Victoria than in Western Australia where unions had previously 
relied on formal preference and closed shop arrangements. 
Next, the female coefficient is significant and positive, indicating that a 
female worker has a higher estimated probability of open shop employment 
than a male with similar attributes. We should exercise caution in interpreting 
the coefficient, however. For example, it is not clear whether the positive 
relationship is due to a lower availability of closed shop employment in jobs 
with higher rates of female employment, or due to women choosing open shop 
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employment in preference to closed shop employment. 
Only one of the migrant and non-English speaking coefficients is 
significant at the 10 percent level.'" In particular, it is estimated that a 
worker from a non-English speaking background has an estimated probability 
of open shop employment of 17 percentage points lower than a similar 
individual form an English-speaking background. Once again, we cannot be 
certain to what extent this is a demand-related phenomenon (ie. whether 
workers with a non-English speaking background have a greater desire for 
closed shop employment than workers with an English speaking background), 
or to what extent it is a supply related phenomenon. 
Finally, the education coefficient is positive indicating that more 
educated workers have a higher probability of open shop employment. 
However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
A notable feature of the results reported is the insignificant t-statistic 
attached to the estimated covariance (ajj) between the errors in the two 
equations." This amounts to a test of sample selection bias; if the errors of 
the open shop employment and union membership equations are independent, 
then independent probit estimation of the union membership equation using the 
sub-sample of open shop employees is consistent. With this in mind, the 
discussion now focuses on a comparison of the independent probit estimates of 
'"However, a likelihood ratio test indicates that jointly these variables are 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level (see Table 5 .3) . 
"Furthermore, under the null hypothesis of a ,2=0 , the log-likelihood of the bivariate 
model is equal to the sum of the log-likelihoods of the two separate probits. The 
calculated x ' for the relevant likelihood ratio test is only 0 .02 implying that the null 
hypothesis that the open-shop employment equations are independent cannot be rejected. 
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the determinants of union membership using: (i) the sample of all employees 
and, (ii) the sub-sample of open shop employees. The estimates are presented 
in Table 5.4. 
A quick comparison of the estimates in Table 5.4 reveals that many of 
the significant coefficients in the two equations have the same signs and are of 
similar orders of magnitude. At first glance, this would seem to support the 
view that the estimated coefficients of the union membership equation are not 
greatly biased by failing to separately account for compulsory union 
membership as suggested by Miller and Rummery (1989). 
However, a closer inspection reveals several differences which are 
worthy of comment. 
First, consider the wholesale and retail industry coefficient. It is well 
known that the main retail union, the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' 
Association, relies heavily on national compulsory membership agreements 
with the major retail firms (in 1969 before the membership agreements were 
established the SDA's membership stood at 39,9(X); two years later it had 
grown to 102,300, and by 1976 membership reached 135,200 (Weeks, 1987; 
Deery, 1989)). The impact of these arrangements is evident in the estimated 
coefficients. For the full sample, the coefficient is negative but not statistically 
significant, indicating that a sales industry worker does not have a significantly 
different probability of membership than a similar worker in the community 
services or public administration industries. However, for the open shop 
sample the sales industry coefficient is a larger negative number and is 
significant at the 1 percent level. This means that when the influence of the 
212 
Compulsory Unionism 
closed shop is removed, a wholesale and retail industry employee has a 
significantly lower estimated probability of union membership than a similar 
worker in the community services or public administration industries. (The 
marginal effect suggests that the difference is approximately 11.2 percentage 
points). 
In Chapter 2, considerable attention was paid to outlining the two 
leading models of voluntary union membership. According to the social 
custom model, workers in establishments where there is a social custom of 
union membership are induced to join a union in order to maintain a good 
reputation with their workmates. On the other hand, the insurance model 
posits that workers become union members in order to protect against arbitrary 
managerial decisions including unfair dismissal. While the two models are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, we would naturally like to be able to establish 
the empirical relevance of each model. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Independent Probit Models of Union Membership^ 
Full Sample 
P r ( U = l ) 
0 s.e. Marginal 
Effect 
(%)« 
Open Shop Sample 
P r ( U = l | C = 0) 
^ s.e Marginal 
Effect 
Experience 0.005 0.011 \ 
0.028" 0.015 ) 
(Experience)- 0.000 0.000 
) 0.20 
-0.001" 0.000 
J 0.70 
Education (years) -0.015 0.014 -0.6 -0.005 0.020 -0.1 
Tenure in current job 0.093"" 0.013 ] 
0.096"" 0.017 \ 
(Tenure)- -0.002'" 0.000 
j 3.60 
-0.002"" 0.001 
/ 2.50 
Hours of work 0.019" 0.008 1 
0.054"" 0.013 
1 
(Hours)^ 0.000" 0.000 
i 0.80 
-0.001"" 0.000 
J 1.40 
Current occupation: 
Manager, administrator -1.14"" 0.17 -34.90 -0.84"" 0.22 -13.60 
Professional -0.69"" 0.13 -24.30 -0.41" 0.17 -8.50 
Para-professional - 0 . 5 6 - 0.14 -20.30 -0.33" 0.18 -7.20 
Tradesperson -0.36"" 0.11 -13.70 -0.40" 0.16 -8.40 
Clerk -0.73"" 0.12 -25.40 -0.47"" 0.16 -9.40 
Salesperson -0.35"" 0.13 -13.20 -0.36" 0.19 -7.80 
Plant and machine operator -0.06 0.12 -2.20 -0.13 0.19 -3.20 
Supervisory status: 
Supervisor -0.06 0.07 -2.40 0.06 0.10 1.50 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 0.71"" 0.10 26.90 0.70""" 0.12 23.20 
Workplace size: 
1-20 employees -0.64"" 0.10 -22.90 -0.38""" 0.13 -8.00 
21-50 employees -0.26" 0.11 -9.90 0.03 0.14 0.90 
51-100 employees -0.12 0.12 -4.80 -0.03 0.16 -0.80 
101-500 employees 0.07 0.11 2.60 -0.05 0.14 -1.30 
Workplace size not known -0.34 0.21 -12.90 -0.28 0.31 -6.20 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture, mining -0.43 0.24 -16.10 -0.99"" 0.39 -14.70 
Manufacturing 0.04 0.12 1.60 -0.41"" 0.16 -8.50 
Electricity, gas and water 0.20 0.27 7.90 0.14 0.34 3.90 
Construction 0.26 0.17 10.30 -0.36 0.23 -7.70 
Wholesale and retail trade -0.15 0.14 -6.00 -0.61"" 0.19 -11.20 
Transport and storage 0.43"" 0.17 17.10 0.04 0.22 1.10 
Communication 0 .59" 0.23 22.90 0.47" 0.28 14.50 
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Finance, property and business 0 . 3 1 " 0 .14 12.40 0 .23 0 .16 6 .60 
services 
Recreational and personal services -0.07 0 .16 -2.60 -0.47"" 0 .22 -9 .40 
Location of residence: 
Other urban location 0.15 0.11 6.20 0 . 3 6 ' " 0 .14 10.80 
Rural location 0 .10 0.10 4.00 0 .35"" 0 .13 10.40 
Importance of job security: 
Job security important in a job 0.13" 0 .07 5 .30 0 . 2 3 " 0 .10 6 .50 
Political affiliation: 
Labor voter 0 . 1 7 " 0 .07 6 .70 0 .29"" 0 .10 8.40 
Coalition voter -0.05 0.09 -1.90 0.01 0 .12 0 .30 
Migrant status: 
Non-English speaking background 0.15 0.23 5.90 -0.27 0 .36 -6 .10 
(NESB) 
Migrated to Aust. 18 years or -0.11 0.10 -4.20 -0 .14 0 .14 -3 .30 
younger 
Migrated to Aust. af ter 18 years of -0.02 0 .10 -1.00 -0.02 0 .13 -0 .50 
age 
(Migrated to Aust. 18 years or -0.20 0.30 -7.60 0 .10 0 .47 2 .80 
younger)*(NESB) 
(Migrated to Aust. after 18 years 0.13 0.25 5.20 0.49 0 .39 15.30 
of age)*(NESB) 
Sex: 
Female -0.13" 0.08 -5.10 -0.00 0 .10 -0 .10 
Marital status: 
Marr ied , defacto 0.02" 0.09 0.70 -0.01 0 .12 -0 .30 
Widowed, d ivorced, separated 0.28" 0.15 11.10 0 .12 0 .20 3 .20 
Constant -0.30 0.32 - -2 .23"" 0 .48 -
Log-likelihood -1121.45 -601.77 
2(lnL-lnLo) ( r ) 638.15"" 437 .40"" 
Pseudo R^ 0.22 0 .27 
Number of cases 2088 1486 
Notes: 
Values of 0 .000 or -0 .000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ± 0 . 0 0 1 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
"s ignif icant at 5% (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed Mest for coefficients) 
^Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union membership 
with all independent variables set at their mean values. 
^Base categories for dummy variables: Occupation - Labourer; Sector - Private sector; 
Establishment size - 500 or more employees; Industry - I»ublic administration and defence, and 
community services industries; Political affiliation - no party affiliation or minor party affiliation; 
Location of residence - major urban centre (100,000-1- residents); Migrant status - Australian born , 
English-speaking background. 
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Unfortunately, given the available data, it is not possible to provide a 
clear-cut test of these models, even though the IMA data allow us to separately 
identify voluntary and compulsory union members. For example, the extent of 
union membership in the individual's place of work is not available in the data. 
(This information would indicate the level of support for unionism among the 
individual's fellow workers, and would therefore provide the basis of a test of 
the social custom model). Another problem is that by excluding all 
compulsory union members, the sample is potentially biased in favour of the 
insurance model. 
There are two reasons why the sample of closed shop employees may 
contain a relatively high proportion of workers who, even if membership were 
not compulsory, would still join a union because of a workplace social custom. 
First, recall from Chapter 2 that, for the social custom model, a stable 
equilibrium level of membership is established at a very high level of 
workplace union density. Now, it can be argued that, if the high level of 
membership is maintained for some time, a formal (or informal) compulsory 
membership arrangement is likely to be reached with the employer. After all, 
what has the employer to lose from such an arrangement? Because the 
workforce is already highly unionised, the costs of implementing a closed shop 
are not great, but there may be appreciable benefits to the employer in the 
form of greater goodwill with the union. 
Second, we must be aware that the social pressure to join a union in a 
location where membership is a strong social custom may be so great that an 
individual perceives union membership to be "compulsory" when, in actual 
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fact, it is not. Indeed, as previously mentioned, Crockett and Hall (1987) 
report that some school teachers in Western Australia nominated compulsion as 
the main reason for joining a union when, in fact, union membership was not 
compulsory for those workers. 
While we must be cautious in interpreting any changes in the estimated 
parameters, the open shop sample yields estimates that appear to provide 
stronger support for the insurance model of membership than the full sample 
estimates.'^ For instance, the coefficient of the job security dummy variable 
( = 1 if the individual says that job security is important in a job; = 0 
otherwise) has a greater degree of statistical significance and is slightly larger 
in the open shop equation than the full sample equation. 
Similarly, consider the experience coefficient. To the extent that older 
workers face more limited job opportunities outside their present job, the 
insurance model predicts a positive coefficient. Estimating the membership 
equation for the full sample produces a positive but insignificant coefficient. 
However, using the open shop sample, the coefficient is much larger and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. In particular, the estimated coefficient 
indicates that (evaluated at the means of all the independent variables), an 
additional year of labour market experience increases an individual's 
probability of union membership by approximately 0.7 of a percentage point. 
In the full sample equation, the rural and other urban coefficients are 
insignificant. However, it is commonly thought that employees outside the 
'^Note that we do not mean to suggest that the estimates favour the insurance model 
over the social custom model. Rather, we wish to show that the estimates are consistent 
with an insurance model of union membership. 
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major metropolitan areas have more limited alternative job opportunities. If 
this is correct, the insurance model would predict positive coefficients. 
Indeed, the estimated coefficients in the open shop equation are positive and 
significant. 
Finally, the largest and most substantial difference in the full-sample 
and open shop estimates is the change in the constant term. In the full sample 
model, the estimated constant coefficient is -0.30. In contrast, the open shop 
estimate of the constant term is -2.23 (and is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level). 
A clear illustration of the impact of the change in the constant term is 
provided by Figure 5.4. Here we plot job tenure and the estimated probability 
of union membership for a stylised individual whose characteristics are the 
same as the sample means of independent variables (excluding tenure). Using 
the standard (full-sample) parameter estimates, the stylised individual with zero 
years tenure has a probability of union membership of 32 percent. After 25 
years tenure the estimated probability of membership rises to 76 percent. 
However, using the open shop parameter estimates the stylised individual's 
estimated probability of membership starts at just 11 percent and rises to 41 
percent after twenty year's tenure. 
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FIGURE 5.4 
Tenure and Estimated Probability of Membership: 
Open Shop and Full Sample Estimates 
Estimated Probability of Membership (% 
80 
60 
4 0 
20 
Full Sample Estimate Open Shop Estimate 
0 5 10 15 20 
Tenure with Current Employer (Years) 
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5.5 Conscripts and Volunteers 
Rawson (1978) calls union members in open shops "volunteers", while those m 
closed shops are "conscripts". He notes that some conscripts would join a 
union even if membership was not compulsory; these conscripts are called 
"willing conscripts". The remaining compulsory members are called 
"unwilling conscripts". 
In the IMA survey, compulsory union members are asked if they would 
have joined the union even if membership was not compulsory (see Figure 
5.5). Of the closed shop employees, 54 percent are willing conscripts. 
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What determines whether a conscript is a willing or unwilling union 
member? To answer this question, we estimate a probit model using the 
sample of all compulsory union members. The estimates are presented in 
Table 5.5. 
FIGURE 5.5 
IMA Union Membership Questions: An Overview 
Do you belong to a 
trade union? 
No Yes 
Non-member 
Is your union membership 
compulsory for your job ? 
Yes No 
Voluntary union member 
If you didn't have to join the union, 
would you have joined anyway? 
No Yes 
Unwilling "conscripr Willing "conscript" 
The most striking feature of the estimates is the lack of significance of 
most coefficients. Variables which are routinely found to be significant 
determinants of union membership such as occupation, tenure and hours of 
work are all insignificant. This could be because a response to the intention to 
join question is motivated by the respondent's current attitude towards his or 
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her union. That is, the response may be a better indication of his or her 
current opinion of the performance of the union, and may be quite different 
from what he or she would do if union membership were, in actual fact, 
voluntary. 
There are, however, some significant coefficients. First, there is some 
evidence that workers employed in closed shop plants of more than 100 
employees are more likely to be willing conscripts (the coefficients on the 21-
50 and 51-100 employees dummies are negative and significant at the 10 
percent level). This may be because economies of scale allow unions to 
deliver a better service to workers in very large plants. Alternatively, it may 
reflect a greater demand by workers in very large plants for the voice or 
insurance services of unions. 
Public sector employees in closed shops are more likely say that they 
would voluntarily join their union. Again, we cannot be sure whether this is a 
demand or supply related phenomenon. For example, there may be a greater 
desire by individuals for the voice services of unions in large bureaucratic 
settings. Alternatively, the public sector setting may allow unions to deliver a 
better, more comprehensive service to their members than would usually be 
possible in the private sector. 
Finally, political affiliation strongly influences whether an individual in 
a closed shop is likely to state a willingness to voluntarily join the union. For 
example, it is estimated that the probability of a Labor voter saying that he or 
she would be willing to voluntarily join the union is approximately 30 
percentage points higher than for a Coalition voter. 
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TABLE 5.5 
Willingness to Join a Union: Probit Estimates^ 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Marginal Effect 
Expenence 0.032 
(Experience)' -0.001 
Education (years) -0.029 
Tenure in current job 0.009 
(Tenure)^ 0.000 
Hours of work -0.011 
(Hours)^ 0.000 
Current occupation: 
Manager, administrator 0.18 
Professional 0.34 
Para-professional 0 .54 ' 
Tradesperson -0.03 
Clerk -0.07 
Salesperson 0.29 
Plant and machine operator -0.13 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 0 . 4 6 " 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture, mining 0.08 
Manufacturing 0.05 
Electricity, gas and water 0.11 
Construction -0.03 
Wholesale and retail trade -0.22 
Transport and storage 0.07 
Communication -0.17 
Finance, property and business services 0.28 
Recreational and personal services 0.39 
Workplace size: 
1-20 employees -0.19 
21-50 employees -0.36" 
51-100 employees - 0 . 3 7 
101-500 employees -0.17 
Importance of job security: 
Job security important in a job -0.06 
Political affiliation: 
Labor voter 0.35"° 
Coalition voter - 0 . 6 5 ~ 
0.020 
0.000 
0.025 
0.022 
0.001 
0.017 
0.000 
0.42 
0.28 
0.29 
0.16 
0.25 
0.28 
0.17 
0.20 
0.51 
0.26 
0.38 
0.30 
0.32 
0.27 
0.33 
0.31 
0.35 
0 . 18 
0.20 
0.20 
0.16 
0.14 
0.13 
0.17 
• 1.2 
- 1 . 1 
0.4 
0.4 
6.9 
13.0 
19.4 
-1.3 
-2.9 
11.2 
-5.0 
16.9 
3.2 
2.1 
4.4 
-1.3 
-8.9 
2.6 
-6.9 
10.7 
14.5 
-7.4 
-14.40 
-14.6 
- 6 . 8 
-2.5 
13.0 
-25.2 
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Sex: 
Female -0.40"° 0.15 -15.8 
Constant 0.38 0.60 
Lx)g-likelihood -357.69 
2(lnL-lnL„) ( r ) 107.50™ 
Pseudo R^ 0.13 
Number of cases 599 
Notes:Values of 0.000 or -0.000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ±0.001 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
"""significant at 1 % (two-tailed /-test for coefficients) 
'Effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the probability of union 
membership with all independent variables set at their mean values, 
^ a s e categories for dummy variables: Occupation - Labourer; Sector - Private sector; 
Establishment size - 500 or more employees; Political affiliation - no party affiliation or 
minor party affiliation. 
Estimated equation also includes marital status, migrant status, supervisory status, and 
location of residence dummy variables. 
5.6 The Impact of the Closed Shop 
In the full IMA sample, approximately 46 percent of wage and salary earners 
are union members. However, almost 60 percent of these union members are 
employed in closed shops. Naturally, this raises the question of what the 
overall union membership density would be if there were no compulsory 
unionism? 
One answer, of course, is to accept that 54 percent of compulsory 
union members would do as they say and still join a union if membership were 
voluntary. If this were to actually happen, the aggregate union density rate 
would drop to 33.5 percent; that is, the overall level of union membership 
would drop by over 25 percent. 
The problem with this estimate is that it relies on compulsory members' 
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responses to the question: "If you didn't have to join the union, would you 
have joined anyway?" Unfortunately, as noted above, this question has a 
certain opinion survey quality about it, and it may not necessarily indicate 
what workers would actually do if membership were voluntary. 
Another way of estimating the impact of the closed shop is to use the 
open shop parameter estimates to predict how many closed shop employees 
would voluntarily join a union. However, before doing this some new notation 
is defined. 
Following Farber (1990), the average predicted probability of union 
membership for workers in category j using the coefficients for the open shop 
probit (column IV) in Table 5.2 is 
(5.8) 
where nj is the number of workers in the yth category, Xj is a vector of 
characteristics for each worker in the jth category and is the vector of open 
shop parameter estimates of the membership equation. The term 
estimates the probability that the /th worker in the yth category is a union 
member using the open shop coefficients. These terms are then summed for 
all workers in the category, and divided by the number of workers in the 
category to give the estimated union density (or average predicted probability 
of membership). 
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The actual union density rate for employees in open shops is 24.1 
percent. Now, the average predicted probability of membership for employees 
in open shops ( j=0) using the estimated parameters from the probit model of 
open shop union membership is given by This is calculated to be 
24.2 percent (see Table 5.6). 
By definition, the actual rate of membership for closed shop employees 
is 100 percent. But what would it be if there were no compulsory union 
membership? One estimate is given by P(Xi,/3J, where the subscript "c" 
indicates that the sample used consists of closed shop employees. That is, the 
open shop parameters are used to determine what proportion of closed shop 
workers would still join a union if membership were not compulsory. Using 
this method, we estimate that only 35.3 percent of all compulsory union 
members would still join a union if they were not employed under a closed 
shop arrangement (see Table 5.6). Even so, this estimate is still substantially 
higher than the 24 percent of workers in open shops who are union members. 
What this suggests is that compulsory unionism is more likely in those sectors 
that are more conducive to union organisation, or among workers who are 
more likely to voluntarily desire union membership, or both. Nevertheless, 
this estimate contrasts starkly with the view that compulsory unionism has no 
significant impact on union density because those workers employed in closed 
shops would have joined anyway. 
An alternative estimate of what the union membership density would be 
for closed shop employees if membership were not compulsory is given by 
P(X,i8J. Instead of the open shop estimates, we use the parameter estimates 
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from a probit model of voluntary union membership. Here the dependent 
variable is equal to one if the individual is a union member in an open shop or 
is a closed shop employee who says that he or she would voluntarily join the 
union, otherwise the dependent variable is zero. Using the voluntary 
membership estimates, the average predicted probability of union membership 
for closed shop employees is 43.1 percent. 
If there was no compulsory union membership, what would be the 
average probability of union membership for all workers? This can be 
estimated by calculating (that is, by applying the estimated voluntary 
union membership coefficients to the full sample of workers - both those in 
closed shops and those in open shops), an alternative estimate is given by 
P(X^y). The two estimates indicate that if there were no compulsory 
membership, the overall union density rate would fall substantially: from 45.9 
percent'^ to somewhere between 27.4 and 33.0 percent. 
The estimates presented in Table 5.6 also highlight the importance of 
the closed shop in the private sector. For example, it is estimated that 
approximately 65 percent of compulsory members in the public sector would 
still join if membership were voluntary. In contrast, it is estimated that only 
24 to 34 percent of private sector employees in closed shops would voluntarily 
join a union. 
'^The actual union density rate for all employees is reported to be 45 .9 percent in 
Table 5 .6 and as 45 .5 percent in Table 5.1. The difference arises because only the 
general sample is used to calculate the means reported in Table 5 .1 . Table 5 .6 is based 
on the full IMA sample. 
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TABLE 5.6 
Predicted and Actual Average Probabilities of Union Membership 
Sample: Average Predicted Probability 
of Membership (%) 
Using Using ^^  
Actual 
Membership 
Density (%) 
Private and public sectors: 
Open shop employees 24.2 29.0 24.1 
Closed shop employees 35.3 43.1 100 
All employees (open and closed 
shop workers) 
27.4 33.0 45.9 
Private sector: 
Open shop employees 14.1 20.1 14.0 
Closed shop employees 23.6 34.1 100 
Public sector: 
Open shop employees 53.9 55.0 53.8 
Closed shop employees 63.6 64.9 100 
The Demise of the Closed Shop and the Decline in Trade Union Membership 
Early empirical evidence of the extent of compulsory unionism in Australia is 
presented by Rawson in his 1978 book Unions and Unionists in Australia. In 
a survey of 1003 unionists conducted in May 1976, nearly 70 percent reported 
that they were required to be union members to hold their jobs. However, in a 
similar survey conducted in 1991 the proportion had fallen to 54 percent 
(Rawson, 1990). During the same period the overall rate of union membership 
also fell - from 51 percent to 40.5 percent. This means that in 1976, 33.5 
percent of wage and salary earners were employed in closed shops but by 1990 
the proportion of closed shop employees had fallen to 21.6 percent. 
To date, the decline in the incidence of closed shop employment has not 
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been widely canvassed as a possible source of the decline in union 
membership. However, the estimates presented here offer prima facie 
evidence to suggest that the fall in compulsory union membership has been an 
important element in the overall decline in union density. In particular, it is 
estimated that only 35 to 43 percent of compulsory union members would still 
join a union if membership were voluntary. This means that of the 14 
percentage point decline in membership over the period from 1976 to 1990, 
somewhere between 5.5 and 7.8 percentage points might be due to the decline 
in compulsory membership. 
It is relevant to note, however, that the decline in the incidence of 
compulsory unionism may itself be the product of underlying structural change 
in the labour market. In particular, the demise of the closed shop may largely 
be the product of structural change away from blue collar, industrial jobs, with 
their tradition of compulsory membership, and towards new jobs in the service 
sector which do not have the same traditions and which offer a less fertile 
environment for trade union organisation. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Compulsory membership is a prominent and widespread feature of Australian 
unionism: over half of all union members report that union membership is 
required for their job. In this chapter we have developed a model of union 
membership in which compulsory members are distinguished from voluntary 
members. While data limitations prevent the estimation of a fully specified 
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structural model, we are nevertheless able to estimate a reduced form model 
which provides further insights into the determinants of voluntary and 
compulsory membership. 
Using the reduced form model, we have produced estimates which 
suggest that the closed shop has a substantial impact on the overall level of 
union density. In particular, it is estimated that in the region of 50 to 65 
percent of compulsory union members would not voluntarily join their union if 
membership was not a requirement of their job. On this basis, if compulsory 
membership were completely outlawed, Australia's union density could be 
expected to fall from its current level to approximately 25 percent. Such a rate 
of union membership would place Australia among the nations with the lowest 
levels of unionisation in the OECD. 
However, it is unlikely that the full decline in membership would occur 
immediately. Indeed, a substantial proportion of current closed shop members 
are probably "locked" into membership through the automatic deduction of 
fees from their pay. But over time, as more workers change jobs, it could be 
expected that the rate of union membership would drop steadily to somewhere 
around 25 percent of the workforce. 
It is possible that the estimates presented here may actually 
underestimate the possible drop in union membership. Because the closed 
shop provides a ready source of income to many unions, (a steady stream of 
new members is delivered at low recruitment cost), it can be argued that 
compulsory members provide unions with the extra financial resources to 
recruit voluntary members in open shops. Without these resources, unions 
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would not have the same capacity to attract members as they currently do and 
the average rate of membership could possibly decline further still. 
Finally, there is evidence that closed shop employment has declined 
substantially over the last 15 years or so. Consequently, the estimates 
presented in this chapter offer prima fade evidence to suggest that the demise 
of the closed shop may be an important element in a complete explanation of 
the overall decline in union membership. 
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Membership Differential 
6.1 Introduction 
There is a substantial difference in the union membership rates of Australian 
men and women. In August 1992, 43.4 percent of male wage and salary 
earners were union members while only 34.5 percent of women were union 
members. Bridging the membership gap is an important goal of the Australian 
trade union movement. Indeed, trade union leaders see increased female 
membership as essential to arresting the decline in membership and ensuring 
the survival of a viable union movement. 
While there have been no detailed econometric studies of the Australian 
male-female membership gap, some evidence of the relationship between sex 
and union membership may be gleaned from the previous Australian studies of 
the determinants of union membership. The evidence is, however, 
inconclusive. On the one hand, Crockett and Hall (1987), and Deery and 
DeCieri (1991) report that an individual's sex has an insignificant effect on his 
or her estimated probability of union membership. On the other hand, Christie 
and Miller (1989) and Christie (1992) (both using the same data source) report 
that being female has a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
probability of membership. Finally, using workplace data from the AWIRS, 
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Wooden and Balchin (1993) find a negative relationship between the proportion 
of women in a given establishment and the rate of union membership in the 
establishment. 
Most studies of union membership in the United States show a negative 
relationship between being female and union membership (Voos, 1983). 
However, the magnitude of the relationship falls dramatically as controls for 
personal and job characteristics are added to the membership equation (Antos 
et. al 1980; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Freeman and Leonard, 1987). A 
consensus seems to be emerging that the lower rate of membership among 
women is due more to the restricted availability of unionised jobs for 
American women, rather than a lower desire by women for membership (see, 
for example, Leigh and Hills, 1987, and Schur and Kruse, 1992). 
In Chapter 3 we saw that the IMA and CSA data yield mixed evidence 
of the impact of an individual's sex on his or her probability of union 
membership. Using the IMA data, it was estimated that being female reduces 
the probability of membership by approximately 6 percentage points (albeit 
with a marginal degree of statistical significance). The CSA equation, on the 
other hand, yielded a positive but insignificant female coefficient. 
The approach adopted in Chapter 3, (and in the previous Australian 
studies), imposes several restrictive assumptions. First, the coefficients on the 
independent variables in the membership equation are constrained to be the 
equal for males and females - only the intercept term is allowed to vary. The 
disadvantage of such an approach is that it can hide important relationships in 
the data. For example, it might be that female managers are more likely to 
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become union members than male managers, while female plant and machine 
operators are less likely to become union members than their male 
counterparts. The standard approach also fails to account for the presence of 
compulsory unionism and for variations in the availability of union 
membership. 
6.2 Explanations for the Male-Female Membership Differential 
The explanations for the male-female membership differential can be 
conveniently categorised as "demand side" and "supply side" explanations. 
Demand Side Explanations 
It is a matter of record that Australian unions have been, and continue to be, 
male-denominated organisations (Wilkinson, 1983; Donaldson, 1991). Some 
commentators believe that, as a consequence, unions have been slow to address 
the special needs of women workers, and that this has led to lower rates of 
union membership among women (Wilkinson, 1983; Mumford, 1989). 
Implicit in this explanation is the notion that female workers have different 
tastes for membership than men. In particular, women are alleged to have a 
special interest in such matters as child care, affirmative action, maternity and 
paternity leave, and flexible working arrangements. For example, Winters 
(1987) argues that the failure of unions to address the special needs of women 
may ultimately prove to be costly for unions generally. Similarly, the assistant 
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secretary of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, Jennie George, has noted 
that survey evidence indicates that women don't join unions because "they 
don't see that the movement is relevant to them or that it is interested in their 
concerns".' 
Another explanation for the membership gap derives from the so-called 
"female docility thesis". This is the idea that women are socialised to be 
passive and avoid confrontation. To the extent that unions are seen as 
adversarial institutions, the desire by women for membership is asserted to be 
correspondingly reduced. However, the female docility thesis has received 
little support in empirical studies conducted in Australia (Winters, 1987), the 
United States (Schur and Kruse, 1992) and Canada (Wetzel et. al. 1991). 
Perhaps the most widely canvassed demand-side explanation for the 
male-female membership differential relates to the weaker average attachment 
of women to the workforce (see, for example. Booth, 1986). Having a weaker 
attachment to the workforce is assumed to reduce the demand for the insurance 
and other services of unions. Thus, the increased labour force participation of 
women over the last 30 years has been advanced as an explanation for the 
increase in female membership observed in several OECD countries (Curtin, 
1993). In a similar vein, Visser (1991: p. 115) notes that countries with the 
smallest male-female differentials are also the ones with the highest rates of 
female labour force activity. 
' Interview with ABC television news, Sunday 8 September 1991. 
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Supply Side Explanations 
On the supply side, it is frequently observed that women are employed in 
smaller, more dispersed workplaces and in jobs which are characterised by 
higher rates of labour turnover. In short, female employment is concentrated 
in those sectors of the labour market that are most costly to organise. An 
explanation for the membership differential, then, is not that women have a 
lower desire for membership, but that unions are constrained in their capacity 
to deliver an effective service to many women because of the high cost of 
organising their jobs. 
Finally, it is occasionally suggested that the supply side barriers to 
female membership are exacerbated by the reluctance of (male) union officials 
to devote the resources necessary to organise female jobs (Winters, 1987; 
Green, 1990). This might be seen as a legacy of the early days of trade 
unionism, when many unions actively sought to exclude women both from 
membership and from the labour force. 
6.3 Male and Female Membership: Some Sample Statistics 
In this chapter data from the IMA and CSA surveys are used. A rough 
indication of the sources of the male-female membership differential can be 
gained by examining the sample means for men and women. 
Tables 6.1a and 6.1b report the sample means by sex for occupational, 
industrial and sector of employment categories as well as selected job tenure 
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and hours of work categories. Both tables also report the average union 
membership rates by sex in the selected categories. 
Because the IMA and CSA samples are not representative of the 
population as a whole, the sample means are biased estimates of the true 
population means. This is apparent when we look at the mean male-female 
membership differentials. For the IMA sample the membership differential is 
approximately 13.6 percentage points (the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
reports a differential of 11.3 percentage points in 1988). However, for the 
CSA sample the differential is only 4.4 percentage points. This difference is 
almost certainly a product of the scope of the CSA survey. In particular, only 
females working at least 15 hours per week in regular part-time or full-time 
work are included in the sample, (males in casual employment or working less 
than 30 hours per week are also excluded from the sample). Since casuals 
have a much lower rate of membership than permanent employees, and 
proportionately more women are casuals than men, the smaller membership 
differential observed in the CSA data is likely to be attributable to the 
exclusion of casuals. 
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TABLE 6.1 A 
Sample Statistics: IMA Survey 
Males (1254 cases) Females (834 cases) 
Sample Membership Sample Membership 
Mean Density Mean Density 
Total: 1.000 0.514 1.000 0.378 
Occupation: 
Manager, administrator 0.083 0.173 0.040 0.333 
Professional 0.130 0.466 0.163 0.434 
Para-professional 0.086 0.519 0.073 0.508 
Tradesperson 0.259 0.498 0.048 0.300 
Clerk 0.063 0.582 0.277 0.294 
Salesperson, personal service worker 0.055 0.333 0.165 0.319 
Plant and machine operator 0.128 0.640 0.059 0.490 
Labourer 0.195 0.657 0.175 0.452 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture, mining, construction and utilities 0.137 0.532 0.040 0.118 
Manufacturing 0.327 0.517 0.197 0.409 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.130 0.239 0.156 0.269 
Transport, storage and communications 0.093 0.822 0.051 0.535 
Finance and business services 0.081 0.422 0.112 0.376 
Recreational and personal services 0.052 0.338 0.082 0.294 
Community services 0.120 0.596 0.312 0.423 
Public administration and defence 0.059 0.676 0.049 0.512 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 0.250 0.760 0.288 0.588 
Private sector 0.750 0.433 0.712 0.293 
Establishment size: 
1-20 employees 0.353 0.332 0.427 0.216 
21-50 employees 0.140 0.520 0.140 0.444 
51-100 employees 0.120 0.609 0.100 0.494 
101-500 employees 0.181 0.639 0.167 0.518 
> 500 employees 0.187 0.654 0.131 0.596 
Job tenure, age, hours worked: 
Employed < 1 year 0.242 0.342 0.308 0.233 
Employed 1-5 years 0.403 0.450 0.470 0.393 
Employed > 5 years 0.355 0.706 0.222 0.546 
Works < 20 hours 0.024 0.300 0.175 0.260 
Works 20-30 hours 0.035 0.477 0.174 0.317 
Works > 30 hours 0.941 0.521 0.651 0.425 
Political affiliation: 
Coalition voter 0.208 0.418 0.263 0.361 
Labor voter 0.356 0.626 0.357 0.496 
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TABLE 6.IB 
Sample Statistics: CSA 
Males (544 cases) Females (465 cases) 
Sample Membership Sample Membership 
Mean Density Mean Density 
Total: 1.000 0.539 1.000 0.495 
Occupation: 
Manager, administrator 0.110 0.267 0.056 0.154 
Professional 0.252 0.562 0.393 0.617 
Clerk 0.085 0.674 0.273 0.378 
Salesperson 0.053 0.172 0.080 0.513 
Service, sport and recreation worker 0.063 0.618 0.127 0.458 
Transport, communications worker 0.077 0.786 0.011 0.800 
Tradesperson, labourer, process worker 0.312 0.612 0.054 0.520 
Other occupations (miner, farmer etc.) 0.054 0.231 0.011 0.670 
Managerial, supervisory status: 
Manager 0.173 0.287 0.099 0.370 
Supervisor 0.274 0.557 0.260 0.570 
Industry of Employment: 
Agriculture, mining, construction and 0.110 0.650 0.022 0.300 
utilities 
Manufacturing 0.221 0.500 0.082 0.237 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.086 0.247 0.133 0.477 
Transport, storage and communications 0.118 0.393 0.043 0.470 
Finance and business services 0.096 0.457 0.125 0.497 
Recreational and personal services 0.031 0.493 0.080 0.463 
Community services 0.199 0.731 0.419 0.482 
Public administration and defence 0.140 0.513 0.097 0.533 
Sector of Employment: 
Public sector 0.432 0.749 0.456 0.708 
Private sector 0.568 0.379 0.544 0.316 
Job tenure, age, hours worked: 
Employed < 1 year 0.140 0.329 0.193 0.389 
Employed 1-5 years 0.469 0.467 0.520 0.463 
Employed > 5 years 0.392 0.700 0.286 0.624 
Works < 20 hours 0.000 n.a. 0.082 0.447 
Works 20-30 hours 0.018 0.200 0.176 0.451 
Works > 30 hours 0.982 0.545 0.742 0.510 
Political affiliation: 
Coalition voter 0.199 0.389 0.189 0.318 
Labor voter 0.300 0.693 0.318 0.615 
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The statistics reported in Tables 6.1a and 6.1b confirm much of what is 
already well-known about female employment (for example, there is a high 
concentration of women in the clerical, professional and sales occupations, and 
in the community services, sales and finance industries). However, some of 
the statistics are of particular interest. First, the IMA data support Winters' 
(1987) assertion that female workers are concentrated in smaller establishments 
(43 percent of women are employed in the 1-20 employees category, while 35 
percent of men are employed in this workplace size category). 
The IMA data also reveal a striking difference in the hours worked by 
men and women. Only 6 percent of males work less than 30 hours per week, 
while 35 percent of women are employed for less than 30 hours. Women also 
have a lower average tenure in their current job than men. 
While an analysis of the sample statistics provides an indication of the 
sources of the male-female membership differential, it does not allow the 
independent impact of variables to be determined. In order to do this a 
multivariate model, which simultaneously controls for all of the measured 
determinants of union membership, is required. 
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6.4 Estimating the Membership Differential 
No Slope Interactions 
First, consider the following reduced form model of union membership: 
U, = KU*) 
where FEMALE is a dummy variable (=1 if individual i is female), X, is a 
vector of other characteristics which determine the probability of membership, 
and is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
If the membership equation includes only a constant and a female 
dummy then the estimated coefficient, /3,, measures the "raw" sex differential. 
Part of the raw differential is likely to be a product of the high concentration 
of women in less unionised industries and occupations, and because of their 
weaker labour force attachment. 
How large is the male-female membership differential once we account 
for the other personal and job-related characteristics of men and women? 
Antos et. al. (1980) use a simple stepwise procedure to address this question. 
By adding successively more controls to the membership equation, they 
estimate how much of the differential can be explained by factors other than a 
pure female effect. The differential remaining after additional controls are 
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added is called the "net" male-female membership differential. 
Table 6.2 gives the probit estimates of /S, using data from both the IMA 
and CSA surveys. Looking first at the IMA estimates we see that with a 
female dummy variable as the sole explanatory variable the estimated 
coefficient is -0.35 implying a raw sex differential of -13.3 percent. In line 
with the studies by Freeman and Leonard (1987) and Antos et. al. (1980), the 
addition of demographic, human capital and place of residence variables has a 
very small impact on the female coefficient. 
The American studies also report a substantial decline in the net 
differential when industry and occupational controls are included in the 
membership equation. This pattern is not evident in the IMA data - once 
industry and occupation are controlled, the net differential is still of the order 
of 12 percent. However, a large decline in the net differential does occur 
when job tenure, hours worked, sector of employment and workplace size 
variables are added. Controlling all of these factors, the estimated coefficient 
falls to -0.14, (implying a net differential of 5.6%), and is significant only at 
the 10 percent level. In short, more than half of the raw sex differential is 
eliminated once a full range of controls is included in the membership 
equation. 
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TABLE 6.2 
Probit Estimates of the Effect of Being Female on the 
Probability of Union Membership 
Independent variables added 
successively: 
IMA survey CSA survey 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect on 
Probability 
of 
Membership^ 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect on 
Probability 
of 
Membership^ 
With FEMALE as the sole 
independent variable 
- 0 . 3 5 -
(0.06) 
-13.3% -0.11 
(0.08) 
-4.4% 
Demographic and human capital 
controls added 
(ie. age, education, marital 
status, migrant status, birthplace) 
- 0 . 3 3 -
(0.06) 
-12.7% -0.07 
(0.08) 
-2.8% 
Place of residence controls added 
(location and state of residence) 
- 0 . 3 3 -
(0.06) 
-12.7% -0.05 
(0.08) 
-2.0% 
Occupation controls added - 0 . 3 1 -
(0.07) 
-11.7% -0.04 
(0.10) 
-1.6% 
Industry controls added - 0 . 3 1 -
(0.07) 
-12.0% -0.03 
(0.10) 
-1.2% 
Political affiliation controls added - 0 . 3 3 -
(0.08) 
-12.4% -0.06 
(0.10) 
-2.4% 
Tenure and hours worked added -0 .19" 
(0.07) 
-7.2% -0.00 
(0.11) 
0.0% 
Public sector control added -0.16" 
(0.07) 
-6.3% 0.03 
(0.14) 
1.2% 
Workplace size control added -0.14" 
(0.08) 
-5.6% - -
Notes: 
Standard errors of estimates are in parenthesis. 
Values of 0.00 or -0.00 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ±0.01 . 
^Effect of a one unit change in the FEMALE dummy variable on the probability of union 
membership with all independent variables at their mean values, 
significant at 10% (two-tailed f-test) 
significant at 5 % (two-tailed f-test) 
significant at 1 % (two-tailed f-test) 
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The CSA data are not well suited to this sort of analysis. In particular, 
the raw differential is only 4.4 percent and is not statistically significant. 
However, the exclusion of casuals, and part-time employees working less than 
15 hours per week, points strongly to the weaker labour force attachment of 
women as an important source of the male-female membership differential. 
Certainly, when the job tenure and hours of work variables are added in the 
IMA equation, the net differential is almost halved. Moreover, it is likely that 
the reduction would be greater if casual employment could be controlled.^ 
However, there are no data on casual employment status in the IMA survey. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the CSA data^ it should be noted 
that once a full set of controls are included, the net differential is not only 
eliminated but actually becomes positive (albeit with no statistical significance). 
Full Slope Interactions: Full IMA Sample 
The above analysis imposes equal coefficients for men and women - only the 
constant/intercept coefficient changes. This specification implies that, after 
differences in the distribution of men and women across the explanatory 
^For instance, in August 1992, 16.5 percent of casual female employees were 
union members while 42.9 percent of permanent female employees were members. 
(ABS, 1993). 
^Of course, migrants are over-sampled in the IMA data. In order to ensure that 
the results presented in Table 6.2 were generally applicable, the analysis was repeated 
using data for the genera! sample only. There were no marked differences in the 
results obtained. 
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variables have been accounted for, being female has a single "lump sum" 
impact on the probability of membership (Fiorito and Greer, 1986). However, 
it is conceivable that the relationship between sex and membership is more 
complicated, and that there are significant differences between the coefficients 
of the other explanatory variables for men and women. In order to investigate 
this possibility, it is necessary to estimate separate membership equations for 
males and females. 
Table 6.3 presents the probit estimates for union membership equations 
estimated separately for men and women using the IMA data. The table also 
gives the differences in the male and female parameter estimates. The 
standard errors of the differences can be obtained by estimating a pooled 
equation in which all the explanatory variables are interacted with a female 
dummy variable. 
A brief inspection of Table 6.3 reveals that only a small number of the 
male-female differences in the estimated parameters are significant at the 5 
percent level or better. However, a likelihood ratio test indicates that the null 
hypothesis that the interacted variable coefficients are jointly zero can be 
rejected at the 1 percent level (x^ = 76.03; see Table 6.5). 
The most striking differences between the male and female parameter 
estimates are for the occupational variables. The male coefficients exhibit the 
usual pattern (plant and machine operators and labourers have the highest 
probability of membership, professionals and managers the lowest). However, 
for women only one of the occupational coefficients (the clerical coefficient) is 
significantly different from zero. This implies that female managers, for 
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instance, do not have a significantly lower probability of membership than 
female labourers (the omitted category). 
Why are women in professional and managerial occupations more likely 
to become union members than men in these occupations, even after the other 
determinants of union membership have been controlled? Unfortunately, in the 
context of a reduced form model of union membership, a definitive answer 
cannot be given. 
For instance, differences in the male and female parameter estimates 
can arise for several reasons, including the following: 
(1) Females in the category have a greater (or lesser) desire for 
membership than males in the category. For example, all female 
mangers may have a greater demand for membership than male 
managers. 
(2) Females are concentrated in particular occupational sub-groups in which 
all workers - both male and female - have a higher (or lower) demand 
for the services of trade unions. For example, it may be that women 
tend to be concentrated in more junior managerial positions where there 
is a greater demand for membership by male and female managers. 
(3) The supply of union services varies across occupational sub-groups, and 
females are concentrated in sub-groups characterised by a lower (or, 
possibly, higher) quality of union services. 
(4) Women are concentrated in occupational sub-groups with a lower (or 
higher) incidence of compulsory membership. 
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TABLE 6.3 
Probit Estimates of Union Membership: 
Full IMA Sample^' 
Males 
(1254 cases) 
Females 
(834 cases) 
L s.e. s.e. 
Difference 
A/? s.e. 
Experience 0.003 0.015 0.024 0.017 0.020 0.023 
(Experience)^ 0.000 0.000 - o . o o r 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Education (years) -0.015 0.019 -0.025 0.025 -0.009 0.031 
Tenure in current job 0.098"" 0.016 0.103"" 0.026 0.005 0.031 
(Tenure)^ -0.002"" 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Hours of work 0.007 0.014 0.030" 0.014 0.023 0.019 
(Hours)^ 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Current occupation: 
Manager, administrator -1.50"" 0.21 -0.30 0.31 1.20"" 0.38 
Professional -0.94"" 0.17 -0.23 0.21 0.72"" 0.27 
Para-professional -0.81"" 0.18 -0.01 0.25 0.80"" 0.30 
Tradesperson -0.45*" 0.12 -0.19 0.27 0.26 0.30 
Clerk -0.44"" 0.19 -0.56"* 0.17 -0.12 0.26 
Salesperson, personal 
service worker 
-0.49" 0.21 -0.16 0.19 0.33 0.28 
Plant and machine 
operator 
-0.23 0.15 0.21 0.24 0.44 0.28 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 0.64"" 0.14 0.90"" 0.15 0.25 0.21 
Workplace size: 
1 -20 employees -0.53"* 0.13 -0.85"* 0.17 -0.32 0.21 
21-50 employees -0.28* 0.15 -0.25 0.19 0.03 0.24 
51-100 employees 0.00 0.15 -0.31 0.21 -0.31 0.26 
101-500 employees 0.16 0.14 -0.09 0.18 -0.25 0.22 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture, mining, 
construction and utilities 
0.08 0.17 -0.41 0.37 -0.49 0.40 
Manufacturing -0.11 0.17 0.30 0.20 0.41 0.26 
Wholesale and retail trade -0.46" 0.20 0.38' 0.20 0.84"" 0.28 
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Transport, storage and 
communications 
0 .53° 0.20 0.36 0.24 -0.17 0.31 
Finance and business 
services 
0.13 0.20 0.65° 0.20 0.52* 0.28 
Recreational and personal 
services 
-0.40" 0.24 0.41* 0.23 0.81** 0.33 
Political affiliation: 
Labor voter 0.25" 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.18 
Coalition voter -0.07 0.12 0.10 0.14 -0.11 0.15 
Marital status: 
Married, de facto 0.14 0.12 -0.16 0.14 -0.30* 0.18 
Widowed, divorced, 
separated 
0.62" 0.22 -0.13 0.22 -0.75° 0.31 
Constant 0.07 0.48 -0.88" 0.51 -0.95 0.70 
Log-likelihood -643.35 -435.50 
2(InL-lnL^) (x') 450 .6 r~ 234.76""* 
Pseudo R^ 0.26 0.21 
Notes: 
Values of 0.000 or -0.000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ±0.001 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed r-test for coefficients) 
"significant at 5 % (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
•••Estimated equations also include the following independent variables: location of residence, 
state of residence, migrant status, and importance of job security. 
'Base categories for dummy variables: Occupation - Labourer; Sector - Private sector; 
Establishment size - 500 or more employees; Industry - Public administration and defence, 
and community services industries; Political affiliation - no party affiliation or minor party 
affiliation; Marital status - Never married. 
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Looking at the industry coefficients, there is a sizeable difference in the 
male and female estimates of the agriculture, mining and construction industry 
coefficient. The difference is, however, significant only at the 10 percent level 
(probably because there is a very small number of women represented in these 
industries, which limits the precision of the estimate). Similarly, women in the 
wholesale and retail trade, finance and business services and the recreational 
and personal services industries are all more likely to become union members 
than their male counterparts. 
The only other significant differences in the male and female 
coefficients are for the marital status variables. 
In the context of an insurance model of union membership, it might be 
expected that single workers would be less likely to seek the job protection 
services of unions. (The argument is that single workers are likely to be more 
mobile and have less commitment than married workers (Booth, 1986)). The 
male coefficients have the expected positive signs (although the dummy 
variable for married workers is not statistically significant). However, the 
female coefficients are negative indicating, for example, that married women 
are less likely to become union members than women who have never married. 
Finally, although the coefficients are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels,"^ an extra year of labour market experience has a greater 
impact on a female's probability of membership than a male's. This provides 
some support for the proposition that older women have greater attachment to 
"^Note that although the female experience coefficient is not statistically s ignif icant 
at the 10% level, it is at least greater than its standard error . 
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the labour market because they are more likely to have already had their 
children (and are less likely to expect to have more children) (Booth, 1986). 
Full Slope Interactions: Open Shop Sub-Sample 
There is some prima facie evidence to suggest that an important source of the 
male-female membership differential is compulsory unionism: almost 35 
percent of men are employed in closed shops, but only 19 percent of women 
are compulsory members. Furthermore, approximately two-thirds of male 
union members are compulsory members, while only 50 percent of female 
members work in closed shops. Given the substantial difference in the male 
and female rates of compulsory membership, a separate analysis using open 
shop data is warranted. 
The probit estimates of the parameters determining the probabilities of 
membership for men and women employed in open shops are presented in 
Table 6.4. 
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TABLE 6.4 
Probit Estimates of Probability of Trade Union Membership: 
Open Shop Sample^^ 
Males 
(817 cases) 
Females 
(672 cases) 
Difference 
k s.e. s.e. A/? s.e. 
Experience 0.030 0.021 0.034 0.024 0.004 0.032 
(Experience)- - o . o o r 0.000 - o . o o r 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Education (years) 0.001 0.028 -0.003 0.033 -0.004 0.043 
Tenure in current job 0.104"" 0.023 0 . 1 0 5 " 0.039 0.002 0.045 
(Tenure)^ -0.003"" 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 
Hours of work 0.035 0.024 0.099™ 0.025 0.064' 0.035 
(Hours)^ 0.000 0.000 -0.001™ 0.000 -0.001° 0.000 
Current occupation: 
Manager, administrator - 1 . 2 6 " 0.29 -0.20 0.41 1.06° 0.50 
Professional -0.58° 0.23 -0.07 0.28 0.51 0.36 
Para-professional - 0 . 6 5 " 0.23 0.12 0.31 0 .77° 0.39 
Tradesperson -0.60™ 0.19 0.08 0.40 0.69 0.44 
Clerk -0.39 0.26 -0.28 0.23 0.11 0.35 
Salesperson, personal service 
worker 
-0.40 0.29 -0.17 0.28 0.23 0.40 
Plant and machine operator -0.38' 0.23 0.24 0.34 0.63 0.42 
Sector of employment: 
Public sector 0 . 8 0 " 0.18 0.71™ 0.18 -0.09 0.25 
Workplace size: 
1-20 employees -0.19 0.18 - 0 . 7 2 " 0.22 -0.52" 0.28 
21-50 employees 0.10 0.20 -0.18 0.23 -0.27 0.31 
51-100 employees 0.18 0.22 -0.44' 0.26 -0.61" 0.34 
101-500 employees 0.24 0.20 -0.46" 0.23 -0.70° 0.31 
Industry of employment: 
Agriculture, mining, 
construction and utilities 
-0.24 0.23 -0.42 0.40 -0.18 0.46 
Manufactunng -0.35 0.22 -0.32 0.25 0.02 0.33 
Wholesale and retail trade -0.45' 0.26 -0.75° 0.31 -0.30 0.40 
250 
The Male-Female Membership Differemial 
Transport, storage and 0.46' 0.25 -0.02 0.29 -0.48 0.39 
communications 
Finance and business services 0.27 0.24 0.33 0.23 0.06 0.34 
Recreational and personal -0.46 0.32 -0.36 0.33 0.10 0.46 
services 
Political affiliation: 
Labor voter 0.30*- 0.14 0.33** 0.16 0.33 0.25 
Coalition voter -0.09 0.16 0.24 0.18 0.03 0.21 
Marital status: 
Married, de facto 0.17 0.16 -0.25 0.18 -0.41* 0.24 
Separated, divorced, widowed 0.48 0.31 -0.39 0.30 -0 .87- 0.43 
Constant -1.97" 0.80 -2.83' 0.73 -0.86 1.08 
Log-likelihood -325.00 •257.99 
2(lnL-lnU) (x') 277.01*" 205.03""" 
Pseudo R^ 0.30 0.28 
Notes: 
Values of 0.000 or -0.000 reflect absolute values rounded to less than ±0.001 
'significant at 10% (two-tailed r-test for coefficients) 
""significant at 5 % (two-tailed r-test for coefficients) 
""significant at 1 % (two-tailed f-test for coefficients) 
^Estimated equations also include the following independent variables: location of residence, 
state of residence, migrant status, and importance of job security. 
'Base categories for dummy variables: Occupation - Labourer; Sector - Private sector; 
Establishment size - 500 or more employees; Industry - Public administration and defence, 
and community services industries; Political affiliation - no party affiliation or rmnor party 
affiliation; Marital status - Never mamed. 
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TABLE 6.5 
Likelihood Ratio Tests - Variables Interacted with FEMALE 
Full Sample 
-1 
X" 
Open Shop Sample 
X' Degrees of 
freedom 
Experience 1.57 0.09 2 
Tenure 0.54 0.18 2 
Hours of work 1.60 5 .06 ' 2 
Occupation 2 2 . 2 5 ~ 9.50 7 
Workplace size 6.15 7.36 5 
Industry of employment 2 0 . 1 2 " 2.78 6 
Political affiliation 2.47 2.06 2 
Location of residence 0.69 1.06 2 
State of residence 3.56 3.19 6 
Migrant status 1.55 1.71 5 
Marital status 6 . 1 1 " 4 .84 ' 2 
All variables interacted: 76.03™ 40.31 46 
Notes: 
significant at 10% 
significant at 5% 
significant at 1 % 
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For the most part, the open shop estimates presented in Table 6.4 
display a similar pattern to the full sample estimates. This is most clearly 
evident in the occupational coefficients - once again, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between occupation and probability of union 
membership for women. 
There is, however, one important difference in the two sets of 
estimates. For men employed in open shops, there is no significant 
relationship between establishment size and probability of union membership. 
However, a statistically significant relationship is evident for women. For 
example, the 1-20 employees category coefficient is significant at the 1 percent 
level (the estimated coefficient, -0.72, implies a marginal effect of 
approximately 15 percent). 
With closed shop employees excluded, there is an even stronger 
relationship between hours worked and probability of union membership for 
women (the estimated coefficients indicate that a stylised female employee, 
with characteristics that are the sample means, working 40 hours per week has 
an estimated probability of membership of 25 percent, while a stylised female 
employee working 20 hours per week has only a 10 percent probability of 
membership). 
Notwithstanding the differences in some of the individual coefficients, a 
likelihood ratio test of the joint significance of all the interacted variables 
indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the male and female parameter estimates (see Table 6.5) 
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6.5 Decomposition Analysis 
Using a decomposition method proposed by Farber (1990), the average 
predicted male-female membership differential can be decomposed into two 
components: (1) a component due to the different job and personal 
characteristics of men and women; and (2) a component due to differences in 
the male and female coefficients. The method used is the probit analogue of 
the well-known Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition applied to OLS models. 
Before describing Farber's method, note that the average predicted 
probability of union membership, using the characteristics of workers of sex j 
and parameter estimates for workers of sex k, is defined as 
. (6.2) 
P(X^Pk) - - ' 
where nj is the number of workers of sex j , X,j is a vector of characteristics for 
each worker of that sex, and ^^ is a vector of estimated parameters for sex k. 
The average estimated differential in unionisation rates for men and women is 
therefore given by 
(6-3) 
The portion of the overall differential which can be attributed to 
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differences in the distribution of men and women across job and personal 
characteristics can be estimated in two ways: 
P(X„P, ) -P(X,P , ) (Method A) 
(Method B) 
In each case, the average predicted probabilities are calculated using the same 
parameter estimates but allowing the characteristics to vary. In a similar 
fashion, the part of the differential which can be attributed to differences in 
coefficients is given by 
(Method A) 
P ( X , p j - P ( X f P , ) (Method B) 
Here characteristics are held constant and the parameters which determine the 
estimated probability of union membership are allowed to vary. 
The overall differential can be decomposed into two components - one 
attributable to the differences in coefficients, the other due to differences in 
characteristics. The same decomposition can be performed in two ways:' 
'Taking an average of the two decomposition we have: 
[P(X„P J -P(X^Pf)] - 1/2[P(X^P,) -P(X,p,)] + l/2[P(X„p J -P (X„p , ) ] 
1 / 2 [ P ( X , L ) - J ] - l/2[P(X,p J - P(X,P,)] 
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Method A: 
J -P(XfPf)] -P(X,P,)] J -P(X^Pf)] 
(6.6) 
Method B: 
- P(X,P,)] - [P(X J J - P(X,P J ] - [P(X,P J - P(X,P,)] 
Decomposition Estimates 
To start, we use the full sample reduced form parameter estimates to 
decompose the male-female membership differential. 
The overall difference in the average predicted probabilities of 
membership for men and women in the full sample is 13.3 percent (see Table 
6.6). As outlined above, the differential can be decomposed in two parts: the 
first part is due to differences in the characteristics of men and women (AX), 
and the second part is due to differences in the male and female coefficients 
(A|8). The decomposition can be performed in two ways (these are labelled 
Methods A and B in Table 6.6), and an average of the two methods can be 
taken to give a third decomposition. In the first column of Table 6.6 we allow 
all the coefficients to vary for men and women. In the second column the 
decomposition is repeated but now only the significant interacted coefficients 
are allowed to vary for males and females. 
In decomposition A, the portion of the overall differential due to the 
different personal and job characteristics of men and women is estimated using 
the female coefficients. First, the average predicted probability of membership 
for men is calculated using the female coefficients. Then we calculate the 
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average predicted probability of membership for women using the female 
coefficients. The difference between the two predicted probabilities is 0.088, 
indicating that if women were to have the same characteristics as men the 
male-female membership differential would be 8.8 percent points, not 13.3 
percentage points. 
In decomposition B, the male coefficients are used to estimate the 
membership differential due to characteristics. The difference is 0.048 
indicating that if men were to have the same characteristics as women the 
predicted membership differential would only be 4.8 percent. Taking an 
average of the two methods, the estimated differential attributable to the 
different characteristics of men and women is 0.068. That is, if men and 
women were to have the same coefficients the membership differential would 
be, on average, 6.8 percentage points. 
Now consider the differential due to differences in the coefficients. If 
men were to have the same coefficients as women, it is estimated that the 
differential would be 0.046 (method A). Alternatively, if women were to have 
the same coefficients as men the differential would be 0.086 (method B). 
Thus, on average, if men and women were to have the same characteristics the 
membership differential would be 6.6 percentage points. 
In short, allowing all coefficients to vary for men and women, the 
decomposition analysis indicates that approximately half of the overall 
membership differential is due to differences in the distribution of men and 
women across the characteristics which determine the probability of union 
membership. Furthermore, if we allow only those coefficients for which the 
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male and female estimates are significantly different to vary, 60 percent of the 
overall membership differential is due to differences in the distribution of men 
and women across the characteristics. 
In Table 6.6 the decomposition analysis is repeated using the open shop 
parameter estimates. However, it should be noted that the overall male-female 
membership differential is very small - the difference in the average predicted 
probabilities of membership for men and women is only 2.4 percentage points. 
Overall, the decomposition analysis is not particularly revealing. For 
example, if women were to have the same characteristics as men, it is 
estimated that the average predicted probability of membership for females 
would be 4.4 percentage points higher than it actually is. However, it is 
estimated that if men were to have the same characteristics as women they 
would also have a higher probability of membership (up by 0.8 percentage 
points). 
Similarly, if men were to have the same coefficients as women, their 
average probability of membership would increase by 2.0 percentage points, 
while if women had the same coefficients as men, their average probability of 
membership would increase by 3.2 percentage points. 
An average of the two decomposition methods indicates that about two-
thirds of the small male-female membership differential in open shops is due to 
differences in characteristics while one third is due to differences in 
coefficients. 
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TABLE 6.6 
Decomposition of the Male-Female Membership Dift'erential 
Difference in Average Predicted Probability of Membership 
Full Sample Open Shop Sample 
Full Interactions Full Interactions Significant 
Interactions 
Only' 
Significant 
Interactions 
Onlyt 
Overall Differential: 0.133 0.134 0.024 0.025 
Differential Due to Characteristics: 
Method A. Female Base (P(X^f)-P(X^f)) 0.088 0.096 0.044 0.044 
Method B. Male Base 0.048 0.065 -0.008 -0.011 
Average: 0.068 0.081 0.018 0.017 
Differential Due to Coefficients: 
Method A. Male Base ( P ( X j 8 j - P ( X J , ) ) 0.046 0.038 -0.020 -0.020 
Method B. Female Base (P(X^J-P(X^f ) ) 0.086 0.069 0.032 0.035 
Average: 0.066 0.054 0.006 0.008 
Notes: 
'Estimated equation includes female dummy and 
^Estimated equation includes female dummy and 
interacted occupation, industry and marital status variables, 
interacted occupation, workplace size and marital status variables. 
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6.6 Trade Union Availability and the Male-Female Membership 
Differential 
As previously noted, the scope of the CSA survey means that the data are 
biased against producing a sizeable male-female differential. This is reflected 
in the insignificant coefficient on the female dummy in a standard membership 
equation (see Table 6.2). However, the analysis conducted in Chapter 4 
reveals that once the sample is restricted to workers in eligible unionised 
employment only, there is a significant female effect. 
Table 6.7 gives the estimated female coefficients in a standard 
membership equation estimated first for all workers, and then unionised and 
eligible unionised employees (the full estimated equations are reported in Table 
4.3). For the full sample the estimated FEMALE coefficient is positive and 
insignificant. However, with the data restricted to the sub-sample of unionised 
employees, the coefficient is negative and significant at the 10 percent level (-
0.26 implying a marginal effect of 9.2 percentage points). When the data are 
further restricted to employees in unionised locations who are eligible for 
membership of a union that is present, the estimated coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 5 percent level. (The estimate implies that a female with 
characteristics which are the same as the sample means has a marginal 
probability of union membership approximately 13.6 percentage points lower 
than a similar male). 
In view of the proceeding analysis we must, however, be careful not to 
immediately ascribe this result as evidence that women have a lower desire for 
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membership than men. Given the substantial gap in the rates of closed shop 
employment, it is likely that the coefficient is capturing a compulsory 
membership effect. Unfortunately, in the absence of data containing 
information on both unionised employment and compulsory membership, this 
remains a question which cannot be fully resolved. 
TABLE 6.7 
Estimated FEMALE Coefficients: CSA Data 
Sample used: Standard 
Error 
Marginal Effect on 
Probability of Membership 
All employees 0.02 0.12 0.8% 
Unionised Employees -0.26 0.16 -9.2% 
Eligible Unionised Employees -0.40"" 0.18 -13.6% 
significant at 10% (two tailed /-test) 
significant at 5% (two tailed Mest) 
significant at 1 % (two tailed Mest) 
6.7 Male-Female Differences in Attitudes to Trade Unionism 
A definitive test of whether men and women have different "tastes" for union 
membership requires a data source that allows both the availability/supply of 
union services and closed shop employment to be controlled. While the data 
to conduct such a test are not available, the CSA survey is a rich source of 
information on workers' attitudes towards trade unions and trade unionism in 
general. This allows us to directly investigate whether women have different 
attitudes to unions than men. 
Figure 6.1 shows the responses of males and females to four statements 
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about trade unions. Looking at the table, no strong differences in the attitudes 
of men and women are apparent. Indeed, if anything, it might be argued that 
female employees are slightly more inclined to be pro-union than male 
employees. For example, women are more likely to agree that "trade unions 
are necessary to protect the workers", and are less likely to strongly agree that 
"the trade unions in this country have too much power". 
F i g u r e 6 . 1 
Attitudes to Trade Unions: Males and Females 
SfonglyVae Aqtm Dttagm Smngty Disv** 
TTie trade unions in ttiis country have too mucfi powef.' 
A«m Dmotm Stmgty Diagraa 
Trade unions are necessary to protect ttie »yor)(efs." 
Slror^AgrM V * * Svon^DMgrM 
•On many occasions strikes are the only effective 
means for adiievin^ wofkefs' objectives.' 
80% 
60S 
20\ 
0* 
t3J%| 
- 17JH 
yMM* 
m ^ 10% 12% 
SiraiglyAflPW A«ree D s a ^ Sffon^ Doagree 
TTie gains itiat trade unioos have made for their 
memtjers have been at the expense of the 
general community.' 
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6.8 Conclusion 
The question addressed in this chapter is why are proportionately fewer women 
union members than men? Broadly speaking, there are two explanations. The 
first has it that women have specific interests that make them less likely to 
demand the services provided by unions. The second explanation, on the other 
hand, says that sex per se is not important. Rather, women are concentrated 
in those jobs that are characterised by lower unionisation rates for all workers 
whether they be male or female. 
If we were able to estimate a structural demand equation, then the 
decomposition analysis performed in Section 6.5 would enable us to determine 
the contribution of each of the explanations of the male-female membership 
differential. However, although data limitations prevent a definitive test, there 
is little evidence to support the proposition that there is a strong difference in 
the desire for membership between men and women. 
In support of this conclusion we rely on the following points: 
(i) According to the CSA data, men and women who are in regular 
employment and who work a substantial number of hours each week 
(15+ hours for women, 30+ hours for men) have similar rates of 
union membership (50 percent for women versus 54 percent for men). 
(ii) Although women employed in unionised establishments are less likely 
to become union members than men, it would seem that this is because 
men are more likely to be employed in closed shops than women. 
Indeed, data from the IMA survey show that men are substantially more 
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likely to be employed in closed shops than women (31 percent of men 
are employed in closed shops, while only 19 percent of women are 
employed in closed shops), 
(iii) In open shops, where membership is not a compulsory condition of 
employment, there is no significant difference in the estimated 
probabilities of union membership for men and women. 
It is also heartening to note that our conclusion, tentative though it may be, is 
consistent with the findings of several studies conducted in other countries 
(see, for example, Kochan, 1979; Voos, 1983; Fiorito and Greer, 1986; 
Freeman and Leonard, 1987; Leigh and Hills, 1987; Wetzel et. al. 1991; 
Schur and Kruse, 1992). 
This conclusion, if correct, has important policy implications for the 
union movement. Specifically, it suggests that changing union priorities to 
emphasise issues of particular interest to women may not be effective in 
bridging the membership differential, no matter how laudable these changes 
may be on equity or other grounds. If the union movement wants to increase 
female membership it faces the difficult task of providing an effective service 
to workers in those sections of the labour market which are most costly to 
organise. If this challenge can be met, not only are more women likely to 
become members, but more men are too. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis is about what determines an individual's probability of union 
membership. To this end we use data from two surveys to improve and build 
upon the previous econometric studies of Australian union membership. 
The analysis commences with the estimation of a conventional 
dichotomous choice model of union membership. We argue that given the data 
typically available to researchers, this model should be interpreted as a reduced 
form model which encompasses both supply and demand influences. 
The simple reduced form model is particularly useful for summarising 
the major determinants of union membership. However, it is prone to masking 
important relationships that are revealed by more disaggregated models. 
Indeed, a major contribution of this thesis is the development of more 
complex, "multiple-hurdle" models of union membership. 
In Chapter 4 we acknowledge the need to separately consider the 
individual's desire for union membership from the availability of membership. 
Thus, union membership is modelled as a decision which is conditional on the 
individual being employed in a unionised workplace. The underlying logic is 
that, (some very specific cases aside), union membership is a decision made by 
employees in unionised establishments where unions are actively involved in 
supplying a service to workers. 
It would be tempting to treat the union membership equation estimated 
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for individuals in unionised employment as a structural demand equation. 
However, there are two reasons why this cannot be done. First, the supply of 
union services is not uniform across all unionised workplaces. For example, 
some unionised establishments will have a very active union presence, while in 
other establishments the union presence may amount to little more than a 
couple of workplace visits a year by a union official. Moreover, unions in 
different segments of the labour market are more successful in deriving 
benefits for their members. These benefits may be private goods (such as 
protection against unfair managerial actions) or collective goods (such as better 
working conditions for the workers in a particular plant). 
The second difficulty with treating the union membership equation 
estimated conditional on unionised employment as a structural demand equation 
relates to compulsory unionism. Indeed, approximately 50 percent of all union 
members are required, as a condition of their employment, to be union 
members. Clearly, we are unable to identify the desire of compulsory 
members for union membership separately from their desire to be employed in 
a closed shop. 
Therefore, in Chapter 5 we focus on the determinants of voluntary and 
compulsory union membership. Unfortunately, the estimated voluntary union 
membership equation also cannot be interpreted as a structural demand 
equation because we are unable to control for the availability or supply of 
union services. Nevertheless, our estimates indicate that compulsory 
membership arrangements have a substantial impact on Australian union 
membership. 
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The Main Findings 
Throughout the thesis we consider the impact of a diverse range of variables 
on the individual's probability of membership. These range from education 
and marital status to occupation and industry of employment. Because it 
would be tedious to review the impact of each of the variables considered, we 
have selected a handful of key variables in order to briefly highlight some of 
the main empirical findings. 
Workplace Size 
In Chapter 3 we present the first Australian estimates of the relationship 
between workplace size and the individual's probability of union membership. 
Controlling for the other determinants of union membership, the size of the 
establishment in which an individual is employed is a significant determinant of 
union membership. Interestingly, we find that the workplace size effect is 
largely exhausted once the workplace reaches about 50 employees. Moreover, 
we find that the workplace size effect is mostly accounted for by a higher 
incidence of compulsory membership in large workplaces (see Figure 7.1). 
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FIGURE 7.1 
Workplace Size and Estimated Probabilities of Membership for a 
Stylised Worker: IMA Estimates 
m Full Sample Estimate • Open Shop Estimate 
59% 
52% 
47% 
32% 
13% 
24% 22% 
57% 
21% 22% 
1-20 21-50 51-100 101-500 >500 
Workplace Size (Number of Employees) 
Sector of Employment 
Consistent with the earlier studies of union membership, we find that public 
sector employees have a significantly higher probability of union membership 
than private sector employees. Indeed, after controlling for compulsory 
membership arrangements, a public sector worker is almost twice as likely to 
become a union member as a similar private sector employee (see Figure 7.2). 
However, when the availability of union membership is controlled, the 
difference in the estimated probabilities of membership narrows considerably 
and is no longer statistically significant. 
268 
Conclusion 
While our inability to estimate a structural demand equation for union 
membership prevents precise judgements, we nevertheless draw the following 
conclusions: (i) most of the difference in the probabilities of union 
membership for private and public sector employees is accounted for by the 
lower availability of union membership in the private sector; and (ii) in the 
absence of compulsory membership arrangements, public sector employees 
have a greater demand for union membership than private sector employees. 
FIGURE 7.2 
Sector of Employment and Estimated Probabilities of Membership for a 
Stylised Worker: IMA and CSA Estimates 
IMA: 
• PiMcSKkir • Prtviai S«k)r 
3«S 
Ful Sampl« Estimate 
CSA; 
Full Sample Estimate 
34S 
Open Shop Estimate 
Unionised Emp. Est 
U S 
78% 73% 
36S 
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Tenure in Current Job 
One of the most robust determinants of union membership is job tenure. 
Interestingly, both of the leading theories of voluntary union membership (the 
insurance and social custom models) predict a positive relationship between 
tenure and union membership. In the insurance model, as workers accumulate 
more firm-specific human capital the costs of being dismissed or changing jobs 
rise, and workers have a greater incentive to insure against unfair dismissal or 
arbitrary managerial actions by joining a union. Similarly, the social custom 
model predicts that the greater the weight individuals place on their workplace 
reputation, the more likely they are to join a union if membership is a social 
custom at their place of work. To the extent that longer tenure is associated 
with stronger workplace social bonds, an extra year's service is expected to 
increase the probability of membership. 
Political Affiliation 
Political affiliation is found to be a robust determinant of union membership. 
Controlling for compulsory membership (or, alternatively, for trade union 
availability) a Labor voter has a higher estimated probability of union 
membership than an individual with another party affiliation, or no party 
affiliation. This finding is most readily explained in the context of the social 
custom model of union membership. In particular, we expect that a Labor 
voter would be more sympathetic to the aims of trade unionism than other 
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voters and, in the social custom model, an individual who believes in trade 
unionism is more likely to join a union. 
Attitudinal data allow a more direct test of this proposition. In Chapter 
3 we follow Deery and DeCieri (1991) and Christie and Miller (1989) by 
constructing an index of attitudes to unionism. Using a new data source (the 
CSA survey), we confirm the findings of these earlier studies that union 
attitudes are a significant determinant of an individual's probability of union 
membership. 
FIGURE 7.3 
Political AfTiliation and Estimated Probabilities of Manbership for a 
Stylised Worker: IMA and CSA Estimates 
IMA: 
CSA: 
• Labor • Minor Party. No AfflllatkxCl Coalition 
61* 
^ 
42% 
Full SarTY>le Estimate 
68% 
52% 
3S% 
Full Sample Estimale 
23% 
15% 15% 
Open Shop Estimate 
87% 
82% 
87% 
Unionised Emp. Est. 
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Union Membership and Wages 
Several North American studies emphasise the expected wage gain from union 
membership as a fundamental determinant of the individual's probability of 
membership. An early example of this approach is Lee's (1978) model which 
forms the basis of the studies by Miller and Rummery (1989), Miller and 
Christie (1989) and Christie (1992). However, we express serious reservations 
about the way in which the model has been used to explain union membership 
in Australia. 
Our argument is that individuals with similar attributes, and who 
perform similar tasks, will be remunerated equally within a given 
establishment. In particular, we argue that the wage received by a worker in a 
unionised establishment is independent of his or her union status. In other 
words, individuals in unionised settings cannot expect a wage gain simply by 
joining the relevant trade union. Therefore, we maintain that it is 
inappropriate to include the expected wage term as a determinant of union 
membership. 
Nevertheless, we do believe that it is appropriate to model unionised 
employment and wages in a simultaneous equations framework. Indeed, we 
propose a model of unionised employment which assumes that workers are 
confronted with the choice of employment in the unionised or non-unionised 
sectors. The employee's choice is assumed to be based on observed 
differences in the structures of remuneration in the two sectors, or on 
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differences in working conditions in the two sectors, or both. In Chapter 4 we 
find that there is a significant wage premium associated with unionised 
employment. Conversely, we find that there is no significant relationship 
between union membership and wages for workers in unionised establishments. 
Sex 
Chapter 6 is devoted to estimating the source of the male-female membership 
differential. In short, we find that there is limited evidence to support the 
proposition that women have a lower desire for membership than men. 
Instead, the male-female differential is largely the product of two factors: (i) a 
lower trade union presence in jobs with high levels of female employment; and 
(ii) a lower incidence of compulsory membership arrangements in female jobs. 
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FIGURE 7.4 
Sex and Estimated Probabilities of Membership for a 
Stylised Worker: IMA and CSA Estimates 
IMA: 
47* 
• MaleDFain^ 
42S 
17% 17* 
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CSA: 
53* 53% 
15* 
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Practical Relevance and Suggestions for Future Research 
Faced with declining rates of union membership, there is considerable interest 
among trade union officials about the impact of different membership 
recruitment practices - and about the reasons for the decline in union 
membership. There are numerous issues that would be of great interest to 
trade union leaders but that have not been addressed here, principally because 
of data constraints. For instance, union officials would be interested to know: 
• What is the price elasticity of demand for membership? 
• What is the impact of different payment methods of union dues on the 
demand for union membership? 
• What is the impact of workplace visits by union officials on the 
probability of union membership? 
• How important are workplace union delegates and shop stewards in 
recruiting members? 
• What effect do trade union fringe benefits such as retail discounts, 
cheap holidays and the like have on union membership? 
While we are unable to answer these questions, and a host of other similar 
questions, the findings of the thesis do have some practical application. 
First, we find little evidence to support the proposition that there is a 
significant difference in the desire for union membership by men and women. 
(Although we acknowledge that the inability to estimate a structural demand 
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equation for membership, means that we have to treat this conclusion with a 
degree of caution). Nevertheless, if our conclusion is correct, then female 
workers do not represent a pool of recruits who might be recruited cheaply if 
only unions would rearrange their priorities to better address those issues that 
are thought to be of special interest to women. Rather, it suggests that if 
unions wish to recruit more women they must develop more efficient operating 
practices in order to free the resources necessary to organise the sectors of the 
labour force in which female employment is concentrated. 
The findings of Chapter 5 highlight just how reliant trade unions are on 
compulsory membership arrangements, particularly in the private sector. 
Indeed, voluntary membership estimates suggest that as few as 36 percent of 
closed shop employees would still join a union if membership were not a 
condition of their employment. (Alternatively, 54 percent of compulsory union 
members say they would join if membership were not compulsory). 
Our findings also highlight the difficulties facing the union movement in 
arresting the decline in union membership. In particular, our estimates of the 
impact of job tenure and workplace size on union membership indicate that the 
trend towards a more flexible, mobile workforce employed in smaller 
establishments, is likely to lead to even lower rates of union membership in the 
future. 
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